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February 28, 2013

VIA eFILING

Rosemary Chiavetta, Secretary
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
Commonwealth Keystone Building
400 North Street
Harrisburg, PA 17105-3265

**Re: Joint Petition Of Metropolitan Edison Company, Pennsylvania Electric Company,
 Pennsylvania Power Company and West Penn Power Company For Approval Of Their
 Default Service Programs
 Docket No. P-2011-2273650, Docket No. P-2011-2273668,
 Docket No. P-2011-2273669 and Docket No. P-2011-2273670**

Dear Secretary Chiavetta:

Enclosed for filing is the **Petition to Amend the Commission's August 12, 2012 Order and the November 8, 2012 Secretarial Letter Approving Default Service Procurement Bidding Rules on behalf of Metropolitan Edison Company, Pennsylvania Electric Company, Pennsylvania Power Company and West Penn Power Company** (the "Petition") in the above-captioned proceeding.

As indicated on the enclosed Certificate of Service, copies of this letter and the Petition are being served on all active parties and the presiding Administrative Law Judge.

Sincerely,



Thomas P. Gadsden

TPG/tp
Enclosures

c: Per Certificate of Service

**BEFORE THE
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------|
| JOINT PETITION OF METROPOLITAN | : | |
| EDISON COMPANY, PENNSYLVANIA | : | |
| ELECTRIC COMPANY, PENNSYLVANIA | : | DOCKET NOS. P-2011-2273650 |
| POWER COMPANY AND WEST PENN | : | P-2011-2273668 |
| POWER COMPANY FOR APPROVAL OF | : | P-2011-2273669 |
| THEIR DEFAULT SERVICE PROGRAMS | : | P-2011-2273670 |

**PETITION TO AMEND THE COMMISSION’S AUGUST 12, 2012 ORDER AND
THE NOVEMBER 8, 2012 SECRETARIAL LETTER APPROVING
DEFAULT SERVICE PROCUREMENT BIDDING RULES**

Pursuant to Section 703(g) of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 703(g), and Section 5.41 of the Commission’s Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure, 52 Pa. Code § 5.41, Metropolitan Edison Company (“Met-Ed”), Pennsylvania Electric Company (“Penelec”), Pennsylvania Power Company (“Penn Power”) and West Penn Power Company (“West Penn”) (each individually a “Company” and, collectively, the “Companies”) hereby petition the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (the “Commission”) to amend its Order of August 16, 2012 (the “*August 2012 Order*”)¹ and November 8, 2012 Secretarial Letter (the “*November 2012 Letter*”)² in the above-referenced proceedings to clarify the price that will be paid to suppliers of default service for industrial customers during the June 1, 2013 – May 31, 2015 period. Specifically, the Companies request that the Commission amend the *August 2012 Order* (pp. 34-37) and the *November 2012 Letter*: (i) to clarify that suppliers of default service

¹ Opinion and Order, *Joint Petition Of Metropolitan Edison Company, Pennsylvania Electric Company, Pennsylvania Power Company And West Penn Power Company For Approval Of Their Default Service Programs*, Docket Nos. P-2011-2273650, P-2011-2273668, P-2011-2273669, and P-2011-2273670.

² Letter of Secretary Rosemary A. Chiavetta to Richard D’Angelo dated November 8, 2012. The *November 2012 Letter* approved modifications to the Companies’ default service programs (“DSPs”) directed by the Commission in the *August 2012 Order*.

for the Companies' industrial customers will be paid the winning prices bid in the Companies' hourly-priced default service supply auction, in addition to a variable "spot price" established by PJM Interconnection, Inc. ("PJM") and a fixed adder to cover the cost of ancillary services and other supply components, as provided in the Companies' industrial class default service supplier master agreement ("SMA") approved by the Commission; and (ii) to adopt revised bidding rules which reflect the same clarification to the price that will be paid to industrial default service suppliers. This clarification and the revised bidding rules will ensure that a default service procurement can be conducted for industrial customers consistent with the provisions of the SMA and the intent of the Commission and the Companies, as reflected in the *August 2012 Order*.³

I. BACKGROUND

1. On November 17, 2011, the Companies filed a Joint Petition ("Joint Petition") requesting that the Commission approve their proposed default service programs ("DSPs") and find that such DSPs satisfy the criteria set forth in 66 Pa.C.S. § 2807(e)(3.7). The proposed DSPs were designed to provide the Companies' default service customers access to an adequate, reliable generation supply at the least cost over time and to enable the Companies to recover their costs of furnishing that service pursuant to "a commission-approved competitive procurement plan." See 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 2807(e)(3.6) - (3.9).

2. As described in the Joint Petition, the Companies' DSPs contained all of the elements required by the Commission's default service regulations (52 Pa. Code §§ 54.181 –

³ The Companies informed counsel to all parties in this proceeding of their intention to petition the Commission to clarify the *August 2012 Order* and provided a copy of the revised bidding rules, which are attached as Exhibit A to this petition. No party has objected to the Companies' proposed clarification or the revised bidding rules. However, the Retail Energy Supply Association ("RESA") has objected to the Companies' re-solicitation of default service industrial supply contracts at the same time as its next scheduled default service procurement for residential and commercial customers (September 2013), as discussed *infra*.

54.189), including default service procurement plans, default service implementation plans, contingency plans, form supplier agreements, rate design plans, and associated tariff pages. *See August 2012 Order*, pp. 4-5.

3. In the Joint Petition, the Companies proposed to procure full-service, load-following energy-related products for all default service customers through a competitive procurement process. For procurement purposes, non-shopping load would be segregated into residential, commercial, and industrial customer classes, with each class having its own product specification. *Id.*, pp. 14-15.

4. For the industrial customer class, the Companies proposed to acquire 24-month “full requirements” contracts through a descending clock auction, with the amount paid to suppliers including the real-time hourly locational marginal price (“LMP”) established by PJM for the PJM zone of the applicable Company during the term of the contracts and a \$5 per megawatt-hour adder for other supply components. *Id.* & pp. 34-35.

5. In light of the real-time pricing of the default service product for industrial customers, the Companies proposed to conduct one auction for the industrial class in January 2013 for the June 1, 2013 – May 31, 2015 DSP period. The auction would be held at the same time as auctions for the residential and commercial customer classes and also administered by an independent evaluator, CRA International, Inc. (“Independent Evaluator”). *Id.*, pp. 6 & 15.

6. The Joint Petition included a form SMA with provisions for calculation of the amount to be paid to industrial default service suppliers, which includes the real-time LMP, the \$5 per megawatt-hour adder, and the amount bid in the auction by winning bidders. *See Met-Ed/Penelec/Penn Power/West Penn St. No. 3, Exhibit No. 3 (Industrial (Hourly-Pricing) SMA)*,

Article 9 & Appendix D. The bidding rules for the descending clock auction to be conducted by the Companies included text summarizing payments that would be made to winning suppliers under the SMA, but did not reference the winning auction bid. *See Met-Ed/Penelec/Penn Power/West Penn St. No. 5, Exhibit No. 1, Section 3.2.*

7. In the *August 2012 Order*, the Commission directed the Companies to file a revised default service plan with certain modifications. The Commission made no modifications to the Companies' procurement plans or bidding rules for the industrial class, rejecting a request by the West Penn Power Industrial Intervenors that the Commission require West Penn to procure default service supply directly from PJM for its industrial customers instead of conducting a competitive procurement. In making this determination, the Commission concluded that "there was insufficient record evidence to support a finding that the entire cost of [hourly-priced] default service for West Penn's industrial customers will be higher under the competitive procurement process employed by the other three FirstEnergy Companies." *Id.*, p. 37. The Commission noted that it had approved the type of hourly-priced service proposed by West Penn "for the default service industrial customers of [Met-Ed, Penelec, and Penn Power] and no party to this proceeding opposed its continued use for those companies." *Id.*

8. While the Commission made clear that all of the Companies would use the same competitive procurement process for industrial default service supply, the *August 2012 Order* does not state that default service suppliers will receive the winning prices bid in the auction in addition to the real-time LMP and the \$5 per megawatt-hour adder. *See August 2012 Order*, pp. 34-37.

9. As directed by the *August 2012 Order*, the Companies filed a Revised Default Service Plan on September 6, 2012, which included bidding rules reflecting the modifications

required by the Commission. A Secretarial Letter (the *November 2012 Letter*) approving the Revised Default Service Plan was issued on November 8, 2012 in the same docket as the Companies' default service proceedings.

10. Subsequently, on January 15, 2013, the Companies conducted procurements for industrial, residential, and commercial default service supply. On January 16, 2013, the Commission issued a Secretarial Letter in which it approved the results of the Companies' residential and commercial class procurements but rejected the results of the Companies' procurement for the industrial class because those results "do not appear to have been conducted in accordance with the RFP Process and Rules, filed pursuant to the Commission's Opinions and Orders." See Letter of Secretary Rosemary A. Chiavetta to Tori L. Giesler, dated January 16, 2013.

11. Following the procurement, the Commission informed the Companies that the industrial class procurement results were rejected in light of provisions of the *August 2012 Order* and the bidding rules which did not adequately state that suppliers to the industrial class would be paid the winning auction price applicable to each Company established in the descending clock auction, in addition to the real-time hourly LMP applicable to each Company and the \$5 per megawatt-hour adder.

**II. THE COMMISSION SHOULD AMEND THE AUGUST 16, 2012
ORDER AND THE NOVEMBER 8, 2012 SECRETARIAL LETTER
TO ADOPT REVISED BIDDING RULES**

12. In light of the Commission's ruling on the Companies' January 2013 procurement results for the industrial class, the Companies respectfully request that the Commission amend the *August 2012 Order* to clarify that industrial default service suppliers will be paid the winning prices bid in the Companies' hourly-priced default service supply auction, in addition to a

variable LMP and the fixed \$5 per megawatt-hour adder. The Companies and the Independent Evaluator have also prepared revised bidding rules for consideration by the Commission which explain the pricing that will be paid to winning suppliers for industrial class default service supply under the SMA. A copy of the bidding rules showing revisions in “track changes” to the rules approved by the Commission in the *November 2012 Letter* is attached as Exhibit B.

13. Under the Companies’ Revised DSPs approved by the Commission, only one procurement (in January 2013) for industrial default service supply was scheduled. The Companies and the Independent Evaluator believe that a second procurement for default service supply for industrial customers should be conducted in September 2013, at the same time as the next scheduled solicitation for default service supply for residential and commercial customers. The term length of the industrial default service contracts to be procured will be eighteen months so that the contracts will terminate on May 31, 2015, consistent with the DSPs approved by the Commission.

14. Implementation of this second procurement of industrial default service supply with the revised bidding rules will ensure that a default service procurement can be conducted for industrial customers consistent with the provisions of the SMA and the intent of the Commission and the Companies, as reflected in the *August 2012 Order*.

15. During the period from June 1, 2013 to November 30, 2013, in accordance with their default service contingency plans, the Companies will procure the necessary physical supply for default service industrial customers directly from PJM, as well as associated ancillary products (e.g., alternative energy credits necessary to satisfy requirements of Pennsylvania’s Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard).

16. A copy of the procurement schedules for all Companies reflecting the contingency procurement for the industrial customer classes is attached as Exhibit C.

17. As noted *supra*, the Companies informed counsel to all parties in this proceeding of their intention to petition the Commission to clarify the August 2012 Order and provided a copy of the revised bidding rules. No party has objected to the Companies' proposed clarification or the revised bidding rules. However, RESA has objected to the Companies' re-solicitation of default service industrial supply contracts at the same time as its next scheduled default service procurement for residential and commercial customers (September 2013) and the Companies' procurement of supply from PJM during the June 1 - November 30, 2013 period.

18. While the Companies' default service contingency plans do not explicitly address the possibility of the rejection of bids by the Commission (*see* Exhibit A, Section 10), the Companies and the Independent Evaluator believe that a procurement solely for industrial default service supply prior to September 2013 is likely to fail in light of the relatively small number of industrial customers remaining on default service and the expected lack of bidder interest in such a procurement.⁴ A failed procurement will only lead to unnecessary costs for industrial default service customers.

19. In order for the Companies to plan to obtain default service supply for default service customers for delivery beginning June 1, 2013, the Companies respectfully request the Commission consider this Petition on or before the public meeting scheduled for April 18, 2013.

⁴ As of January 1, 2013, electric generation suppliers are serving the following percentage of industrial customer load in the service territories of the Companies: Met-Ed (96.2%), Penelec (97.6%), Penn Power (96.6%), and West Penn Power (88.4%). This load is associated with the following percentage of industrial customers of each Company: Met-Ed (84.4%), Penelec (81.5%), Penn Power (97.7%), and West Penn Power (89.9%). *See Pennsylvania Shopping Statistics January 1, 2013*, available at <http://www.oca.state.pa.us>.

III. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Commission should grant this Petition and amend the *August 2012 Order* and *November 2012 Letter* to adopt revisions to the bidding rules as described herein and set forth in Exhibit A.

Respectfully Submitted



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Dated: February 28, 2013

**BEFORE THE
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**

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| EDISON COMPANY, PENNSYLVANIA | : | DOCKET NOS. P-2011-2273650 |
| ELECTRIC COMPANY, PENNSYLVANIA | : | P-2011-2273668 |
| POWER COMPANY AND WEST PENN | : | P-2011-2273669 |
| POWER COMPANY FOR APPROVAL OF | : | P-2011-2273670 |
| THEIR DEFAULT SERVICE PROGRAMS | : | |

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that I have this day served copies of the **Petition to Amend the Commission's August 12, 2012 Order And The November 8, 2012 Secretarial Letter Approving Default Service Procurement Bidding Rules on behalf of Metropolitan Edison Company, Pennsylvania Electric Company, Pennsylvania Power Company and West Penn Power Company** upon the following persons, in the matter specified below, in accordance with the requirements of 52 Pa. Code § 1.54:

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Dated: February 28, 2013

EXHIBIT A

Bidding Rules

To Procure Default Service Products for

Metropolitan Edison Company (“Met-Ed”)

Pennsylvania Electric Company (“Penelec”)

Pennsylvania Power Company (“Penn Power”)

**West Penn Power Company (“West Penn
Power”)**

Exhibit BAM-1

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1. INTRODUCTION

These Bidding Rules apply to the auctions to procure Default Service products for Metropolitan Edison Company ("Met-Ed"), Pennsylvania Electric Company ("Penelec"), Pennsylvania Power Company ("Penn Power") and West Penn Power Company ("West Penn Power") (each of which may be referred to as a "Company", and/or in combinations as "Companies") for all of their retail customers that take retail generation service from the Companies.

Default Service products for residential and commercial customers will be procured in a separate auction ("Residential/Commercial Auction") from the auction for industrial customers ("Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction"). There is a Supplier Master Agreement ("SMA") for the Residential/Commercial Auction and a separate SMA for the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction. Unless otherwise noted, these Bidding Rules apply to both auctions.

Bidders need to be familiar with the applicable SMA, the Bidding Rules, and all other documents for the auctions, including the Part 1 Application and the Part 2 Application which apply to both auctions. Bidders should visit the Information Website regularly for up-to-date information, including information specific to each auction. The Information Website contains relevant data, the schedule and key dates for participating in the auction process, frequently asked questions, and other information.

The following documents are appended to, and shall be considered integral parts of, these Bidding Rules:

- Appendix 1 Part 1 Application for Residential/Commercial and Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auctions to Procure Default Service Products
- Appendix 2 Part 2 Application for Residential/Commercial and Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auctions to Procure Default Service Products
- Appendix 3 Sample Pre-Bid Letter of Credit
- Appendix 4 Sample Letter of Intent to Provide a Guaranty
- Appendix 5 Sample Bank Letters of Reference for Pre-Bid Security

Unless noted otherwise, "days" refer to business days and times refer to prevailing Eastern Time. Capitalized terms in this document, which are not defined explicitly herein, are defined in each of the Default Service SMAs. In accordance with the SMAs, "Default Service" and "DS" are equivalent (e.g., "Default Service Load" in these Bidding Rules corresponds to "DS Load" in the SMAs).

Examples in these Bidding Rules are illustrative only.

These Bidding Rules may be modified from time to time by the Independent Evaluator in order to: (i) facilitate a more competitive auction process, (ii) make any necessary corrections and/or clarifications, (iii) account for any change in auction products, (iv) conform to any change in state or federal law or rule, and (v) apply any change deemed necessary at the discretion of the Independent Evaluator. All modifications will be posted to the Information Website and carried out in consultation with the Companies.

1.1 Independent Evaluator

The Independent Evaluator is CRA International, Inc. The Independent Evaluator can be contacted by sending an email to fepaauction@crai.com. The full contact information for the Independent Evaluator is as follows:

CRA International, Inc.
John Hancock Tower
200 Clarendon Street, T-33
Boston, MA 02116-5092
Phone: 617.425.3384
Fax: 617.425.6574
fepaauction@crai.com
Attn: Brad Miller, Vice President / Independent Evaluator

2. THE PRODUCTS BEING PROCURED

This section summarizes the common elements of the products to be procured in the auctions. The Information Website provides details about the products to be procured in a specific auction, including the delivery periods, the number of tranches, the nominal MW size of the tranches, and any seasonal price factors.

2.1 Default Service Load

Default Service Load is each Company's aggregate requirement to serve its Default Service customers. For purposes of these Bidding Rules, a "Default Service Customer" is a retail customer of a Company taking Default Service.

2.2 Full Requirements Service

The auctions are designed to procure full requirements generation service for Default Service Customers of the Companies. Winning bidders will assume all responsibilities of a Load Serving Entity ("LSE"). Suppliers will provide Default Supply under the SMAs, which includes all energy, capacity, ancillary services, transmission (including Network Integration Transmission Service ("NITS") but excluding Regional Transmission Expansion Plan charges ("RTEPs") and PJM Expansion Cost Recovery charges), and Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act ("AEPS Act" or "AEPS") credits needed to meet the requirements of the Companies' Default Service Load as more specifically described in the SMAs.

Note that the obligations of Default Service Suppliers to provide AECs under the SMAs vary between the Companies. Each supplier to Met-Ed, Penelec and Penn Power must provide non-solar Tier I and Tier II AECs to meet AEPS requirements for the load it serves, but those Companies will satisfy all Tier I solar AEPS requirements associated with their Default Service load using solar AECs obtained through separate procurements. Each supplier to West Penn Power will be required to provide all Tier I (including solar) and Tier II AECs associated with AEPS requirements for the default service load served by the supplier, less a specified number of Tier I solar AECs and Tier I non-solar AECs obtained by West Penn Power under separate long-term contracts. Prior to each auction, West Penn Power will calculate the amount of West Penn Power AECs that will be applied to each supplier's AEPS obligations. AECs will not be transferred to suppliers by any Company but used only to reduce the number of AECs that suppliers must transfer to a Company. More details are found in the SMA.

2.3 Tranches

Default Service Load will be divided into identical units called tranches, each representing a defined percentage of Default Service Load. For example, if there are 25 tranches for a given customer class, then each tranche equals one divided by twenty-five, or four percent of that class's load. This includes four percent (4%) of the actual hourly energy required for Default Service Load for the applicable delivery period as well as four percent (4%) of the PJM capacity requirement for the applicable delivery period.

The number of tranches intended to be procured in the auction for a product is referred to as the "tranche target" for that product. The Independent Evaluator may reduce the tranche targets prior to the auction if indications of interest in the auction are such that doing so is required to promote more competitive bidding.

3. PRICES PAID TO DEFAULT SERVICE SUPPLIERS

This section summarizes the components of the prices to be paid to Default Service Suppliers. The respective Supplier Master Agreements take precedent over the summary provided here.

3.1 Prices Paid to Winning Suppliers in the Residential/Commercial Auction

The Default Service Suppliers from the Residential/Commercial Auction will be paid a price with a fixed component and a variable component. The fixed price will be applied for 90 percent (90%) of the delivered supply each hour in dollars per megawatt-hour (\$/MWh), and will be established through the Companies' competitive procurement process and included in the SMA's Appendix E. For the remaining 10 percent (10%), the supplier will receive a "spot" payment equal to the sum of the real time hourly total locational marginal price ("LMP") established by PJM Interconnection L.L.C. ("PJM"), the Companies' regional transmission organization, for the PJM delivery point of the applicable Company (i.e., the PJM designated METED, PENELEC, PENN POWER or APS Zone), plus an additional \$20/MWh. This additional amount is designed to cover costs for other supply components associated with the LMP-priced portion of the Default Service supply, including capacity, ancillary services, and AEPS Act compliance. This adder will be included in Appendix E of the SMA for the Residential/Commercial Auction.

The fixed price paid to Default Service Suppliers from the Residential/Commercial Auction will be adjusted for each MWh of load by a seasonal billing factor, representing anticipated seasonal differences in energy prices. The seasonal billing factors are included in Appendix E of the SMA for these Suppliers. One seasonal billing factor applies in the summer months (June-August) and the other seasonal billing factor applies in the non-summer months (September-May) for each delivery period.

3.2 Prices Paid to Winning Suppliers in the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction

In accordance with Appendix D of the "Default Service Supplier Master Agreement for Industrial Customer Class (Hourly Pricing Service)," the Default Service Suppliers from the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction will be paid a price with a fixed price component and a variable price component.

- The fixed price component will be equal to 100 percent (100%) of the delivered supply each hour multiplied by the price established through the Companies' competitive procurement process. The seasonal billing factor described above for the Default Service Suppliers from the Residential/Commercial Auction does not apply to the Default Service Suppliers from the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction.
- The variable price component will be equal to 100 percent (100%) of the delivered supply each hour multiplied by a "spot price." The "spot price" will be equal to the sum of: (a) the real time hourly total LMP established by PJM for the PJM delivery point of the applicable Company, plus (b) an adder of \$5/MWh. This adder is designed to cover costs of other supply components associated with the LMP-priced portion of the Default Service supply, including ancillary services and AEPS compliance.

4. PRIOR TO THE START OF BIDDING

4.1 Information Provided to Bidders

The Companies will make available certain information to suppliers in advance of qualification. This information will be posted on the Information Website.

4.1.1 Data

Load and other data that are posted to the Information Website are described in a data description document on the Information Website.

4.1.2 Minimum and Maximum Starting Prices

The Independent Evaluator will announce a minimum starting price and a maximum starting price for each product in the auction. The minimum and maximum starting prices establish the range for the possible round 1 prices for the auction.

4.1.3 Tranche Size, Tranche Targets

No later than eight (8) days prior to the Part 1 Application Due Date, the Independent Evaluator will announce for each product in the auction:

- The tranche targets or the number of tranches being procured for each product.
- The size (%) and MW-measure of the tranches in the auction.

No later than four (4) days prior to the Part 2 Application Due Date, the Independent Evaluator will announce:

- Any update to the MW-measure of the tranches in the auction.

4.2 Qualification Process

There are two parts to the bidder application and qualification process. In Part 1, prospective bidders apply to become Qualified Bidders. In Part 2, each Qualified Bidder provides certifications and its indicative offer and pre-bid security in order to become a Registered Bidder.

If two auctions with similar products are held within a fairly short time period (for example, within one month of each other), a prospective bidder who submitted a completed Part 1 Application for the first auction need not complete and submit another Part 1 Application for the subsequent auction. The Qualified Bidder still needs to complete a separate Part 2 Application for each auction. In any case, a prospective bidder is obligated to inform the Independent Evaluator of any change in its status related to the information the prospective bidder previously provided in its Part 1 Application or its Part 2 Application.

4.2.1 Part 1 Application: Certifications and Other Qualified Bidder Requirements

In the Part 1 Application process, prospective bidders will be required to:

- Submit an application from a person with the power to bind the bidder.
- Agree to comply with all rules of the auction.
- Agree that if they become winning bidders, they will execute the applicable SMA with the Companies within 3 business days following the date of the Commission's approval of the auction results.
- Show either that they are a PJM Market Participant and Load Serving Entity in PJM, or that there exist no impediments to them becoming a PJM Market Participant and Load Serving Entity in PJM by the start of the applicable delivery period.
- Agree that if they become winning bidders, they will comply with the creditworthiness requirements set forth in the SMA.
- Certify that if they qualify to participate, they will not disclose information regarding the list of Qualified Bidders or confidential information that may be obtained during the bidding process about Qualified Bidders.
- Certify that if they qualify to participate, they will not substitute another entity in their place, transfer their rights to another entity, or otherwise assign their status as Qualified Bidders to another entity.

Part 1 Applications must be submitted to the Independent Evaluator no later than 12:00 p.m. noon prevailing Eastern Time on the Part 1 Application Due Date. Prospective bidders will be notified by the Independent Evaluator no later than three (3) days after the Part 1 Application Due Date whether they succeeded in becoming Qualified Bidders.

A prospective bidder that has qualified during the Part 1 Application process becomes a Qualified Bidder. The Independent Evaluator will send a list of all Qualified Bidders to relevant parties that have undertaken to maintain the confidentiality of the list of Qualified Bidders. The relevant parties that will receive this list of Qualified Bidders are as follows:

- Each Qualified Bidder.
- Other parties as necessary to oversee the proper conduct of the auction, including representatives from the Companies and Commission Staff.

All parties receiving a list of Qualified Bidders will be subject to the confidentiality requirements as specified below and in the section, "Communications Protocols," in these Bidding Rules.

4.2.2 Part 2 Application: Certifications, Indicative Offer, and Pre-Bid Security

For each auction, a Qualified Bidder must successfully complete the Part 2 Application process in order to become a Registered Bidder that can bid in the auction. Only Qualified Bidders may submit a Part 2 Application.

Part 2 Applications must be submitted to the Independent Evaluator no later than 12:00 p.m. noon prevailing Eastern Time on the Part 2 Application Due Date. Qualified Bidders will be notified by the Independent Evaluator whether they succeeded in the Part 2 Application process no later than three (3) days after the Part 2 Application Due Date.

Certifications

In the Part 2 Application, each Qualified Bidder will make a number of certifications regarding associations to ensure that they are participating independently of other Qualified Bidders and to ensure the confidentiality of information regarding the auction.

A Qualified Bidder is associated with another Qualified Bidder if the two bidders have ties that could allow them to act in concert or that could prevent them from competing actively against each other. The competitiveness of the auction and the ability of the auction to produce competitive prices may be harmed by the coordinated or collusive behavior that associations facilitate. As the Independent Evaluator relies on a number of factors to assess and promote competitive bidding, including the number of independent competitors, using inaccurate information or insufficient disclosure of associations in the Part 2 Application is prohibited.

Indicative Offer

With its Part 2 Application, a Qualified Bidder will be required to submit an indicative offer and to post pre-bid security sufficient for this indicative offer. A Qualified Bidder's indicative offer specifies two (2) numbers of tranches for each product in the auction. For each product, the first number represents the number of tranches that the Qualified Bidder is willing to serve at the minimum starting price for the product and the second number represents the number of tranches that the Qualified Bidder is willing to serve at the maximum starting price for the product. For each product, the number of tranches specified

in the indicative offer at the minimum starting price cannot exceed the number of tranches specified at the maximum starting price.

Indicative offers are important in two respects. First, the Independent Evaluator may use the indicative offers to inform the setting of the starting price for each product (i.e., round 1 announced price). Second, the total number of tranches indicated by the Qualified Bidder at the maximum starting prices is used to determine the Qualified Bidder's initial eligibility (i.e., the maximum total number of tranches the Qualified Bidder can bid across all products in round 1 of the auction): the Qualified Bidder's initial eligibility is set to the sum of the number of tranches at the maximum starting prices across all products in the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer. During the auction, bidders are free to switch their tranches among products in response to changes in announced prices (subject to any bidding restrictions). However, a bidder will never be able to bid a total number of tranches across products that exceeds the bidder's initial eligibility. Thus, the number of tranches for each product at the maximum starting prices in the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer does not limit the number of tranches the Qualified Bidder can bid on a particular product, but the total number of tranches at the maximum starting prices across all products in the indicative offer must be equal to the Qualified Bidder's desired initial eligibility across all products.

Restrictions on the Indicative Offer

Each Qualified Bidder will be subject to a load cap that limits the number of tranches the bidder can bid on and win. Thus, the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer at the maximum starting prices across all products is not allowed the load cap. The load cap will be 50 percent on an aggregated load basis across all auction products for each auction such that no bidder may bid on and win more tranches than the load cap. The load cap will be implemented by ensuring that each bidder's initial eligibility does not exceed the load cap in an auction.

Pre-Bid Security

Each Qualified Bidder must post pre-bid security sufficient for its indicative offer at the maximum starting prices. Each Qualified Bidder must post pre-bid security in an amount equal to \$250,000 per tranche for all products included in the bidder's indicative offer at the maximum starting prices. Either cash or a letter of credit will be accepted as pre-bid security. Some bidders may be subject to additional credit requirements or may be required to submit a letter of intent to provide a guaranty from a Guarantor or a letter of reference from a bank. Interest will not be paid on cash posted as pre-bid security. The standard form of the letter of credit and other security documents that are in a form acceptable to the Companies will be posted to the Information Website.

If a draft letter of credit, alternate guaranty, letter of intent to provide a guaranty, letter of reference, or any alternate security submitted by the prospective bidder with the Part 1 Application does not conform to the standard form, the prospective bidder shall indicate clearly any and all modifications in electronic, redlined format from the standard form. The Companies will assess, in their sole and exclusive discretion, whether such modifications are acceptable. Modifications that are accepted by the Companies will be posted on the Website. In its Part 2 Application, a Qualified Bidder must provide the required executed credit documents that either use the standard form or incorporate only those modifications to the standard form accepted by the Companies upon review of the bidder's Part 1 Application.

The following is an example calculation of the pre-bid security.

The following is an example calculation of the pre-bid security.

Example 1. Pre-Bid Security

A Qualified Bidder rated investment grade submits an indicative offer of 5 tranches for the Met-Ed 24-month residential product at the minimum starting price and 10 tranches for the Met-Ed 24-month residential product at the maximum starting price, 3 tranches for the Penelec 12-month residential product at the minimum starting price and 6 tranches for the Penelec 12-month residential product at the maximum starting price, and 2 tranches for the Penn Power 6-month commercial product at the minimum starting price and 4 tranches for the Penn Power 6-month commercial product at the maximum starting price. The Qualified Bidder must submit with this indicative offer of 20 tranches at the maximum starting prices cash or a letter of credit of \$250,000 per tranche. The Qualified Bidder thus posts cash or a letter of credit of \$5 million (20 tranches X \$250,000 per tranche).

Depending on whether the Qualified Bidder is relying on its own financial standing or on that of a Guarantor, and depending on the results of the creditworthiness assessment at the time of the Part 1 Application, the Qualified Bidder may be required additionally to submit a letter of intent to provide a guaranty from its Guarantor or to provide a letter of reference from its bank. Any such additional requirements would be communicated to the Qualified Bidder at the time of qualification during the Part 1 Application process.

For a Part 2 Application to be accepted, it must be complete, including the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer, letter of credit or cash, and additional security (if required). After its Part 2 Application is accepted, a Qualified Bidder becomes a Registered Bidder. The Independent Evaluator will send each Registered Bidder a summary of its indicative offer, pre-bid security amount, and the Registered Bidder's initial eligibility.

The Independent Evaluator also will send simultaneously to each Registered Bidder, and to those other parties as necessary to oversee the proper conduct of the auction, a list of Registered Bidders, and the total initial eligibility aggregated across all Registered Bidders. The list of Registered Bidders and the total initial eligibility will not be released publicly. Qualified Bidders, in their Part 2 Applications, will have undertaken to maintain the confidentiality of the list of Registered Bidders and the total initial eligibility, and to destroy documents including electronic files with this information provided by the Independent Evaluator within five (5) days following the conclusion of the auction, as explained further in the Part 2 Application.

Letters of credit and additional security (if required) will remain in full force, at a minimum, until the fifth calendar day after the conclusion of the auction. Subsequently, a bidder's financial guaranty will be marked cancelled and returned:

- As soon as practicable if the bidder has won no tranches.
- After the bidder has signed the SMA and has complied with all creditworthiness requirements of the SMA for the tranches that it has won.

The Companies can collect on the financial guarantees of bidders that win tranches but that fail to sign the SMA or fail to comply with the creditworthiness requirements immediately following the close of the auction.

4.2.3 Sanctions for Failing to Comply with the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications

Sanctions can be imposed on a bidder for failing to disclose information relevant to determining associations, for coordinating with another bidder, or for failing to abide by any of the certifications that it will have made in its Part 1 and Part 2 Applications. Such sanctions can include, but are not limited to, termination of the SMA, loss of all rights to provide supply for the Companies to serve any load won by such bidder, forfeiture of financial guarantees and other fees posted or paid, prosecution under applicable state and federal laws, debarment from participation in future solicitations, and other sanctions that may be appropriate. For any failure to disclose information or for any violation of the certifications, the Independent Evaluator will make a recommendation on a possible sanction.

4.3 Starting Prices (Round 1 Prices)

No later than three (3) days before bidding starts for an auction, the Independent Evaluator will inform all Registered Bidders of the starting price for each product in the auction, which is the announced price that will be in effect for round 1. For each product, the starting price will be no higher than the maximum starting price and no lower than the minimum starting price for the product. The Independent Evaluator will set the starting prices.

4.4 Extraordinary Events

The Independent Evaluator, in consultation with the Companies, may determine that, due to extraordinary events, the minimum starting prices and the maximum starting prices require revision. In this event, the schedule for the auction process also may be revised. If the indicative offers have already been received, the Independent Evaluator will request that the Registered Bidders (or the Qualified Bidders if the Part 2 Application process had not been completed) revise their indicative offers on the basis of the revised minimum starting prices and the revised maximum starting prices.

For such a revision to be necessary, an extraordinary event must occur between the time at which the minimum starting prices and the maximum starting prices are announced and the day on which bidding starts. An extraordinary event must be agreed to by the Companies and the Independent Evaluator. Such events could include, but are not limited to, the advent of war, the disruption of a major supply source for potentially extended periods, or other events that could affect significantly the cost of supply.

If an extraordinary event occurs during that time, the Independent Evaluator in consultation with the Companies will determine revised minimum starting prices and revised maximum starting prices. New indicative offers based on these prices will be required from bidders. To the extent practicable, the determination of new minimum and maximum starting prices, the submission of new indicative offers, and if necessary the announcement of new starting prices, will be carried out so as to afford bidders sufficient time. If an extraordinary event occurs during that time that causes a possible change in the schedule, the Independent Evaluator in consultation with the Companies and Commission staff, will determine a revised schedule.

5. BIDDING FORMAT

In order to participate in the auction, bidders must have been successful in the Part 1 Application process and the Part 2 Application process. Only Registered Bidders are permitted to participate in the auction. Registered Bidders will bid in the auction by accessing the Independent Evaluator's secure Bidding Website.

5.1 Descending-Price Clock Format

The auction format is a simultaneous, multiple-round, descending-price clock format for "N" rounds. The number of rounds "N" for the auction is not pre-determined. Instead, it is determined by the closing rule for the auction (described below). All products are available to bid on simultaneously in the auction. Bids are submitted during bidding rounds. Prices are announced for the products prior to each bidding round, and during a bidding round, a bidder submits for each product the number of tranches it would supply at the product's announced price. If the total number of tranches bid on a product exceeds the product's tranche target — i.e., the product is over-subscribed — the announced price for the product will be reduced for the next round. Announced prices will tend to decline round by round until the number of tranches bid falls sufficiently so that no product is over-subscribed and the auction closes.

An important rule is that a bidder cannot reduce the number of tranches it bids on a product if the product's announced price does not fall from one round to the next; in this case, the bidder can only maintain or increase the number of tranches it bids on the product (subject to other rules).

5.1.1 Rounds

Each bidding round has a specified start time and a specified end time. These start and end times are enforced by the Bidding Website. Prior to the start of the auction, the initial schedule of rounds will be available on the Bidding Website. As the auction progresses, the Independent Evaluator will keep bidders informed of the start and end times of subsequent rounds through the Bidding Website. The Independent Evaluator retains the option of pausing a round, delaying the start or end of a round, or otherwise adjusting the round times. The Independent Evaluator will inform bidders through the Bidding Website if it exercises this discretion to change the start time or end time of a round.

Bidders submit bids only during a round. When a round ends, the bids submitted during that round are processed and results of that round are reported to all bidders as explained in the section "Reporting Round Results" below. Each bidder then prepares to submit a bid for the next round if the auction remains open.

5.1.2 The Announced Prices and a Bid

Prior to the start of each round, the Independent Evaluator announces the price that will be in effect for each product for the round. The announced prices are specified in dollars per MWh or \$/MWh. The price announced by the Independent Evaluator for a product applies to all of the product's tranches. Each bidder decides how many tranches it is willing and able to supply for each product at the product's announced price. A bid by a bidder is, for each product, the number of tranches that the bidder is willing to supply at that announced price for the product. All bids are irrevocable and binding upon the bidders.

At sufficiently high announced prices there will be excess supply for a product causing it to be over-subscribed; that is, the number of tranches bid on the product will exceed the product's tranche target. Excess supply for a product is measured as the total number of tranches bid across all bidders on the product in the round minus the product's tranche target.

5.1.3 Reservation Prices and Starting Prices

There are reservation prices for the auction. The reservation price for a product is the price above which tranches for the product will not be purchased. If, at the conclusion of the auction, the reservation price for a product has not been met, no tranches for that product will be awarded. At the conclusion of the auction, the Independent Evaluator will inform bidders through the Bidding Website if the reservation price for a product has not been met.

Starting prices for the auction are determined after reservation prices are determined. The starting price for a product will be no lower than the reservation price for the product. The starting price may be the same as or higher than the reservation price for the product. The Independent Evaluator will not announce the reservation prices to bidders in advance of an auction.

5.1.4 Restrictions on What a Bidder Can Bid

The total number of tranches a bidder bids across all products in a round cannot exceed the bidder's eligibility for that round. That is, a bidder's eligibility to bid in a round is the maximum number of tranches it is allowed to bid across all products in that round. A bidder's eligibility for a round simply is the number of tranches the bidder bid across all products in the preceding round. Thus, a bidder cannot increase its eligibility from round to round; its eligibility can only stay the same or decrease from round to round.

A bidder is not allowed to bid more tranches on a product in a round than the product's tranche target.

A bidder is not allowed to bid a number of tranches that would violate any applicable load cap.

If the announced price for a product has been reduced from one round to the next round, the bidder can reduce the number of tranches it bid on that product.

If the announced price for a product has not been reduced from one round to the next round, the bidder cannot reduce the number of tranches it bid on that product.

Subject to the rules above, in each round a bidder is free to bid its tranches of eligibility across products however it would like to. Thus, subject to the rules above, bidders are free to reduce the tranches they bid and/or to switch tranches across products from round to round in response to changes in the announced prices for the products.

As discussed above, a bidder's initial eligibility is its eligibility for round 1 of the auction and is determined by the total number of tranches across products at the maximum starting prices in the bidder's indicative offer. During the course of the auction, the bidder's eligibility will decline or remain unchanged depending on the total number of tranches bid by the bidder across all products in each round of the auction.

If a bidder's eligibility falls to zero tranches, it will not be allowed to bid in any more rounds of the auction.

5.1.5 Multiple Bids by a Bidder

Because a bidder may decide to change a bid it submitted previously within the current open round, a bidder is allowed to make multiple bid submissions in a round as long as the round remains open for bidding, with each new confirmed bid fully replacing any prior bids it submitted in the round. If a bidder submits multiple bids in a round, the only bid considered in the round for that bidder is the last confirmed bid it submitted in the round.

5.1.6 Default Bid

After the end of a round, a default bid is submitted automatically on behalf of a bidder if the bidder:

- Entered the round with positive eligibility, and
- Did not submit a confirmed bid in the round.

If the announced price for a product declined from the prior round, then zero tranches will be the default bid for that product.

If the announced price for a product did not decline from the prior round, then the number of tranches that the bidder bid on the product in the prior round as determined by the end-of-round ("EOR") procedure following the prior round will be the default bid for the product.

Each bidder is solely responsible for ensuring it submits a confirmed bid prior to the end of the round in order to avoid a default bid of being submitted on the bidder's behalf.

5.1.7 The EOR Procedure

At the end of each round, the EOR procedure is used to process the confirmed bids submitted during the round. The EOR procedure includes the following steps.

- (a) The supply for each product is measured by summing up — across the confirmed bids for all bidders — the number of tranches bid for each product.
- (b) The subscription level for each product is measured by comparing the supply for the product to the tranche target for the product. A product is over-subscribed, subscribed, or under-subscribed if supply (i.e., the number of tranches bid) is greater than, equal to, or less than the product's tranche target, respectively.
- (c) If a product has become under-subscribed in a round after being over-subscribed or subscribed in the preceding round, then tranches will be rolled back to the point that the product is subscribed. That is, at least some of the tranches that were bid on the product in the preceding round but that were not bid on the product this round will be deemed to still be bid on the product. The price at which a rolled-back tranche is deemed to have been bid simply is the announced price at which the bidder had bid the tranche. There is a priority for selecting tranches to roll back: tranches that otherwise would no longer be bid on any product in the auction and therefore would be reductions in bidders' eligibilities are rolled back first (referred to as "eligibility reduction tranches"), and then if needed, tranches that were switched from being bid on the product to being bid on another product are selected next for rollbacks (referred to as "switched tranches"). Eligibility reduction tranches are selected for rollback proportionally tranche by tranche, not bidder by bidder. Likewise, switched tranches are selected for rollback proportionally tranche by tranche, not bidder by bidder. More precisely, because integer tranches are needed, the actual selection mechanism uses a random number generator to select rollbacks tranche by tranche (first for eligibility reduction tranches and then for switched tranches), but on average the selection process results in proportional rollbacks (with priority given to rolling back eligibility reduction tranches first and then switched tranches second). All tranches that are rolled back maintain their eligibility for the bidder. Any bidder subjected to a rollback will be notified through the Bidding Website that a rollback has taken place and will be informed about the number of tranches deemed bid on each product and the price at which those tranches have been deemed bid.

For example, suppose a bidder bids five tranches on a product and no tranches on other products in round 8, and the price for that product is reduced for round 9 and the bidder bids only 1 tranche on the product and no tranches on other products for round 9. Absent any EOR rollbacks following round 9, the bidder's eligibility would fall from 5 tranches to 1 tranche. But during the EOR procedure, suppose two of the bidder's 4 "eligibility reduction tranches" are rolled back on the product, so after the EOR procedure the bidder is deemed to have bid 3 tranches on the product — one at the announced price of the round just ended and two at the announced price of the preceding round — and therefore the bidder is deemed to have 3 tranches of eligibility for round 10.

- (d) "Free eligibility tranches" are determined as follows. A product's "bid stack" is a list of the tranches currently deemed bid on the product and the price at which each tranche was bid for the product. Because of rollbacks, a product's bid stack could have tranches bid at two different prices: some tranches bid at the earlier, higher announced price and some tranches bid at the current, lower announced price. Any new tranche bid on such a product necessarily will be bid at the current, lower announced price. This new tranche will displace a tranche in the product's bid stack at the earlier, higher announced price. The displaced tranche becomes a "free eligibility tranche". The free eligibility tranche counts as eligibility for the bidder and the bidder can bid the tranche on any product next round, or the bidder can choose not to bid the tranche at all. But if the bidder does not bid the free eligibility tranche next round, the tranche will be withdrawn from the auction permanently and will reduce the bidder's eligibility by one tranche after the next round.
- (e) In some cases, the Independent Evaluator may reduce the tranche targets. The criteria that could lead to such a reduction will be determined prior to the auction but will not be announced to bidders. Once certain pre-specified criteria related to excess supply and related to the reservation price have been met, the discretion to reduce a product's tranche target because of insufficient supply will be eliminated. Thus, any tranche target reduction would more likely occur in the earlier rounds of the auction. If the Independent Evaluator reduces the tranche target for a product, bidders will be informed of the revised tranche target. Any bidder that otherwise would have eligibility exceeding the new tranche targets will have its eligibility reduced so as not to exceed the new tranche targets.
- (f) The closing rule determines whether the auction has concluded. The closing rule is that the auction concludes if either case (1) or case (2) holds as follows:
- (1) If no product is over-subscribed and no bidder has free eligibility tranches, then the auction has concluded. Note that it is possible for the auction to continue with no reductions in announced prices: if no product is over-subscribed there will be no reductions in announced prices but if there are free eligibility tranches (which "expire" after one round), the auction will remain open for one more round (subject to case (2) described next), allowing bidders with free eligibility to bid those tranches.
 - (2) If this is the Nth consecutive round in which no product is over-subscribed, and the number of tranches of free eligibility across all bidders as a percentage of the sum of the tranche targets across all products is less than or equal to X percent, then the auction has concluded. The parameter values for N and X will be determined before the auction. The likelihood that this case (2) would occur in a particular auction is expected to be low.
- (g) If the auction has concluded, the winning tranches, winning bidders, and winning prices are determined as described below.
- (h) If the auction has not concluded, then each bidder's eligibility is determined for the next round and the price decrement (if any) is determined for each product for the next round.

5.1.8 Price Decrements

The announced prices will decrease round by round by a price decrement for over-subscribed products. Pre-specified price guidelines are used to determine the price decrements. Generally the price decrement for a product will be larger for the earlier rounds in the auction and when the excess supply for the product is greater. The price decrement is expected to be between 0.5 percent and 5 percent of the announced price for the most recently completed round.

The Independent Evaluator reserves the right to override the price decrement guidelines. The exercise of that right is expected to occur rarely and only if doing so is believed to facilitate timely progression of the bidding process.

5.2 Determination of Winning Tranches, Winning Bidders, and Winning Prices

At the close of the auction, the winning tranches, winning bidders, and winning prices will be determined as follows.

As a result of the EOR procedure as described above, there are two possible scenarios for a product at the close of the auction.

5.2.1 Bid Stack for a Product has All Tranches at the Same Price

In this scenario, there are no rolled-back tranches in the product's bid stack: all tranches in the bid stack were bid at the last announced price, including any tranches bid on the product in the last round of the auction as determined by the EOR procedure. That announced price is the product's clearing price, and all tranches in the product's bid stack are winning tranches if the clearing price satisfies the product's reservation price. Bidders who bid those tranches are winning bidders for those tranches, and all bidders with winning tranches on a product are paid the same price — i.e., the clearing price — for each winning tranche on the product. Note that this scenario includes the case in which a product was over-subscribed at some point in the auction and later became subscribed, as well as the case in which a product was always under-subscribed in the auction (i.e., it was never subscribed or over-subscribed in the auction).

5.2.2 Bid Stack for a Product has Tranches at Two Different Prices

In this scenario, there are rolled-back tranches in the product's bid stack: some tranches in the bid stack were bid at the last announced price (including any tranches bid on the product in the last round of the auction as determined by the EOR procedure), and some tranches in the bid stack were bid at the next most recent announced price. In this case, the product's clearing price is the next most recent announced price — which necessarily is higher than the last announced price for the product. All tranches in the product's bid stack are winning tranches if the clearing price satisfies the product's reservation price. Bidders who bid those tranches are winning bidders for those tranches, and all bidders with winning tranches on a product are paid the same price — i.e., the clearing price — for each winning tranche on the product.

5.3 Example of Round-by-Round Bidding

Appendix A provides an illustrative example of round-by-round bidding.

5.4 Reporting Round Results

During a round, a bidder can see the current status of the auction and the status of the current round including the announced price for each product as well as the bidder's own bidding status. A bidder will not see information about other bidders.

Between rounds the Bidding Website will report the results for the most recently completed round. Results for all prior rounds also will be accessible. The round results for each completed round in the auction will show:

- The announced price for each product and a range of total supply across all bidders and all products (that is, a range that includes the total number of tranches bid). The range of total supply will be defined by two different integers. Actual total supply will not be reported but will be at least as high as the lower of the two integers and no higher than the higher of the two integers. There is an exception to reporting total supply as a range of two integers: if and when total supply has declined below a pre-determined level, total supply will be reported simply as being below that level. The reporting ranges will be made available to bidders in advance of each auction.
- For each bidder, that bidder's bid for the round — i.e., the number of tranches bid on each product — and the bidder's eligibility for the next round. (Each bidder does not see information about other bidders.)
- The announced price for each product for the next round if the auction will continue with the next round.

5.5 Frequency of Rounds

The early rounds of bidding may be longer in duration than later rounds. The duration of a bidding round will be at least five (5) minutes.

The time between early rounds of bidding may be longer in duration than for later rounds. The time between bidding rounds will be at least five (5) minutes.

The schedule of rounds and any changes to the schedule will be made available to bidders through the Bidding Website.

5.6 Auction Pause Declared by Independent Evaluator

At any time during the auction, the Independent Evaluator may decide to pause the auction. This is not expected to happen often if at all. If the Independent Evaluator pauses the auction or changes the round schedule in any way, bidders will be notified.

6. AFTER THE AUCTION CLOSES

6.1 Notification of Results

At the close of the auction, the Independent Evaluator will notify the Companies, the Commission, and the bidders as follows.

- The Independent Evaluator will notify the Companies and the Commission of the identities of the winning bidders, the number of tranches won by each winning bidder, the prices for the tranches won, and other aggregated information on the bidding process.
- The Independent Evaluator will notify each winning bidder of how many tranches the bidder has won and at what prices. The Independent Evaluator also will notify the unsuccessful bidders that they have not won any tranches.

The names of the winning bidders, the number of tranches won by each bidder, and the winning prices will remain confidential until released publicly by the Commission or as required by law.

The auction results are tentative subject to Commission approval.

After the conclusion of the auction and provision of the auction results to the Commission by the Independent Evaluator, the Commission will have one business day to approve or reject the auction results.

6.2 Execution of SMA

The winning bidders and the Companies will execute the SMAs within three (3) business days following the Commission's approval of the auction results. Each winning bidder must demonstrate compliance with the creditworthiness requirements set forth in the SMA.

6.3 Sanctions for Failure to Execute the SMA

A winning bidder's financial guaranty posted with its Part 2 Application may be forfeited if the winning bidder does not execute the SMA within three (3) business days following the Commission's approval of the auction result, if it fails to demonstrate compliance with the creditworthiness requirements set forth in the SMA, or if it fails to agree to any of the terms of the SMA. In addition, the winning bidder will be liable for damages incurred by the Companies, which will be determined in accordance with the terms of the SMA as though the winning bidder were a defaulting party to the SMA.

7. USE OF THE BIDDING WEBSITE

Bidders will bid in the auction by accessing the Independent Evaluator's secure Bidding Website. A bidder will access the Bidding Website using their own Web browser. The URL address for the Bidding Website, as well as usernames and passwords, will be provided to Registered Bidders prior to the start of the auction.

The Bidding Website allows a Registered Bidder to submit and confirm bids, to verify its status, to view results from prior rounds, to view the schedule of rounds, and to view messages from the Independent Evaluator.

7.1 Importance of Confirmed Bids

Submitting a bid on the Bidding Website involves three steps:

- (1) Web page for entry and submission of the bid quantities. The bidder enters its desired bid and then submits the bid in order to proceed to the next step.
- (2) Web page for validation of the bid. The bidder is asked to review the bid it submitted in the first step before proceeding to the confirmation step.
- (3) Web page showing confirmation of the bid. The bidder receives a unique confirmation ID for the bid and the time-stamp at which the bid was recorded by the Bidding Website server.

It is important to note that a bid is not accepted and recorded as an accepted bid until and unless the bidder reaches the third step in which the bid confirmation Web page displays the unique confirmation ID and time-stamp for the bid.

7.2 Requirements for Using the Bidding Website

Access to the Bidding Website requires all of the following:

- Username and password provided by the Independent Evaluator.
- Access to the Internet.
- Use of one of the more recent versions of a standard Web browser.
- Status as a Registered Bidder.

A bidder loses access to the Bidding Website after it no longer is possible for the bidder to win tranches in the auction.

7.3 Messaging

The Bidding Website displays messages from the Independent Evaluator. These messages from the Independent Evaluator are displayed for all bidders with access to the Bidding Website.

8. BACKUP BIDDING PROCEDURE

In case a bidder has technical difficulties, and as a result is not able to submit a bid via the Bidding Website in a round, a backup bidding procedure will be provided as follows. The bidder uses the Backup Bidding Fax Number to submit its bid via facsimile. It is recommended that the bidder call the Help Desk and inform the operator that it has submitted a bid using the backup bidding procedure. Reasonable efforts will be made to contact the bidder if the backup bid is not received via facsimile in the time expected. Once the backup bid is received via facsimile, a member of the Independent Evaluator team will attempt to enter the bid on the Bidding Website on behalf of the bidder.

Prior to the auction, bidders will be provided with the Backup Bidding Fax Number and with forms to use for faxing a bid using the backup bidding procedure.

Bidders must be aware and understand that there is no guarantee or other assurance that if it submits a bid using the backup bidding procedure that its bid will be submitted and confirmed on its behalf by the Independent Evaluator team consistent with the intentions of the bidder and in time before the round ends.

If a backup bid submitted by a bidder is not accepted and confirmed by the Bidding Website because the round has ended, a default bid will be entered for the bidder as described above in the sections on default bids.

If a backup bid submitted by a bidder is not accepted and confirmed by the Bidding Website for other reasons (e.g., the number of tranches bid is greater than a bidder's eligibility or violates the bidder's credit-based tranche limit or applicable load cap), the Independent Evaluator team will use reasonable efforts to inform the bidder that a new bid must be submitted.

If a backup bid submitted by a bidder is confirmed by the Bidding Website, the Independent Evaluator team will contact the bidder by faxing confirmation of the accepted bid to the bidder.

Bidders use the backup bidding procedure at their own risk. In all cases involving backup bids, the Independent Evaluator team does not accept any responsibility, obligation, or liability for errors, omissions, timeliness, or otherwise, related to whether a backup bid is entered into and confirmed by the Bidding Website on behalf of the bidder or as intended by the bidder.

9. WHO TO CONTACT IN CASE OF PROBLEMS DURING THE AUCTION

A bidder should contact the Help Desk if it has questions or problems. The phone number for the Help Desk will be provided to bidders prior to the start of the auction.

10. CONTINGENCY PLAN

There is a contingency plan to cover two scenarios:

- At least one of the products in an auction is not fully subscribed.
- At least one of the winning suppliers defaults prior to the start of the delivery period or at any time during the delivery period.

10.1 If an Auction is Not Fully Subscribed

In the event that an auction is not fully subscribed, the Companies will rebid the unfilled tranches from that auction provided a minimum of 30 calendar days exists prior to the start of the delivery period. The unfilled tranches will be rebid in the next scheduled auction where supply is sought with the same delivery start date. If there is no such scheduled auction, then the unfilled tranches will be rebid in a separate solicitation no later than 30 days before the original delivery start date. For any remaining unfilled tranches, the Companies will purchase the necessary physical supply through PJM administered markets and meet any AEPS compliance requirements through purchases at market prices.

10.2 If a Winning Bidder Defaults

If a winning bidder defaults prior to the start of or during the delivery period, the Companies will offer the unfilled tranches to the other qualified bidders who participated in the most recent solicitation. The Companies will enter into an agreement with the qualified bidder or bidders offering the best terms for the unfilled tranches resulting from the default, provided the prices offered by such bidder or bidders are consistent with the original prices under which the unfilled tranches were procured and changes in market conditions from the time when the original tranches were procured. If the Companies are not able to enter into such agreement and a minimum of 30 calendar days exists prior to the start of the delivery period, the Companies will seek to bid the defaulted tranches in the next scheduled solicitation for supply with the same start date as the unfilled tranches or in a separate supplemental competitive solicitation. As with other unfilled tranches described above, if insufficient time exists to conduct an additional competitive solicitation, or if the supplemental solicitation is unsuccessful, the Companies will supply the tranches using PJM-administered markets. In addition to damages to which the Companies may be entitled, costs incurred by the Companies in implementing this contingency plan for supply and AEPS requirements will be assessed against the defaulting supplier's credit security, to the extent available.

11. COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS

The communications protocols described here are intended to promote a fair, open, transparent, objective, and non-discriminatory auction. These protocols also are intended to protect proprietary information of participants and information that, should it be released, would be detrimental to the outcome of the auction process or future solicitations.

11.1 The Companies and Affiliates

11.1.1 Internal Communications

The Companies will designate individuals to work on the auction process. These individuals directly or indirectly will not have communication with, or exchange information with, any individuals of an affiliate of the Companies that may bid in the auction process where such communication or information is related directly or indirectly to this auction process.

11.1.2 Communications with Bidders

The Companies will not communicate with bidders prior to the selection of winning bids. When the Independent Evaluator informs the Companies about the prices and tranches of the winning bids and the identity of winning bidders in accordance with Section 6.1 of the Bidding Rules, representatives from the Companies then will communicate with the winning bidders in order to execute the necessary documents.

If a bidder attempts to contact the Companies regarding the auction process by phone call, email, fax, or other means, the Companies will direct the bidder to the Information Website and/or to the Independent Evaluator.

11.1.3 Part 1 Application Process

For the Part 1 Application process, the Independent Evaluator will need to provide the names of applicants to the Companies' credit department for purposes of confirming the applicants' credit requirements.

11.1.4 Part 2 Application Process

For the Part 2 Application process, the Independent Evaluator will need to provide the aggregate eligibility and other information from the Part 2 Applications to the Companies with the names of applicants redacted.

11.2 General Public and Media

While bidding is in progress, there is to be no communication with the media or the public. After the auction process is completed, results are determined, and bidders have been notified, all media inquiries will be forwarded to the Companies.

11.2.1 The Information Website

The central source of information made available publicly and to bidders is the Information Website. The Independent Evaluator will manage the information flow on the Information Website and will be designated on the Website as the contact for any questions or inquiries from parties. Any party will have access to the public sections of the Information Website.

11.2.2 Frequently Asked Questions

Among other information and resources on the Information Website, there will be an FAQ (frequently asked questions) section with posted questions and answers. As inquiries are received, they will be converted into an FAQ and posted on the Information Website without revealing the identity of the party posing the inquiry.

Inquiries to be answered by the Companies will be forwarded by the Independent Evaluator to the Companies. Inquiries to be answered by the Independent Evaluator will be forwarded to the Companies with a draft response. Any inquiry or draft response forwarded by the Independent Evaluator to the Companies will not identify the party posing the inquiry. Both the Companies and the Independent Evaluator will review any inquiry and response before the FAQ is posted to the Information Website.

11.2.3 Registered Users

If a party wishes to receive notices and updates regarding public information and new postings to the Information Website, then the party can register through the Information Website to become a Registered User.

Any information the Independent Evaluator has concerning the auction process that is relevant and that can be disclosed publicly will be made available equally to all Registered Users in a timely manner. The method of such communication likely will be via the Information Website and/or emails to Registered Users using the BCC email field so identification of Registered Users is not disclosed to other Registered Users.

11.2.4 Press Releases

The Companies and/or the Independent Evaluator may issue one or more press releases or may place news items in the trade press with the intent to disseminate information about the auction process in an efficient, fair, and timely manner.

11.2.5 Answering Inquiries from the General Public or Media

Inquiries from the general public or the media to the Independent Evaluator will be directed to the Information Website.

11.3 Bidders

11.3.1 Communications Among Bidders

Bidders are prohibited from communicating with each other in ways that would compromise the integrity and competitiveness of the auction process. Sanctions will be applied if these rules are violated.

11.3.2 Communications between the Independent Evaluator and Bidders

The central source of information made available to bidders is the Information Website. The Website facilitates making information available equally to bidders in a timely manner.

Bidders are encouraged to become Registered Users of the Information Website to receive ongoing information about the auction process. As discussed above, once registered through the Information Website, Registered Users will receive notifications from the Independent Evaluator about updates to the auction process and to the Information Website.

If the Independent Evaluator receives an inquiry from a party and prepares a response that would be relevant for other parties, the Independent Evaluator will ensure the information will be made available equally to all Registered Users in a timely manner and will post the information on the Information Website and/or will email the Registered Users without revealing the identity of parties.

In addition to posting information to the Information Website, the Independent Evaluator may contact bidders directly in order to seek or provide information about the auction process in a way that does not advantage any bidder.

Any communications from the Independent Evaluator to a bidder will not reveal the identity of other bidders.

11.3.3 Bidding Process

During the auction, the Independent Evaluator, the Commission, and Companies' personnel may monitor the bidding process.

The Independent Evaluator will ensure the bids submitted by bidders conform to the rules of the auction process.

The Bidding Rules and pre-determined bid selection criteria will be applied to determine which bids, if any, are winning bids.

11.3.4 Limitations on Disclosures by Bidders

Bidders are not allowed to disclose they are participating in the Residential/Commercial Auction or the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction, and winning bidders are not allowed to disclose that they have won any tranches in the Residential/Commercial Auction or the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction until the Commission publicly reports the results of the auction. Such limitation on public disclosure by bidders is waived if disclosure is required by law.

11.4 Public Utility Commission of Pennsylvania

11.4.1 Communications with the Independent Evaluator

During the bidding process, the identity of bidders, prices, and the number of tranches bid will be kept confidential. This information may be released to the Commission after the auction results are finalized.

11.4.2 Communications with the Companies

The Commission may communicate with the Companies regarding the auction process. However, the Companies will not disclose any proprietary information until after the final round of the auction is completed and bidders are informed of the results of the auction.

11.4.3 Communications with Bidders

The Commission will not communicate with bidders about the auction process prior to the determination of winning bids. If a bidder attempts to contact the Commission by phone call, email, fax, or other means, the Commission will direct the bidder to the Information Website and/or to the Independent Evaluator.

11.4.4 Information on Auction Participation

In order to maintain confidential and proprietary information provided by bidders as part of the auction process, the identity of all bidders that submitted Part 1 and/or Part 2 Applications in the auction and the indicative offers will be kept confidential until released publicly by the Commission. The Commission may elect to keep these data confidential at its sole discretion.

11.4.5 Round-by-Round Bids

Round-by-round bids by bidders will be kept confidential pursuant to the confidentiality provisions of the Bidding Rules and the SMA for as long as the Companies continue to procure Default Service.

12. ASSOCIATION AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION RULES

The Association and Confidential Information rules are described below.

12.1 Process for Reporting Associations, Identifying Concerns and Remedies

A prospective bidder applying to qualify to bid will be required to disclose in its Part 1 Application any bidding agreement or arrangement in which it may have entered. A prospective bidder will be required to certify in its Part 1 Application that, should it qualify to participate, it will not disclose information regarding the list of Qualified Bidders. A prospective bidder also will be required to certify that it accepts the terms of the SMA and, should it win tranches, it will sign the applicable SMA and comply with all creditworthiness requirements by the stated deadline.

Once entities are qualified to bid, each Qualified Bidder will be asked in its Part 2 Application to make a number of certifications, each detailed in the Part 2 Application, and each bidder may be required to provide additional information to the Independent Evaluator if a certification cannot be made. Each Qualified Bidder will be asked to certify that it will undertake steps to appropriately restrict its disclosure of Confidential Information relative to its bidding strategy and Confidential Information regarding the auction. A Qualified Bidder also will be asked to certify that it has not and will not come to any agreement with another Qualified Bidder with respect to bidding in the auction, except as disclosed and approved by the Independent Evaluator in its Part 1 Application.

Before obtaining sealed documentation necessary to participate in the auction, Registered Bidders will be required to certify that they will continue to maintain the confidentiality of any information that they will have acquired through their participation in the auction.

12.2 Confidential Information

Confidential Information relative to bidding strategy means information relating to a bidder's bid(s) in the auction, whether transmitted in writing or verbally, which if it were to be made public likely would have an effect on any of the bids that another bidder would be willing to submit. Confidential Information relative to bidding strategy includes (but is not limited to): a bidder's strategy; a bidder's indicative offer; the quantities that a bidder wishes to supply; the bidder's estimation of the value of a tranche; the bidder's estimation of the risks associated with serving the load for the auction; and a bidder's contractual arrangements for purchasing power to serve such load were the bidder to win tranches in the auction.

Confidential Information regarding the auction means information that is not released publicly by the Commission, the Companies or the Independent Evaluator and that a bidder acquires as a result of participating in the auction, whether transmitted in writing or verbally, which if it were to be made public could impair the integrity of current or future solicitations, impair the ability of the Companies to hold future solicitations, or harm consumers, bidders or applicants. Confidential Information regarding the auction includes (but is not limited to): the list of Qualified Bidders, the list of Registered Bidders, the initial eligibility, the status of a bidder's participation, and all non-public reports of results and announcements made by the Independent Evaluator to any or all bidders in this auction.

Absolute protection from public disclosure of the bidders' data and information filed in this auction process cannot be provided. By participating in this auction process, each bidder acknowledges and agrees to the confidentiality provisions set forth herein, as well as any limitations thereto.

In addition, the bidder agrees the bidder's data and information submitted in this auction process will be disclosed if required by any federal, state or local agency (including, without limitation, the Commission) or by a court of competent jurisdiction. However, the Companies will endeavor to notify the bidder in advance of such disclosure. In any event, neither the Companies nor the Independent Evaluator, nor any of their employees or agents, will be responsible to the bidders or any other party, or liable for any disclosure of such designated materials before, during or subsequent to this auction. Notwithstanding the above, the Companies and the Independent Evaluator reserve the right to use and communicate publicly and/or to third parties any and all information/data submitted as part of this auction process in any proceedings before FERC, the Commission, and any other regulatory body and the courts, if necessary, without the prior consent/approval of, or notice to, any such bidder. The bidder expressly agrees that the Companies may provide bidder information on a confidential basis to the Commission, the Pennsylvania Office of the Consumer Advocate, and the Office of Small Business Advocate as necessary for compliance with any default service procurement reporting obligations.

12.3 Certifications and Disclosures to Be Made

A prospective bidder will be required in its Part 1 Application to disclose any bidding agreement or any other arrangement in which the prospective bidder may have entered and that is related to its participation in the auction. A prospective bidder that has entered into such an agreement or arrangement must name the entities with which the prospective bidder has entered into a bidding agreement, or a joint venture for the purpose of participating in the auction, or a bidding consortium, or any other arrangement pertaining to participating in the auction. A bidding consortium is a group of separate businesses or business people joining together to submit joint bids in the auction.

In addition, a prospective bidder will be required to make the certifications listed in the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications.

The Commission may publicly release the winning prices and the names of the winning bidders from the auction. The Commission may choose to release additional information. After the auction, a winning bidder itself may release information regarding the number of tranches it has won, and a non-winning bidder itself may release information only regarding the fact that it participated in the auction. The winning bidders and the non-winning bidders otherwise continue to be bound by their certifications as described previously. In particular, no winning bidder and no non-winning bidder itself can reveal the winning prices of the auction prior to these being publicly released by the Commission.

12.4 Actions to Be Taken if Certifications Cannot Be Made

If a bidder cannot make all the certifications above, the Independent Evaluator will decide within five (5) days following the deadline to submit the Part 2 Application on a course of action on a case-by-case basis. To decide on this course of action, the Independent Evaluator may make additional inquiries to understand the reason for the inability of the bidder to make the certification.

If Qualified Bidders do not comply with additional information requests by the Independent Evaluator regarding certifications required in the Part 2 Application, the Independent Evaluator may reject the application.

12.5 Sanctions for Failure to Comply

Sanctions may be imposed on a Qualified Bidder for failing to properly disclose information relevant to determining associations, for coordinating with another bidder without disclosing this fact, for releasing Confidential Information or disclosing information during the auction (aside from only the specific exceptions provided above with respect to entities explicitly named in the Part 1 Application as entities that are part of a bidding agreement or other arrangement, to an Advisor; or bidders with which it is associated), and in general for failing to abide by any of the communications protocols in the section, "Communications Protocols," of these Bidding Rules. Such sanctions can include, but are not limited to, any one or more of the following: termination of the SMA; the loss of all rights to provide tranches won by such bidder; the forfeiture of letters of credit and other fees posted or paid; action (including prosecution) under applicable state and/or federal laws; attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in any litigation that arises out of the bidder's improper disclosure; debarment from participation in future solicitations; and/or other sanctions that may be appropriate. Should such an event occur, the Independent Evaluator will make a recommendation to the Companies regarding sanctions. The imposition of such sanctions will be at the discretion of the Companies.

13. MISCELLANEOUS

13.1 Warranty on Information

The information provided for the auction, including but not limited to information provided on the Information Website, has been prepared to assist bidders in evaluating the auction process. It does not purport to contain all the information that may be relevant to a bidder in satisfying its due diligence efforts. Neither the Companies nor the Independent Evaluator make any representation or warranty, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the information, and shall not, either individually or as a corporation, be liable for any representation expressed or implied in the auction process or any omissions from the auction process, or any information provided to a bidder by any other source. A bidder should check the Information Website frequently to ensure it has the latest documentation and information. Neither the Companies, nor the Independent Evaluator, nor any of their representatives, shall be liable to a bidder or any of its representatives for any consequences relating to or arising from the bidder's use of information.

13.2 Hold Harmless

Bidder shall hold the Companies and the Independent Evaluator harmless of and from all damages and costs, including but not limited to legal costs, in connection with all claims, expenses, losses, proceedings or investigations that arise in connection with the auction process or the award of a bid pursuant to the auction process.

13.3 Bid Submissions Become the Companies' Property

All bids submitted by bidders participating in the auction will become the exclusive property of the Companies upon conclusion of the auction process.

13.4 Bidder's Acceptance

Through its participation in the auction process, a bidder acknowledges and accepts all the terms, conditions and requirements of the auction process and the SMA.

13.5 Permits, Licenses, Compliance with the Law and Regulatory Approvals

Bidders shall obtain all licenses, permits and status that may be required by any governmental body, agency or organization necessary to conduct business or to perform hereunder. Bidders' subcontractors, employees, agents and representatives of each in performance hereunder shall comply with all applicable governmental laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, orders and all other governmental requirements.

13.6 Auction Intellectual Property

All title, interests and other intellectual property rights in and to the auction design, the auction format and methodology, the auction software, the source code (including all modifications, enhancements, customization, adaptations and derivative works made by the Independent Evaluator) and associated documentation, including but not limited to these Bidding Rules, and the screen formats and forms designed by the Independent Evaluator (the "Auction Software"), are proprietary to the Independent Evaluator and all rights, title, and interest to the Auction Software remain with the Independent Evaluator. The Independent Evaluator grants Qualified Bidders a non-exclusive, non-transferable, limited license to use the Auction Software, solely for use in connection with the auction, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein, and not for copying, relicensing, sublicensing, distribution or marketing by the Qualified Bidder. No other interest is conveyed to the Qualified Bidder other than the license expressly granted herein. The foregoing use license shall immediately terminate upon disqualification of the Qualified Bidder or upon termination or completion of the auction process. If at any time it is determined in the Independent Evaluator's sole discretion that the Qualified Bidder is in breach of this Section 13.6, the Independent Evaluator shall be entitled to terminate the Qualified Bidder's access rights to the Auction Software.

Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, and without limiting the Qualified Bidder's other obligations herein, the Qualified Bidder shall not, nor shall it permit any third party to: (i) modify, translate or otherwise create derivative works of the Auction Software; (ii) reverse engineer, decompile, decode, disassemble or translate any Auction Software, or output thereof, or otherwise attempt to reduce to human readable form or derive the source code, protocols or architecture of any Auction Software; (iii) use or study any Auction Software, or output thereof, for the purpose of developing any software that is intended to replace, or that has functions, structure or architecture similar to, such Auction Software, or any part thereof; (iv) publish, or otherwise make available to any third party, any benchmark or other testing information or results concerning the Auction Software; (v) permit any other person who is not authorized to access or use all or any part of the Auction Software or (vi) copy the Auction Software, distribute the Auction Software, remove or obscure any proprietary labeling on or in the Auction Software, create any derivative works based on the Auction Software, or modify the Auction Software, in each case, except to the extent expressly permitted by the Independent Evaluator in writing.

In using the Auction Software, a Qualified Bidder shall take steps to prevent any virus, worm, built-in or use-driven destruction mechanism, algorithm, or any other similar disabling code, mechanism, software, equipment, or component designated to disable, destroy or adversely affect the Auction Software from being introduced into the systems.

APPENDIX A — EXAMPLE OF ROUND-BY-ROUND BIDDING

The illustrative example below shows for two bidders (BidderA and BidderB) and two products (Product-1 and Product-2) the confirmed bids (pre-EOR) and the post-EOR results for each round. In the example, the auction closes after round 4.

Round 1

For round 1, the announced prices are \$75.00 and \$82.00 for Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. At those announced prices, BidderA bids 55 tranches and 85 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. BidderB bids 80 tranches and 27 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Each product is over-subscribed: 135 tranches were bid on Product-1 which has a tranche target of 100, and 112 tranches were bid on Product-2 which has a tranche target of 100.

The announced price for Product-1 will be reduced from \$75.00 to \$72.50 for round 2. The announced price for Product-2 will be reduced from \$82.00 to \$78.60 for round 2.

BidderA will have eligibility of $55+85 = 140$ tranches for round 2, and BidderB will have eligibility of $80+27 = 107$ tranches for round 2.

Round 2

At the announced prices for round 2, BidderA bids 40 tranches and 85 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderA reduced its tranches bid on Product-1 from 55 to 40 tranches. BidderB bids 50 tranches and 57 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderB switched 30 tranches from Product-1 to Product-2.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Product-1 is under-subscribed by 10 tranches: only 90 tranches bid against the tranche target of 100 tranches: BidderA's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 15 tranches, while BidderB's bid maintained its eligibility. Thus, 10 of the 15 eligibility reduction tranches of BidderA are rolled back on Product-1. Those 10 tranches are priced at the announced price for Product-1 at which they were bid in round 1: \$75.00. The announced price for Product-1 will remain at \$72.50 for round 3.

Product-2 is over-subscribed by 42 tranches. The announced price for Product-2 will be reduced from \$78.60 to \$76.10 for round 3.

BidderA will have eligibility of $50+85 = 135$ tranches for round 3 (including the 10 tranches rolled back on Product-1), and BidderB will have eligibility of $50+57 = 107$ tranches for round 3.

Round 3

At the announced prices for round 3, BidderA bids 99 tranches and 36 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderA is switching 49 of the tranches bid from Product-2 to Product-1. BidderB bids 50 tranches and 35 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderB is reducing its tranches bid on Product-2 from 57 to 35 tranches.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Product-1 is over-subscribed by 49 tranches. Product-2 is under-subscribed by 29 tranches: only 71 tranches bid against the tranche target of 100 tranches: BidderA's bid maintained its eligibility while BidderB's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 22 tranches. Thus, all 22 of the eligibility reduction tranches of BidderB are rolled back on Product-2. Those 22 tranches are priced at the announced price for Product-2 at which they were bid in round 2: \$78.60. Even after rolling back those 22 eligibility reduction tranches of BidderA, Product-2 still is under-subscribed — by 7 tranches. So 7 tranches that BidderA had switched from Product-2 to Product-1 are rolled back to Product-2. Those 7 tranches are priced at the announced price for Product-2 at which they were bid in round 2: \$78.60.

After rolling back 7 tranches from Product-1 to Product-2 for BidderA, BidderA still has increased the number of tranches it is bidding on Product-1: from 50 tranches bid in round 2 (10 tranches at \$75.00 and 40 tranches at \$72.50) to 92 tranches bid in round 3 (10 tranches at \$75.00 and 82 tranches at \$72.50). Product-1 is over-subscribed as a result, so higher-priced tranches in Product-1's bid stack can be removed. All 10 of BidderA's higher-priced tranches are removed from Product-1's bid stack, and these 10 tranches become BidderA's free eligibility for round 4. In round 4, BidderA can bid any of the 10 tranches on any product, but to the extent those 10 tranches are not bid on a product in round 4, those free eligibility tranches and their associated eligibility for BidderA will be permanently removed from the auction after round 4.

Because Product-1 is over-subscribed, the announced price for Product-1 will be reduced from \$72.50 to \$70.15 for round 4. Because Product-2 is not over-subscribed, the announced price for Product-2 will remain at \$76.10 for round 4.

BidderA will have eligibility of $82+43+10 = 135$ tranches for round 4, and BidderB will have eligibility of $50+57 = 107$ tranches for round 4 (including the 22 tranches rolled back on Product-2).

Round 4

At the announced prices for round 4, BidderA bids 46 tranches and 43 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderA reduced its tranches bid on Product-1 from 82 to 46 tranches. BidderB bids 32 tranches and 57 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderB reduced its tranches bid on Product-1 from 50 to 32 tranches.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Product-1 is under-subscribed by 22 tranches: only 78 tranches bid against the tranche target of 100 tranches: BidderA's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 36 tranches, while BidderB's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 18 tranches. Of the 54 fewer tranches bid on Product-1, 36 were eligibility reductions from BidderA and 18 were eligibility reductions from BidderB. Of those 54 fewer tranches bid, $100-78 = 22$ tranches need to be rolled back on Product-1. The selection of which tranches are rolled back is done by assigning random numbers tranche by tranche (not bidder by bidder) to each of the 54 fewer tranches bid on Product-1. On average, the selection of the rolled back tranches will be proportional based on the number of tranches by which each bidder reduced its bid on the product. Thus, if the assignment of random numbers and selection of rolled back tranches were repeated many times, the number of rolled back tranches for BidderA on Product-1 would be expected to be 15 on average or $(82-46)/(132-78)*(100-78) = 36/54*22$, rounded, and the number of rolled back tranches for BidderB on Product-1 would be expected to be 7 on average: $(50-32)/(132-78)*(100-78) = 18/54*22$, rounded.

Auction Close

After the rollback is done for Product-1, it is determined that no product is over-subscribed and no bidder has free eligibility tranches. Thus, the criteria are met for closing the auction.

Product-1's bid stack has tranches bid at \$72.50 and tranches bid at \$70.15. So Product-1's clearing price is the higher of the two, or \$72.50. BidderA wins 61 tranches and BidderB wins 39 tranches for Product-1. All 100 tranches procured for Product-1 are paid the price of \$72.50.

Product-2's bid stack has tranches bid at \$78.60 and tranches bid at \$76.10. So Product-2's clearing price is the higher of the two, or \$78.60. BidderA wins 43 tranches and BidderB wins 57 tranches for Product-2. All 100 tranches procured for Product-2 are paid the price of \$78.60.

Example 2. Round-by-Round Bidding with Pre-EOR and Post-EOR Results

| Round | Product-1 | | | | | Product-2 | | | | | Next-Round Eligibility | |
|----------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|-----------|---------------|------------------------|-------|
| | Announced Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Bid | @ Price | Excess Supply | Announced Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Bid | @ Price | Excess Supply | Free | Total |
| 1 | \$75.00 | | | | | \$82.00 | | | | | | |
| Pre-EOR | | 100 | 135 | | 35 | | 100 | 112 | | 12 | | |
| BidderA | | | 55 | @ \$75.00 | | | | 85 | @ \$82.00 | | — | 140 |
| BidderB | | | 80 | @ \$75.00 | | | | 27 | @ \$82.00 | | — | 107 |
| Post-EOR | | 100 | 135 | | 35 | | 100 | 112 | | 12 | | |
| BidderA | | | 55 | @ \$75.00 | | | | 85 | @ \$82.00 | | — | 140 |
| BidderB | | | 80 | @ \$75.00 | | | | 27 | @ \$82.00 | | — | 107 |
| 2 | \$72.50 | | | | | \$78.60 | | | | | | |
| Pre-EOR | | 100 | 90 | | (10) | | 100 | 142 | | 42 | | |
| BidderA | | | 40 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 85 | @ \$78.60 | | — | 125 |
| BidderB | | | 50 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 57 | @ \$78.60 | | — | 107 |
| Post-EOR | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | 100 | 142 | | 42 | | |
| BidderA | | | 50 | 10 @ \$75.00 40 @ \$72.50 | | | | 85 | @ \$78.60 | | — | 135 |
| BidderB | | | 50 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 57 | @ \$78.60 | | — | 107 |

| Round | Product-1 | | | | | Product-2 | | | | | Next-Round Eligibility | |
|----------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|------------------------------|---------------|------------------------|-------|
| | Announced Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Bid | @ Price | Excess Supply | Announced Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Bid | @ Price | Excess Supply | Free | Total |
| 3 | \$72.50 | | | | | \$76.10 | | | | | | |
| Pre-EOR | | 100 | 149 | | 49 | | 100 | 71 | | (29) | | |
| BidderA | | | 99 | 10 @ \$75.00 89 @ \$72.50 | | | | 36 | @ \$76.10 | | — | 135 |
| BidderB | | | 50 | 50 @ \$72.50 | | | | 35 | @ \$76.10 | | — | 85 |
| Post-EOR | | 100 | 132 | | 32 | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | |
| BidderA | | | 82 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 43 | 7 @ \$78.60 36 @ \$76.10 | | 10 | 135 |
| BidderB | | | 50 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 57 | 22 @ \$78.60 35 @ \$76.10 | | — | 107 |
| 4 | \$70.15 | | | | | \$76.10 | | | | | | |
| Pre-EOR | | 100 | 78 | | (22) | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | |
| BidderA | | | 46 | @ \$70.15 | | | | 43 | 7 @ \$78.60 36 @ \$76.10 | | — | 89 |
| BidderB | | | 32 | @ \$70.15 | | | | 57 | 22 @ \$78.60 35 @ \$76.10 | | — | 89 |
| Post-EOR | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | |
| BidderA | | | 61 | 15 @ \$72.50 46 @ \$70.15 | | | | 43 | 7 @ \$78.60 36 @ \$76.10 | | — | 104 |
| BidderB | | | 39 | 7 @ \$72.50 32 @ \$70.15 | | | | 57 | 22 @ \$78.60 35 @ \$76.10 | | — | 96 |

| | Product-1 | | | | Product-2 | | | Tranches Won |
|---------|----------------|----------------|--------------|--|----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Clearing Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Won | | Clearing Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Won | |
| Results | \$72.50 | 100 | 100 | | \$78.60 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| BidderA | | | 61 | | | | 43 | 104 |
| BidderB | | | 39 | | | | 57 | 96 |

EXHIBIT B



Bidding Rules

**To Procure Default Service Products for
Metropolitan Edison Company (“Met-Ed”)
Pennsylvania Electric Company (“Penelec”)
Pennsylvania Power Company (“Penn Power”)
West Penn Power Company (“West Penn
Power”)**

Exhibit BAM-1

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1. INTRODUCTION

These Bidding Rules apply to the auctions to procure Default Service products for Metropolitan Edison Company ("Met-Ed"), Pennsylvania Electric Company ("Penelec"), Pennsylvania Power Company ("Penn Power") and West Penn Power Company ("West Penn Power") (each of which may be referred to as a "Company", and/or in combinations as "Companies") for all of their retail customers that take retail generation service from the Companies.

Default Service products for residential and commercial customers will be procured in a separate auction ("Residential/Commercial Auction") from the auction for industrial customers ("Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction"). There is a Supplier Master Agreement ("SMA") for the Residential/Commercial Auction and a separate SMA for the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction. Unless otherwise noted, these Bidding Rules apply to both auctions.

Bidders need to be familiar with the applicable SMA, the Bidding Rules, and all other documents for the auctions, including the Part 1 Application and the Part 2 Application which apply to both auctions. Bidders should visit the Information Website regularly for up-to-date information, including information specific to each auction. The Information Website contains relevant data, the schedule and key dates for participating in the auction process, frequently asked questions, and other information.

The following documents are appended to, and shall be considered integral parts of, these Bidding Rules:

- Appendix 1 Part 1 Application for Residential/Commercial and Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auctions to Procure Default Service Products
- Appendix 2 Part 2 Application for Residential/Commercial and Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auctions to Procure Default Service Products
- Appendix 3 Sample Pre-Bid Letter of Credit
- Appendix 4 Sample Letter of Intent to Provide a Guaranty
- Appendix 5 Sample Bank Letters of Reference for Pre-Bid Security

Unless noted otherwise, "days" refer to business days and times refer to prevailing Eastern Time. Capitalized terms in this document, which are not defined explicitly herein, are defined in each of the Default Service SMAs. In accordance with the SMAs, "Default Service" and "DS" are equivalent (e.g., "Default Service Load" in these Bidding Rules corresponds to "DS Load" in the SMAs).

Examples in these Bidding Rules are illustrative only.

These Bidding Rules may be modified from time to time by the Independent Evaluator in order to: (i) facilitate a more competitive auction process, (ii) make any necessary corrections and/or clarifications, (iii) account for any change in auction products, (iv) conform to any change in state or federal law or rule, and (v) apply any change deemed necessary at the discretion of the Independent Evaluator. All modifications will be posted to the Information Website and carried out in consultation with the Companies.

1.1 Independent Evaluator

The Independent Evaluator is CRA International, Inc. The Independent Evaluator can be contacted by sending an email to fepaauction@crai.com. The full contact information for the Independent Evaluator is as follows:

CRA International, Inc.
John Hancock Tower
200 Clarendon Street, T-33
Boston, MA 02116-5092
Phone: 617.425.3384
Fax: 617.425.6574
fepaauction@crai.com
Attn: Brad Miller, Vice President / Independent Evaluator

2. THE PRODUCTS BEING PROCURED

This section summarizes the common elements of the products to be procured in the auctions. The Information Website provides details about the products to be procured in a specific auction, including the delivery periods, the number of tranches, the nominal MW size of the tranches, and any seasonal price factors.

2.1 Default Service Load

Default Service Load is each Company's aggregate requirement to serve its Default Service customers. For purposes of these Bidding Rules, a "Default Service Customer" is a retail customer of a Company taking Default Service.

2.2 Full Requirements Service

The auctions are designed to procure full requirements generation service for Default Service Customers of the Companies. Winning bidders will assume all responsibilities of a Load Serving Entity ("LSE"). Suppliers will provide Default Supply under the SMAs, which includes all energy, capacity, ancillary services, transmission (including Network Integration Transmission Service ("NITS") but excluding Regional Transmission Expansion Plan charges ("RTEPs") and PJM Expansion Cost Recovery charges), and Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act ("AEPS Act" or "AEPS") credits needed to meet the requirements of the Companies' Default Service Load as more specifically described in the SMAs.

Note that the obligations of Default Service Suppliers to provide AECs under the SMAs vary between the Companies. Each supplier to Met-Ed, Penelec and Penn Power must provide non-solar Tier I and Tier II AECs to meet AEPS requirements for the load it serves, but those Companies will satisfy all Tier I solar AEPS requirements associated with their Default Service load using solar AECs obtained through separate procurements. Each supplier to West Penn Power will be required to provide all Tier I (including solar) and Tier II AECs associated with AEPS requirements for the default service load served by the supplier, less a specified number of Tier I solar AECs and Tier I non-solar AECs obtained by West Penn Power under separate long-term contracts. Prior to each auction, West Penn Power will calculate the amount of West Penn Power AECs that will be applied to each supplier's AEPS obligations. AECs will not be transferred to suppliers by any Company but used only to reduce the number of AECs that suppliers must transfer to a Company. More details are found in the SMA.

2.3 Tranches

Default Service Load will be divided into identical units called tranches, each representing a defined percentage of Default Service Load. For example, if there are 25 tranches for a given customer class, then each tranche equals one divided by twenty-five, or four percent of that class's load. This includes four percent (4%) of the actual hourly energy required for Default Service Load for the applicable delivery period as well as four percent (4%) of the PJM capacity requirement for the applicable delivery period.

The number of tranches intended to be procured in the auction for a product is referred to as the "tranche target" for that product. The Independent Evaluator may reduce the tranche targets prior to the auction if indications of interest in the auction are such that doing so is required to promote more competitive bidding.

3. PRICES PAID TO DEFAULT SERVICE SUPPLIERS

This section summarizes the components of the prices to be paid to Default Service Suppliers. The respective Supplier Master Agreements take precedent over the summary provided here.

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3.1 Prices Paid to Winning Suppliers in the Residential/Commercial Auction

The Default Service Suppliers from the Residential/Commercial Auction will be paid a price with a fixed component and a variable component. The fixed price will be applied for 90 percent (90%) of the delivered supply each hour in dollars per megawatt-hour (\$/MWh), and will be established through the Companies' competitive procurement process and included in the SMA's Appendix E. For the remaining 10 percent (10%), the supplier will receive a "spot" payment equal to the sum of the real time hourly total locational marginal price ("LMP") established by PJM Interconnection L.L.C. ("PJM"), the Companies' regional transmission organization, for the PJM delivery point of the applicable Company (i.e., the PJM designated METED, PENELEC, PENN POWER or APS Zone), plus an additional \$20/MWh. This additional amount is designed to cover costs for other supply components associated with the LMP-priced portion of the Default Service supply, including capacity, ancillary services, and AEPS Act compliance. This adder will be included in Appendix E of the SMA for the Residential/Commercial Auction.

The fixed price paid to Default Service Suppliers from the Residential/Commercial Auction will be adjusted for each MWh of load by a seasonal billing factor, representing anticipated seasonal differences in energy prices. The seasonal billing factors are included in Appendix E of the SMA for these Suppliers. One seasonal billing factor applies in the summer months (June-August) and the other seasonal billing factor applies in the non-summer months (September-May) for each delivery period.

3.2 Prices Paid to Winning Suppliers in the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction

In accordance with Appendix D of the "Default Service Supplier Master Agreement for Industrial Customer Class (Hourly Pricing Service)," the Default Service Suppliers from the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction will be paid a price with a fixed price component and a variable price component.

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- The fixed price component will be equal to 100 percent (100%) of the delivered supply each hour multiplied by the price established through the Companies' competitive procurement process. The seasonal billing factor described above for the Default Service Suppliers from the Residential/Commercial Auction does not apply to the Default Service Suppliers from the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction.
- The variable price component will be equal to 100 percent (100%) of the delivered supply each hour multiplied by a "spot price." The "spot price" will be equal to the sum of: (a) the real time hourly total LMP established by PJM for the PJM delivery point of the applicable Company, plus (b) an adder of \$5/MWh. This adder is designed to cover costs of other supply components associated with the LMP-priced portion of the Default Service supply, including ancillary services and AEPS compliance.

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Deleted: Default Service Suppliers from the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction will be paid a variable price equal to the real-time hourly total LMP for the applicable PJM delivery point, plus an additional \$5/MWh

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4. PRIOR TO THE START OF BIDDING

4.1 Information Provided to Bidders

The Companies will make available certain information to suppliers in advance of qualification. This information will be posted on the Information Website.

4.1.1 Data

Load and other data that are posted to the Information Website are described in a data description document on the Information Website.

4.1.2 Minimum and Maximum Starting Prices

The Independent Evaluator will announce a minimum starting price and a maximum starting price for each product in the auction. The minimum and maximum starting prices establish the range for the possible round 1 prices for the auction.

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4.1.3 Tranche Size, Tranche Targets

No later than eight (8) days prior to the Part 1 Application Due Date, the Independent Evaluator will announce for each product in the auction:

- The tranche targets or the number of tranches being procured for each product.
- The size (%) and MW-measure of the tranches in the auction.

No later than four (4) days prior to the Part 2 Application Due Date, the Independent Evaluator will announce:

- Any update to the MW-measure of the tranches in the auction.

4.2 Qualification Process

There are two parts to the bidder application and qualification process. In Part 1, prospective bidders apply to become Qualified Bidders. In Part 2, each Qualified Bidder provides certifications and its indicative offer and pre-bid security in order to become a Registered Bidder.

If two auctions with similar products are held within a fairly short time period (for example, within one month of each other), a prospective bidder who submitted a completed Part 1 Application for the first auction need not complete and submit another Part 1 Application for the subsequent auction. The Qualified Bidder still needs to complete a separate Part 2 Application for each auction. In any case, a prospective bidder is obligated to inform the Independent Evaluator of any change in its status related to the information the prospective bidder previously provided in its Part 1 Application or its Part 2 Application.

4.2.1 Part 1 Application: Certifications and Other Qualified Bidder Requirements

In the Part 1 Application process, prospective bidders will be required to:

- Submit an application from a person with the power to bind the bidder.
- Agree to comply with all rules of the auction.
- Agree that if they become winning bidders, they will execute the applicable SMA with the Companies within 3 business days following the date of the Commission's approval of the auction results.
- Show either that they are a PJM Market Participant and Load Serving Entity in PJM, or that there exist no impediments to them becoming a PJM Market Participant and Load Serving Entity in PJM by the start of the applicable delivery period.
- Agree that if they become winning bidders, they will comply with the creditworthiness requirements set forth in the SMA.
- Certify that if they qualify to participate, they will not disclose information regarding the list of Qualified Bidders or confidential information that may be obtained during the bidding process about Qualified Bidders.
- Certify that if they qualify to participate, they will not substitute another entity in their place, transfer their rights to another entity, or otherwise assign their status as Qualified Bidders to another entity.

Part 1 Applications must be submitted to the Independent Evaluator no later than 12:00 p.m. noon prevailing Eastern Time on the Part 1 Application Due Date. Prospective bidders will be notified by the Independent Evaluator no later than three (3) days after the Part 1 Application Due Date whether they succeeded in becoming Qualified Bidders.

A prospective bidder that has qualified during the Part 1 Application process becomes a Qualified Bidder. The Independent Evaluator will send a list of all Qualified Bidders to relevant parties that have undertaken to maintain the confidentiality of the list of Qualified Bidders. The relevant parties that will receive this list of Qualified Bidders are as follows:

- Each Qualified Bidder.
- Other parties as necessary to oversee the proper conduct of the auction, including representatives from the Companies and Commission Staff.

All parties receiving a list of Qualified Bidders will be subject to the confidentiality requirements as specified below and in the section, "Communications Protocols," in these Bidding Rules.

4.2.2 Part 2 Application: Certifications, Indicative Offer, and Pre-Bid Security

For each auction, a Qualified Bidder must successfully complete the Part 2 Application process in order to become a Registered Bidder that can bid in the auction. Only Qualified Bidders may submit a Part 2 Application.

Part 2 Applications must be submitted to the Independent Evaluator no later than 12:00 p.m. noon prevailing Eastern Time on the Part 2 Application Due Date. Qualified Bidders will be notified by the Independent Evaluator whether they succeeded in the Part 2 Application process no later than three (3) days after the Part 2 Application Due Date.

Certifications

In the Part 2 Application, each Qualified Bidder will make a number of certifications regarding associations to ensure that they are participating independently of other Qualified Bidders and to ensure the confidentiality of information regarding the auction.

A Qualified Bidder is associated with another Qualified Bidder if the two bidders have ties that could allow them to act in concert or that could prevent them from competing actively against each other. The competitiveness of the auction and the ability of the auction to produce competitive prices may be harmed by the coordinated or collusive behavior that associations facilitate. As the Independent Evaluator relies on a number of factors to assess and promote competitive bidding, including the number of independent competitors, using inaccurate information or insufficient disclosure of associations in the Part 2 Application is prohibited.

Indicative Offer

With its Part 2 Application, a Qualified Bidder will be required to submit an indicative offer and to post pre-bid security sufficient for this indicative offer. A Qualified Bidder's indicative offer specifies two (2) numbers of tranches for each product in the auction. For each product, the first number represents the number of tranches that the Qualified Bidder is willing to serve at the minimum starting price for the product and the second number represents the number of tranches that the Qualified Bidder is willing to serve at the maximum starting price for the product. For each product, the number of tranches specified

in the indicative offer at the minimum starting price cannot exceed the number of tranches specified at the maximum starting price.

Indicative offers are important in two respects. First, the Independent Evaluator may use the indicative offers to inform the setting of the starting price for each product (i.e., round 1 announced price). Second, the total number of tranches indicated by the Qualified Bidder at the maximum starting prices is used to determine the Qualified Bidder's initial eligibility (i.e., the maximum total number of tranches the Qualified Bidder can bid across all products in round 1 of the auction): the Qualified Bidder's initial eligibility is set to the sum of the number of tranches at the maximum starting prices across all products in the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer. During the auction, bidders are free to switch their tranches among products in response to changes in announced prices (subject to any bidding restrictions). However, a bidder will never be able to bid a total number of tranches across products that exceeds the bidder's initial eligibility. Thus, the number of tranches for each product at the maximum starting prices in the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer does not limit the number of tranches the Qualified Bidder can bid on a particular product, but the total number of tranches at the maximum starting prices across all products in the indicative offer must be equal to the Qualified Bidder's desired initial eligibility across all products.

Restrictions on the Indicative Offer

Each Qualified Bidder will be subject to a load cap that limits the number of tranches the bidder can bid on and win. Thus, the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer at the maximum starting prices across all products is not allowed the load cap. The load cap will be 50 percent on an aggregated load basis across all auction products for each auction such that no bidder may bid on and win more tranches than the load cap. The load cap will be implemented by ensuring that each bidder's initial eligibility does not exceed the load cap in an auction.

Pre-Bid Security

Each Qualified Bidder must post pre-bid security sufficient for its indicative offer at the maximum starting prices. Each Qualified Bidder must post pre-bid security in an amount equal to \$250,000 per tranche for all products included in the bidder's indicative offer at the maximum starting prices. Either cash or a letter of credit will be accepted as pre-bid security. Some bidders may be subject to additional credit requirements or may be required to submit a letter of intent to provide a guaranty from a Guarantor or a letter of reference from a bank. Interest will not be paid on cash posted as pre-bid security. The standard form of the letter of credit and other security documents that are in a form acceptable to the Companies will be posted to the Information Website.

If a draft letter of credit, alternate guaranty, letter of intent to provide a guaranty, letter of reference, or any alternate security submitted by the prospective bidder with the Part 1 Application does not conform to the standard form, the prospective bidder shall indicate clearly any and all modifications in electronic, redlined format from the standard form. The Companies will assess, in their sole and exclusive discretion, whether such modifications are acceptable. Modifications that are accepted by the Companies will be posted on the Website. In its Part 2 Application, a Qualified Bidder must provide the required executed credit documents that either use the standard form or incorporate only those modifications to the standard form accepted by the Companies upon review of the bidder's Part 1 Application.

The following is an example calculation of the pre-bid security.

The following is an example calculation of the pre-bid security.

Example 1. Pre-Bid Security

A Qualified Bidder rated investment grade submits an indicative offer of 5 tranches for the Met-Ed 24-month residential product at the minimum starting price and 10 tranches for the Met-Ed 24-month residential product at the maximum starting price, 3 tranches for the Penelec 12-month residential product at the minimum starting price and 6 tranches for the Penelec 12-month residential product at the maximum starting price, and 2 tranches for the Penn Power 6-month commercial product at the minimum starting price and 4 tranches for the Penn Power 6-month commercial product at the maximum starting price. The Qualified Bidder must submit with this indicative offer of 20 tranches at the maximum starting prices cash or a letter of credit of \$250,000 per tranche. The Qualified Bidder thus posts cash or a letter of credit of \$5 million (20 tranches X \$250,000 per tranche).

Depending on whether the Qualified Bidder is relying on its own financial standing or on that of a Guarantor, and depending on the results of the creditworthiness assessment at the time of the Part 1 Application, the Qualified Bidder may be required additionally to submit a letter of intent to provide a guaranty from its Guarantor or to provide a letter of reference from its bank. Any such additional requirements would be communicated to the Qualified Bidder at the time of qualification during the Part 1 Application process.

For a Part 2 Application to be accepted, it must be complete, including the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer, letter of credit or cash, and additional security (if required). After its Part 2 Application is accepted, a Qualified Bidder becomes a Registered Bidder. The Independent Evaluator will send each Registered Bidder a summary of its indicative offer, pre-bid security amount, and the Registered Bidder's initial eligibility.

The Independent Evaluator also will send simultaneously to each Registered Bidder, and to those other parties as necessary to oversee the proper conduct of the auction, a list of Registered Bidders, and the total initial eligibility aggregated across all Registered Bidders. The list of Registered Bidders and the total initial eligibility will not be released publicly. Qualified Bidders, in their Part 2 Applications, will have undertaken to maintain the confidentiality of the list of Registered Bidders and the total initial eligibility, and to destroy documents including electronic files with this information provided by the Independent Evaluator within five (5) days following the conclusion of the auction, as explained further in the Part 2 Application.

Letters of credit and additional security (if required) will remain in full force, at a minimum, until the fifth calendar day after the conclusion of the auction. Subsequently, a bidder's financial guaranty will be marked cancelled and returned:

- As soon as practicable if the bidder has won no tranches.
- After the bidder has signed the SMA and has complied with all creditworthiness requirements of the SMA for the tranches that it has won.

The Companies can collect on the financial guarantees of bidders that win tranches but that fail to sign the SMA or fail to comply with the creditworthiness requirements immediately following the close of the auction.

4.2.3 Sanctions for Failing to Comply with the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications

Sanctions can be imposed on a bidder for failing to disclose information relevant to determining associations, for coordinating with another bidder, or for failing to abide by any of the certifications that it will have made in its Part 1 and Part 2 Applications. Such sanctions can include, but are not limited to, termination of the SMA, loss of all rights to provide supply for the Companies to serve any load won by such bidder, forfeiture of financial guarantees and other fees posted or paid, prosecution under applicable state and federal laws, debatement from participation in future solicitations, and other sanctions that may be appropriate. For any failure to disclose information or for any violation of the certifications, the Independent Evaluator will make a recommendation on a possible sanction.

4.3 Starting Prices (Round 1 Prices)

No later than three (3) days before bidding starts for an auction, the Independent Evaluator will inform all Registered Bidders of the starting price for each product in the auction, which is the announced price that will be in effect for round 1. For each product, the starting price will be no higher than the maximum starting price and no lower than the minimum starting price for the product. The Independent Evaluator will set the starting prices.

4.4 Extraordinary Events

The Independent Evaluator, in consultation with the Companies, may determine that, due to extraordinary events, the minimum starting prices and the maximum starting prices require revision. In this event, the schedule for the auction process also may be revised. If the indicative offers have already been received, the Independent Evaluator will request that the Registered Bidders (or the Qualified Bidders if the Part 2 Application process had not been completed) revise their indicative offers on the basis of the revised minimum starting prices and the revised maximum starting prices.

For such a revision to be necessary, an extraordinary event must occur between the time at which the minimum starting prices and the maximum starting prices are announced and the day on which bidding starts. An extraordinary event must be agreed to by the Companies and the Independent Evaluator. Such events could include, but are not limited to, the advent of war, the disruption of a major supply source for potentially extended periods, or other events that could affect significantly the cost of supply.

If an extraordinary event occurs during that time, the Independent Evaluator in consultation with the Companies will determine revised minimum starting prices and revised maximum starting prices. New indicative offers based on these prices will be required from bidders. To the extent practicable, the determination of new minimum and maximum starting prices, the submission of new indicative offers, and if necessary the announcement of new starting prices, will be carried out so as to afford bidders sufficient time. If an extraordinary event occurs during that time that causes a possible change in the schedule, the Independent Evaluator in consultation with the Companies and Commission staff, will determine a revised schedule.

5. BIDDING FORMAT

In order to participate in the auction, bidders must have been successful in the Part 1 Application process and the Part 2 Application process. Only Registered Bidders are permitted to participate in the auction. Registered Bidders will bid in the auction by accessing the Independent Evaluator's secure Bidding Website.

5.1 Descending-Price Clock Format

The auction format is a simultaneous, multiple-round, descending-price clock format for "N" rounds. The number of rounds "N" for the auction is not pre-determined. Instead, it is determined by the closing rule for the auction (described below). All products are available to bid on simultaneously in the auction. Bids are submitted during bidding rounds. Prices are announced for the products prior to each bidding round, and during a bidding round, a bidder submits for each product the number of tranches it would supply at the product's announced price. If the total number of tranches bid on a product exceeds the product's tranche target — i.e., the product is over-subscribed — the announced price for the product will be reduced for the next round. Announced prices will tend to decline round by round until the number of tranches bid falls sufficiently so that no product is over-subscribed and the auction closes.

An important rule is that a bidder cannot reduce the number of tranches it bids on a product if the product's announced price does not fall from one round to the next; in this case, the bidder can only maintain or increase the number of tranches it bids on the product (subject to other rules).

5.1.1 Rounds

Each bidding round has a specified start time and a specified end time. These start and end times are enforced by the Bidding Website. Prior to the start of the auction, the initial schedule of rounds will be available on the Bidding Website. As the auction progresses, the Independent Evaluator will keep bidders informed of the start and end times of subsequent rounds through the Bidding Website. The Independent Evaluator retains the option of pausing a round, delaying the start or end of a round, or otherwise adjusting the round times. The Independent Evaluator will inform bidders through the Bidding Website if it exercises this discretion to change the start time or end time of a round.

Bidders submit bids only during a round. When a round ends, the bids submitted during that round are processed and results of that round are reported to all bidders as explained in the section "Reporting Round Results" below. Each bidder then prepares to submit a bid for the next round if the auction remains open.

5.1.2 The Announced Prices and a Bid

Prior to the start of each round, the Independent Evaluator announces the price that will be in effect for each product for the round. The announced prices are specified in dollars per MWh or \$/MWh. The price announced by the Independent Evaluator for a product applies to all of the product's tranches. Each bidder decides how many tranches it is willing and able to supply for each product at the product's announced price. A bid by a bidder is, for each product, the number of tranches that the bidder is willing to supply at that announced price for the product. All bids are irrevocable and binding upon the bidders.

At sufficiently high announced prices there will be excess supply for a product causing it to be over-subscribed; that is, the number of tranches bid on the product will exceed the product's tranche target. Excess supply for a product is measured as the total number of tranches bid across all bidders on the product in the round minus the product's tranche target.

5.1.3 Reservation Prices and Starting Prices

There are reservation prices for the auction. The reservation price for a product is the price above which tranches for the product will not be purchased. If, at the conclusion of the auction, the reservation price for a product has not been met, no tranches for that product will be awarded. At the conclusion of the auction, the Independent Evaluator will inform bidders through the Bidding Website if the reservation price for a product has not been met.

Starting prices for the auction are determined after reservation prices are determined. The starting price for a product will be no lower than the reservation price for the product. The starting price may be the same as or higher than the reservation price for the product. The Independent Evaluator will not announce the reservation prices to bidders in advance of an auction.

5.1.4 Restrictions on What a Bidder Can Bid

The total number of tranches a bidder bids across all products in a round cannot exceed the bidder's eligibility for that round. That is, a bidder's eligibility to bid in a round is the maximum number of tranches it is allowed to bid across all products in that round. A bidder's eligibility for a round simply is the number of tranches the bidder bid across all products in the preceding round. Thus, a bidder cannot increase its eligibility from round to round; its eligibility can only stay the same or decrease from round to round.

A bidder is not allowed to bid more tranches on a product in a round than the product's tranche target.

A bidder is not allowed to bid a number of tranches that would violate any applicable load cap.

If the announced price for a product has been reduced from one round to the next round, the bidder can reduce the number of tranches it bid on that product.

If the announced price for a product has not been reduced from one round to the next round, the bidder cannot reduce the number of tranches it bid on that product.

Subject to the rules above, in each round a bidder is free to bid its tranches of eligibility across products however it would like to. Thus, subject to the rules above, bidders are free to reduce the tranches they bid and/or to switch tranches across products from round to round in response to changes in the announced prices for the products.

As discussed above, a bidder's initial eligibility is its eligibility for round 1 of the auction and is determined by the total number of tranches across products at the maximum starting prices in the bidder's indicative offer. During the course of the auction, the bidder's eligibility will decline or remain unchanged depending on the total number of tranches bid by the bidder across all products in each round of the auction.

If a bidder's eligibility falls to zero tranches, it will not be allowed to bid in any more rounds of the auction.

5.1.5 Multiple Bids by a Bidder

Because a bidder may decide to change a bid it submitted previously within the current open round, a bidder is allowed to make multiple bid submissions in a round as long as the round remains open for bidding, with each new confirmed bid fully replacing any prior bids it submitted in the round. If a bidder submits multiple bids in a round, the only bid considered in the round for that bidder is the last confirmed bid it submitted in the round.

5.1.6 Default Bid

After the end of a round, a default bid is submitted automatically on behalf of a bidder if the bidder:

- Entered the round with positive eligibility, and
- Did not submit a confirmed bid in the round.

If the announced price for a product declined from the prior round, then zero tranches will be the default bid for that product.

If the announced price for a product did not decline from the prior round, then the number of tranches that the bidder bid on the product in the prior round as determined by the end-of-round ("EOR") procedure following the prior round will be the default bid for the product.

Each bidder is solely responsible for ensuring it submits a confirmed bid prior to the end of the round in order to avoid a default bid of being submitted on the bidder's behalf.

5.1.7 The EOR Procedure

At the end of each round, the EOR procedure is used to process the confirmed bids submitted during the round. The EOR procedure includes the following steps.

- (a) The supply for each product is measured by summing up — across the confirmed bids for all bidders — the number of tranches bid for each product.
- (b) The subscription level for each product is measured by comparing the supply for the product to the tranche target for the product. A product is over-subscribed, subscribed, or under-subscribed if supply (i.e., the number of tranches bid) is greater than, equal to, or less than the product's tranche target, respectively.
- (c) If a product has become under-subscribed in a round after being over-subscribed or subscribed in the preceding round, then tranches will be rolled back to the point that the product is subscribed. That is, at least some of the tranches that were bid on the product in the preceding round but that were not bid on the product this round will be deemed to still be bid on the product. The price at which a rolled-back tranche is deemed to have been bid simply is the announced price at which the bidder had bid the tranche. There is a priority for selecting tranches to roll back: tranches that otherwise would no longer be bid on any product in the auction and therefore would be reductions in bidders' eligibilities are rolled back first (referred to as "eligibility reduction tranches"), and then if needed, tranches that were switched from being bid on the product to being bid on another product are selected next for rollbacks (referred to as "switched tranches"). Eligibility reduction tranches are selected for rollback proportionally tranche by tranche, not bidder by bidder. Likewise, switched tranches are selected for rollback proportionally tranche by tranche, not bidder by bidder. More precisely, because integer tranches are needed, the actual selection mechanism uses a random number generator to select rollbacks tranche by tranche (first for eligibility reduction tranches and then for switched tranches), but on average the selection process results in proportional rollbacks (with priority given to rolling back eligibility reduction tranches first and then switched tranches second). All tranches that are rolled back maintain their eligibility for the bidder. Any bidder subjected to a rollback will be notified through the Bidding Website that a rollback has taken place and will be informed about the number of tranches deemed bid on each product and the price at which those tranches have been deemed bid.

For example, suppose a bidder bids five tranches on a product and no tranches on other products in round 8, and the price for that product is reduced for round 9 and the bidder bids only 1 tranche on the product and no tranches on other products for round 9. Absent any EOR rollbacks following round 9, the bidder's eligibility would fall from 5 tranches to 1 tranche. But during the EOR procedure, suppose two of the bidder's 4 "eligibility reduction tranches" are rolled back on the product, so after the EOR procedure the bidder is deemed to have bid 3 tranches on the product — one at the announced price of the round just ended and two at the announced price of the preceding round — and therefore the bidder is deemed to have 3 tranches of eligibility for round 10.

- (d) "Free eligibility tranches" are determined as follows. A product's "bid stack" is a list of the tranches currently deemed bid on the product and the price at which each tranche was bid for the product. Because of rollbacks, a product's bid stack could have tranches bid at two different prices: some tranches bid at the earlier, higher announced price and some tranches bid at the current, lower announced price. Any new tranche bid on such a product necessarily will be bid at the current, lower announced price. This new tranche will displace a tranche in the product's bid stack at the earlier, higher announced price. The displaced tranche becomes a "free eligibility tranche". The free eligibility tranche counts as eligibility for the bidder and the bidder can bid the tranche on any product next round, or the bidder can choose not to bid the tranche at all. But if the bidder does not bid the free eligibility tranche next round, the tranche will be withdrawn from the auction permanently and will reduce the bidder's eligibility by one tranche after the next round.
- (e) In some cases, the Independent Evaluator may reduce the tranche targets. The criteria that could lead to such a reduction will be determined prior to the auction but will not be announced to bidders. Once certain pre-specified criteria related to excess supply and related to the reservation price have been met, the discretion to reduce a product's tranche target because of insufficient supply will be eliminated. Thus, any tranche target reduction would more likely occur in the earlier rounds of the auction. If the Independent Evaluator reduces the tranche target for a product, bidders will be informed of the revised tranche target. Any bidder that otherwise would have eligibility exceeding the new tranche targets will have its eligibility reduced so as not to exceed the new tranche targets.
- (f) The closing rule determines whether the auction has concluded. The closing rules is that the auction concludes if either case (1) or case (2) holds as follows:
- (1) If no product is over-subscribed and no bidder has free eligibility tranches, then the auction has concluded. Note that it is possible for the auction to continue with no reductions in announced prices: if no product is over-subscribed there will be no reductions in announced prices but if there are free eligibility tranches (which "expire" after one round), the auction will remain open for one more round (subject to case (2) described next), allowing bidders with free eligibility to bid those tranches.
- (2) If this is the Nth consecutive round in which no product is over-subscribed, and the number of tranches of free eligibility across all bidders as a percentage of the sum of the tranche targets across all products is less than or equal to X percent, then the auction has concluded. The parameter values for N and X will be determined before the auction. The likelihood that this case (2) would occur in a particular auction is expected to be low.
- (g) If the auction has concluded, the winning tranches, winning bidders, and winning prices are determined as described below.
- (h) If the auction has not concluded, then each bidder's eligibility is determined for the next round and the price decrement (if any) is determined for each product for the next round.

5.1.8 Price Decrements

The announced prices will decrease round by round by a price decrement for over-subscribed products. Pre-specified price guidelines are used to determine the price decrements. Generally the price decrement for a product will be larger for the earlier rounds in the auction and when the excess supply for the product is greater. The price decrement is expected to be between 0.5 percent and 5 percent of the announced price for the most recently completed round.

The Independent Evaluator reserves the right to override the price decrement guidelines. The exercise of that right is expected to occur rarely and only if doing so is believed to facilitate timely progression of the bidding process.

5.2 Determination of Winning Tranches, Winning Bidders, and Winning Prices

At the close of the auction, the winning tranches, winning bidders, and winning prices will be determined as follows.

As a result of the EOR procedure as described above, there are two possible scenarios for a product at the close of the auction.

5.2.1 Bid Stack for a Product has All Tranches at the Same Price

In this scenario, there are no rolled-back tranches in the product's bid stack: all tranches in the bid stack were bid at the last announced price, including any tranches bid on the product in the last round of the auction as determined by the EOR procedure. That announced price is the product's clearing price, and all tranches in the product's bid stack are winning tranches if the clearing price satisfies the product's reservation price. Bidders who bid those tranches are winning bidders for those tranches, and all bidders with winning tranches on a product are paid the same price — i.e., the clearing price — for each winning tranche on the product. Note that this scenario includes the case in which a product was over-subscribed at some point in the auction and later became subscribed, as well as the case in which a product was always under-subscribed in the auction (i.e., it was never subscribed or over-subscribed in the auction).

5.2.2 Bid Stack for a Product has Tranches at Two Different Prices

In this scenario, there are rolled-back tranches in the product's bid stack: some tranches in the bid stack were bid at the last announced price (including any tranches bid on the product in the last round of the auction as determined by the EOR procedure), and some tranches in the bid stack were bid at the next most recent announced price. In this case, the product's clearing price is the next most recent announced price — which necessarily is higher than the last announced price for the product. All tranches in the product's bid stack are winning tranches if the clearing price satisfies the product's reservation price. Bidders who bid those tranches are winning bidders for those tranches, and all bidders with winning tranches on a product are paid the same price — i.e., the clearing price — for each winning tranche on the product.

5.3 Example of Round-by-Round Bidding

Appendix A provides an illustrative example of round-by-round bidding.

5.4 Reporting Round Results

During a round, a bidder can see the current status of the auction and the status of the current round including the announced price for each product as well as the bidder's own bidding status. A bidder will not see information about other bidders.

Between rounds the Bidding Website will report the results for the most recently completed round. Results for all prior rounds also will be accessible. The round results for each completed round in the auction will show:

- The announced price for each product and a range of total supply across all bidders and all products (that is, a range that includes the total number of tranches bid). The range of total supply will be defined by two different integers. Actual total supply will not be reported but will be at least as high as the lower of the two integers and no higher than the higher of the two integers. There is an exception to reporting total supply as a range of two integers: if and when total supply has declined below a pre-determined level, total supply will be reported simply as being below that level. The reporting ranges will be made available to bidders in advance of each auction.
- For each bidder, that bidder's bid for the round — i.e., the number of tranches bid on each product — and the bidder's eligibility for the next round. (Each bidder does not see information about other bidders.)
- The announced price for each product for the next round if the auction will continue with the next round.

5.5 Frequency of Rounds

The early rounds of bidding may be longer in duration than later rounds. The duration of a bidding round will be at least five (5) minutes.

The time between early rounds of bidding may be longer in duration than for later rounds. The time between bidding rounds will be at least five (5) minutes.

The schedule of rounds and any changes to the schedule will be made available to bidders through the Bidding Website.

5.6 Auction Pause Declared by Independent Evaluator

At any time during the auction, the Independent Evaluator may decide to pause the auction. This is not expected to happen often if at all. If the Independent Evaluator pauses the auction or changes the round schedule in any way, bidders will be notified.

6. AFTER THE AUCTION CLOSES

6.1 Notification of Results

At the close of the auction, the Independent Evaluator will notify the Companies, the Commission, and the bidders as follows.

- The Independent Evaluator will notify the Companies and the Commission of the identities of the winning bidders, the number of tranches won by each winning bidder, the prices for the tranches won, and other aggregated information on the bidding process.
- The Independent Evaluator will notify each winning bidder of how many tranches the bidder has won and at what prices. The Independent Evaluator also will notify the unsuccessful bidders that they have not won any tranches.

The names of the winning bidders, the number of tranches won by each bidder, and the winning prices will remain confidential until released publicly by the Commission or as required by law.

The auction results are tentative subject to Commission approval.

After the conclusion of the auction and provision of the auction results to the Commission by the Independent Evaluator, the Commission will have one business day to approve or reject the auction results.

6.2 Execution of SMA

The winning bidders and the Companies will execute the SMAs within three (3) business days following the Commission's approval of the auction results. Each winning bidder must demonstrate compliance with the creditworthiness requirements set forth in the SMA.

6.3 Sanctions for Failure to Execute the SMA

A winning bidder's financial guaranty posted with its Part 2 Application may be forfeited if the winning bidder does not execute the SMA within three (3) business days following the Commission's approval of the auction result, if it fails to demonstrate compliance with the creditworthiness requirements set forth in the SMA, or if it fails to agree to any of the terms of the SMA. In addition, the winning bidder will be liable for damages incurred by the Companies, which will be determined in accordance with the terms of the SMA as though the winning bidder were a defaulting party to the SMA.

7. USE OF THE BIDDING WEBSITE

Bidders will bid in the auction by accessing the Independent Evaluator's secure Bidding Website. A bidder will access the Bidding Website using their own Web browser. The URL address for the Bidding Website, as well as usernames and passwords, will be provided to Registered Bidders prior to the start of the auction.

The Bidding Website allows a Registered Bidder to submit and confirm bids, to verify its status, to view results from prior rounds, to view the schedule of rounds, and to view messages from the Independent Evaluator.

7.1 Importance of Confirmed Bids

Submitting a bid on the Bidding Website involves three steps:

- (1) Web page for entry and submission of the bid quantities. The bidder enters its desired bid and then submits the bid in order to proceed to the next step.
- (2) Web page for validation of the bid. The bidder is asked to review the bid it submitted in the first step before proceeding to the confirmation step.
- (3) Web page showing confirmation of the bid. The bidder receives a unique confirmation ID for the bid and the time-stamp at which the bid was recorded by the Bidding Website server.

It is important to note that a bid is not accepted and recorded as an accepted bid until and unless the bidder reaches the third step in which the bid confirmation Web page displays the unique confirmation ID and time-stamp for the bid.

7.2 Requirements for Using the Bidding Website

Access to the Bidding Website requires all of the following:

- Username and password provided by the Independent Evaluator.
- Access to the Internet.
- Use of one of the more recent versions of a standard Web browser.
- Status as a Registered Bidder.

A bidder loses access to the Bidding Website after it no longer is possible for the bidder to win tranches in the auction.

7.3 Messaging

The Bidding Website displays messages from the Independent Evaluator. These messages from the Independent Evaluator are displayed for all bidders with access to the Bidding Website.

8. BACKUP BIDDING PROCEDURE

In case a bidder has technical difficulties, and as a result is not able to submit a bid via the Bidding Website in a round, a backup bidding procedure will be provided as follows. The bidder uses the Backup Bidding Fax Number to submit its bid via facsimile. It is recommended that the bidder call the Help Desk and inform the operator that it has submitted a bid using the backup bidding procedure. Reasonable efforts will be made to contact the bidder if the backup bid is not received via facsimile in the time expected. Once the backup bid is received via facsimile, a member of the Independent Evaluator team will attempt to enter the bid on the Bidding Website on behalf of the bidder.

Prior to the auction, bidders will be provided with the Backup Bidding Fax Number and with forms to use for faxing a bid using the backup bidding procedure.

Bidders must be aware and understand that there is no guarantee or other assurance that if it submits a bid using the backup bidding procedure that its bid will be submitted and confirmed on its behalf by the Independent Evaluator team consistent with the intentions of the bidder and in time before the round ends.

If a backup bid submitted by a bidder is not accepted and confirmed by the Bidding Website because the round has ended, a default bid will be entered for the bidder as described above in the sections on default bids.

If a backup bid submitted by a bidder is not accepted and confirmed by the Bidding Website for other reasons (e.g., the number of tranches bid is greater than a bidder's eligibility or violates the bidder's credit-based tranche limit or applicable load cap), the Independent Evaluator team will use reasonable efforts to inform the bidder that a new bid must be submitted.

If a backup bid submitted by a bidder is confirmed by the Bidding Website, the Independent Evaluator team will contact the bidder by faxing confirmation of the accepted bid to the bidder.

Bidders use the backup bidding procedure at their own risk. In all cases involving backup bids, the Independent Evaluator team does not accept any responsibility, obligation, or liability for errors, omissions, timeliness, or otherwise, related to whether a backup bid is entered into and confirmed by the Bidding Website on behalf of the bidder or as intended by the bidder.

9. WHO TO CONTACT IN CASE OF PROBLEMS DURING THE AUCTION

A bidder should contact the Help Desk if it has questions or problems. The phone number for the Help Desk will be provided to bidders prior to the start of the auction.

10. CONTINGENCY PLAN

There is a contingency plan to cover two scenarios:

- At least one of the products in an auction is not fully subscribed.
- At least one of the winning suppliers defaults prior to the start of the delivery period or at any time during the delivery period.

10.1 If an Auction is Not Fully Subscribed

In the event that an auction is not fully subscribed, the Companies will rebid the unfilled tranches from that auction provided a minimum of 30 calendar days exists prior to the start of the delivery period. The unfilled tranches will be rebid in the next scheduled auction where supply is sought with the same delivery start date. If there is no such scheduled auction, then the unfilled tranches will be rebid in a separate solicitation no later than 30 days before the original delivery start date. For any remaining unfilled tranches, the Companies will purchase the necessary physical supply through PJM administered markets and meet any AEPS compliance requirements through purchases at market prices.

10.2 If a Winning Bidder Defaults

If a winning bidder defaults prior to the start of or during the delivery period, the Companies will offer the unfilled tranches to the other qualified bidders who participated in the most recent solicitation. The Companies will enter into an agreement with the qualified bidder or bidders offering the best terms for the unfilled tranches resulting from the default, provided the prices offered by such bidder or bidders are consistent with the original prices under which the unfilled tranches were procured and changes in market conditions from the time when the original tranches were procured. If the Companies are not able to enter into such agreement and a minimum of 30 calendar days exists prior to the start of the delivery period, the Companies will seek to bid the defaulted tranches in the next scheduled solicitation for supply with the same start date as the unfilled tranches or in a separate supplemental competitive solicitation. As with other unfilled tranches described above, if insufficient time exists to conduct an additional competitive solicitation, or if the supplemental solicitation is unsuccessful, the Companies will supply the tranches using PJM-administered markets. In addition to damages to which the Companies may be entitled, costs incurred by the Companies in implementing this contingency plan for supply and AEPS requirements will be assessed against the defaulting supplier's credit security, to the extent available.

11. COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS

The communications protocols described here are intended to promote a fair, open, transparent, objective, and non-discriminatory auction. These protocols also are intended to protect proprietary information of participants and information that, should it be released, would be detrimental to the outcome of the auction process or future solicitations.

11.1 The Companies and Affiliates

11.1.1 Internal Communications

The Companies will designate individuals to work on the auction process. These individuals directly or indirectly will not have communication with, or exchange information with, any individuals of an affiliate of the Companies that may bid in the auction process where such communication or information is related directly or indirectly to this auction process.

11.1.2 Communications with Bidders

The Companies will not communicate with bidders prior to the selection of winning bids. When the Independent Evaluator informs the Companies about the prices and tranches of the winning bids and the identity of winning bidders in accordance with Section 6.1 of the Bidding Rules, representatives from the Companies then will communicate with the winning bidders in order to execute the necessary documents.

If a bidder attempts to contact the Companies regarding the auction process by phone call, email, fax, or other means, the Companies will direct the bidder to the Information Website and/or to the Independent Evaluator.

11.1.3 Part 1 Application Process

For the Part 1 Application process, the Independent Evaluator will need to provide the names of applicants to the Companies' credit department for purposes of confirming the applicants' credit requirements.

11.1.4 Part 2 Application Process

For the Part 2 Application process, the Independent Evaluator will need to provide the aggregate eligibility and other information from the Part 2 Applications to the Companies with the names of applicants redacted.

11.2 General Public and Media

While bidding is in progress, there is to be no communication with the media or the public. After the auction process is completed, results are determined, and bidders have been notified, all media inquiries will be forwarded to the Companies.

11.2.1 The Information Website

The central source of information made available publicly and to bidders is the Information Website. The Independent Evaluator will manage the information flow on the Information Website and will be designated on the Website as the contact for any questions or inquiries from parties. Any party will have access to the public sections of the Information Website.

11.2.2 Frequently Asked Questions

Among other information and resources on the Information Website, there will be an FAQ (frequently asked questions) section with posted questions and answers. As inquiries are received, they will be converted into an FAQ and posted on the Information Website without revealing the identity of the party posing the inquiry.

Inquiries to be answered by the Companies will be forwarded by the Independent Evaluator to the Companies. Inquiries to be answered by the Independent Evaluator will be forwarded to the Companies with a draft response. Any inquiry or draft response forwarded by the Independent Evaluator to the Companies will not identify the party posing the inquiry. Both the Companies and the Independent Evaluator will review any inquiry and response before the FAQ is posted to the Information Website.

11.2.3 Registered Users

If a party wishes to receive notices and updates regarding public information and new postings to the Information Website, then the party can register through the Information Website to become a Registered User.

Any information the Independent Evaluator has concerning the auction process that is relevant and that can be disclosed publicly will be made available equally to all Registered Users in a timely manner. The method of such communication likely will be via the Information Website and/or emails to Registered Users using the BCC email field so identification of Registered Users is not disclosed to other Registered Users.

11.2.4 Press Releases

The Companies and/or the Independent Evaluator may issue one or more press releases or may place news items in the trade press with the intent to disseminate information about the auction process in an efficient, fair, and timely manner.

11.2.5 Answering Inquiries from the General Public or Media

Inquiries from the general public or the media to the Independent Evaluator will be directed to the Information Website.

11.3 Bidders

11.3.1 Communications Among Bidders

Bidders are prohibited from communicating with each other in ways that would compromise the integrity and competitiveness of the auction process. Sanctions will be applied if these rules are violated.

11.3.2 Communications between the Independent Evaluator and Bidders

The central source of information made available to bidders is the Information Website. The Website facilitates making information available equally to bidders in a timely manner.

Bidders are encouraged to become Registered Users of the Information Website to receive ongoing information about the auction process. As discussed above, once registered through the Information Website, Registered Users will receive notifications from the Independent Evaluator about updates to the auction process and to the Information Website.

If the Independent Evaluator receives an inquiry from a party and prepares a response that would be relevant for other parties, the Independent Evaluator will ensure the information will be made available equally to all Registered Users in a timely manner and will post the information on the Information Website and/or will email the Registered Users without revealing the identity of parties.

In addition to posting information to the Information Website, the Independent Evaluator may contact bidders directly in order to seek or provide information about the auction process in a way that does not advantage any bidder.

Any communications from the Independent Evaluator to a bidder will not reveal the identity of other bidders.

11.3.3 Bidding Process

During the auction, the Independent Evaluator, the Commission, and Companies' personnel may monitor the bidding process.

The Independent Evaluator will ensure the bids submitted by bidders conform to the rules of the auction process.

The Bidding Rules and pre-determined bid selection criteria will be applied to determine which bids, if any, are winning bids.

11.3.4 Limitations on Disclosures by Bidders

Bidders are not allowed to disclose they are participating in the Residential/Commercial Auction or the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction, and winning bidders are not allowed to disclose that they have won any tranches in the Residential/Commercial Auction or the Industrial (Hourly Priced) Auction until the Commission publicly reports the results of the auction. Such limitation on public disclosure by bidders is waived if disclosure is required by law.

11.4 Public Utility Commission of Pennsylvania

11.4.1 Communications with the Independent Evaluator

During the bidding process, the identity of bidders, prices, and the number of tranches bid will be kept confidential. This information may be released to the Commission after the auction results are finalized.

11.4.2 Communications with the Companies

The Commission may communicate with the Companies regarding the auction process. However, the Companies will not disclose any proprietary information until after the final round of the auction is completed and bidders are informed of the results of the auction.

11.4.3 Communications with Bidders

The Commission will not communicate with bidders about the auction process prior to the determination of winning bids. If a bidder attempts to contact the Commission by phone call, email, fax, or other means, the Commission will direct the bidder to the Information Website and/or to the Independent Evaluator.

11.4.4 Information on Auction Participation

In order to maintain confidential and proprietary information provided by bidders as part of the auction process, the identity of all bidders that submitted Part 1 and/or Part 2 Applications in the auction and the indicative offers will be kept confidential until released publicly by the Commission. The Commission may elect to keep these data confidential at its sole discretion.

11.4.5 Round-by-Round Bids

Round-by-round bids by bidders will be kept confidential pursuant to the confidentiality provisions of the Bidding Rules and the SMA for as long as the Companies continue to procure Default Service.

12. ASSOCIATION AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION RULES

The Association and Confidential Information rules are described below.

12.1 Process for Reporting Associations, Identifying Concerns and Remedies

A prospective bidder applying to qualify to bid will be required to disclose in its Part 1 Application any bidding agreement or arrangement in which it may have entered. A prospective bidder will be required to certify in its Part 1 Application that, should it qualify to participate, it will not disclose information regarding the list of Qualified Bidders. A prospective bidder also will be required to certify that it accepts the terms of the SMA and, should it win tranches, it will sign the applicable SMA and comply with all creditworthiness requirements by the stated deadline.

Once entities are qualified to bid, each Qualified Bidder will be asked in its Part 2 Application to make a number of certifications, each detailed in the Part 2 Application, and each bidder may be required to provide additional information to the Independent Evaluator if a certification cannot be made. Each Qualified Bidder will be asked to certify that it will undertake steps to appropriately restrict its disclosure of Confidential Information relative to its bidding strategy and Confidential Information regarding the auction. A Qualified Bidder also will be asked to certify that it has not and will not come to any agreement with another Qualified Bidder with respect to bidding in the auction, except as disclosed and approved by the Independent Evaluator in its Part 1 Application.

Before obtaining sealed documentation necessary to participate in the auction, Registered Bidders will be required to certify that they will continue to maintain the confidentiality of any information that they will have acquired through their participation in the auction.

12.2 Confidential Information

Confidential Information relative to bidding strategy means information relating to a bidder's bid(s) in the auction, whether transmitted in writing or verbally, which if it were to be made public likely would have an effect on any of the bids that another bidder would be willing to submit. Confidential Information relative to bidding strategy includes (but is not limited to): a bidder's strategy; a bidder's indicative offer; the quantities that a bidder wishes to supply; the bidder's estimation of the value of a tranche; the bidder's estimation of the risks associated with serving the load for the auction; and a bidder's contractual arrangements for purchasing power to serve such load were the bidder to win tranches in the auction.

Confidential Information regarding the auction means information that is not released publicly by the Commission, the Companies or the Independent Evaluator and that a bidder acquires as a result of participating in the auction, whether transmitted in writing or verbally, which if it were to be made public could impair the integrity of current or future solicitations, impair the ability of the Companies to hold future solicitations, or harm consumers, bidders or applicants. Confidential Information regarding the auction includes (but is not limited to): the list of Qualified Bidders, the list of Registered Bidders, the initial eligibility, the status of a bidder's participation, and all non-public reports of results and announcements made by the Independent Evaluator to any or all bidders in this auction.

Absolute protection from public disclosure of the bidders' data and information filed in this auction process cannot be provided. By participating in this auction process, each bidder acknowledges and agrees to the confidentiality provisions set forth herein, as well as any limitations thereto.

In addition, the bidder agrees the bidder's data and information submitted in this auction process will be disclosed if required by any federal, state or local agency (including, without limitation, the Commission) or by a court of competent jurisdiction. However, the Companies will endeavor to notify the bidder in advance of such disclosure. In any event, neither the Companies nor the Independent Evaluator, nor any of their employees or agents, will be responsible to the bidders or any other party, or liable for any disclosure of such designated materials before, during or subsequent to this auction. Notwithstanding the above, the Companies and the Independent Evaluator reserve the right to use and communicate publicly and/or to third parties any and all information/data submitted as part of this auction process in any proceedings before FERC, the Commission, and any other regulatory body and the courts, if necessary, without the prior consent/approval of, or notice to, any such bidder. The bidder expressly agrees that the Companies may provide bidder information on a confidential basis to the Commission, the Pennsylvania Office of the Consumer Advocate, and the Office of Small Business Advocate as necessary for compliance with any default service procurement reporting obligations.

12.3 Certifications and Disclosures to Be Made

A prospective bidder will be required in its Part 1 Application to disclose any bidding agreement or any other arrangement in which the prospective bidder may have entered and that is related to its participation in the auction. A prospective bidder that has entered into such an agreement or arrangement must name the entities with which the prospective bidder has entered into a bidding agreement, or a joint venture for the purpose of participating in the auction, or a bidding consortium, or any other arrangement pertaining to participating in the auction. A bidding consortium is a group of separate businesses or business people joining together to submit joint bids in the auction.

In addition, a prospective bidder will be required to make the certifications listed in the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications.

The Commission may publicly release the winning prices and the names of the winning bidders from the auction. The Commission may choose to release additional information. After the auction, a winning bidder itself may release information regarding the number of tranches it has won, and a non-winning bidder itself may release information only regarding the fact that it participated in the auction. The winning bidders and the non-winning bidders otherwise continue to be bound by their certifications as described previously. In particular, no winning bidder and no non-winning bidder itself can reveal the winning prices of the auction prior to these being publicly released by the Commission.

12.4 Actions to Be Taken if Certifications Cannot Be Made

If a bidder cannot make all the certifications above, the Independent Evaluator will decide within five (5) days following the deadline to submit the Part 2 Application on a course of action on a case-by-case basis. To decide on this course of action, the Independent Evaluator may make additional inquiries to understand the reason for the inability of the bidder to make the certification.

If Qualified Bidders do not comply with additional information requests by the Independent Evaluator regarding certifications required in the Part 2 Application, the Independent Evaluator may reject the application.

12.5 Sanctions for Failure to Comply

Sanctions may be imposed on a Qualified Bidder for failing to properly disclose information relevant to determining associations, for coordinating with another bidder without disclosing this fact, for releasing Confidential Information or disclosing information during the auction (aside from only the specific exceptions provided above with respect to entities explicitly named in the Part 1 Application as entities that are part of a bidding agreement or other arrangement, to an Advisor; or bidders with which it is associated), and in general for failing to abide by any of the communications protocols in the section, "Communications Protocols," of these Bidding Rules. Such sanctions can include, but are not limited to, any one or more of the following: termination of the SMA; the loss of all rights to provide tranches won by such bidder; the forfeiture of letters of credit and other fees posted or paid; action (including prosecution) under applicable state and/or federal laws; attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in any litigation that arises out of the bidder's improper disclosure; debarment from participation in future solicitations; and/or other sanctions that may be appropriate. Should such an event occur, the Independent Evaluator will make a recommendation to the Companies regarding sanctions. The imposition of such sanctions will be at the discretion of the Companies.

13. MISCELLANEOUS

13.1 Warranty on Information

The information provided for the auction, including but not limited to information provided on the Information Website, has been prepared to assist bidders in evaluating the auction process. It does not purport to contain all the information that may be relevant to a bidder in satisfying its due diligence efforts. Neither the Companies nor the Independent Evaluator make any representation or warranty, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the information, and shall not, either individually or as a corporation, be liable for any representation expressed or implied in the auction process or any omissions from the auction process, or any information provided to a bidder by any other source. A bidder should check the Information Website frequently to ensure it has the latest documentation and information. Neither the Companies, nor the Independent Evaluator, nor any of their representatives, shall be liable to a bidder or any of its representatives for any consequences relating to or arising from the bidder's use of information.

13.2 Hold Harmless

Bidder shall hold the Companies and the Independent Evaluator harmless of and from all damages and costs, including but not limited to legal costs, in connection with all claims, expenses, losses, proceedings or investigations that arise in connection with the auction process or the award of a bid pursuant to the auction process.

13.3 Bid Submissions Become the Companies' Property

All bids submitted by bidders participating in the auction will become the exclusive property of the Companies upon conclusion of the auction process.

13.4 Bidder's Acceptance

Through its participation in the auction process, a bidder acknowledges and accepts all the terms, conditions and requirements of the auction process and the SMA.

13.5 Permits, Licenses, Compliance with the Law and Regulatory Approvals

Bidders shall obtain all licenses, permits and status that may be required by any governmental body, agency or organization necessary to conduct business or to perform hereunder. Bidders' subcontractors, employees, agents and representatives of each in performance hereunder shall comply with all applicable governmental laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, orders and all other governmental requirements.

13.6 Auction Intellectual Property

All title, interests and other intellectual property rights in and to the auction design, the auction format and methodology, the auction software, the source code (including all modifications, enhancements, customization, adaptations and derivative works made by the Independent Evaluator) and associated documentation, including but not limited to these Bidding Rules, and the screen formats and forms designed by the Independent Evaluator (the "Auction Software"), are proprietary to the Independent Evaluator and all rights, title, and interest to the Auction Software remain with the Independent Evaluator. The Independent Evaluator grants Qualified Bidders a non-exclusive, non-transferable, limited license to use the Auction Software, solely for use in connection with the auction, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein, and not for copying, relicensing, sublicensing, distribution or marketing by the Qualified Bidder. No other interest is conveyed to the Qualified Bidder other than the license expressly granted herein. The foregoing use license shall immediately terminate upon disqualification of the Qualified Bidder or upon termination or completion of the auction process. If at any time it is determined in the Independent Evaluator's sole discretion that the Qualified Bidder is in breach of this Section 13.6, the Independent Evaluator shall be entitled to terminate the Qualified Bidder's access rights to the Auction Software.

Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, and without limiting the Qualified Bidder's other obligations herein, the Qualified Bidder shall not, nor shall it permit any third party to: (i) modify, translate or otherwise create derivative works of the Auction Software; (ii) reverse engineer, decompile, decode, disassemble or translate any Auction Software, or output thereof, or otherwise attempt to reduce to human readable form or derive the source code, protocols or architecture of any Auction Software; (iii) use or study any Auction Software, or output thereof, for the purpose of developing any software that is intended to replace, or that has functions, structure or architecture similar to, such Auction Software, or any part thereof; (iv) publish, or otherwise make available to any third party, any benchmark or other testing information or results concerning the Auction Software; (v) permit any other person who is not authorized to access or use all or any part of the Auction Software or (vi) copy the Auction Software, distribute the Auction Software, remove or obscure any proprietary labeling on or in the Auction Software, create any derivative works based on the Auction Software, or modify the Auction Software, in each case, except to the extent expressly permitted by the Independent Evaluator in writing.

In using the Auction Software, a Qualified Bidder shall take steps to prevent any virus, worm, built-in or use-driven destruction mechanism, algorithm, or any other similar disabling code, mechanism, software, equipment, or component designated to disable, destroy or adversely affect the Auction Software from being introduced into the systems.

APPENDIX A — EXAMPLE OF ROUND-BY-ROUND BIDDING

The illustrative example below shows for two bidders (BidderA and BidderB) and two products (Product-1 and Product-2) the confirmed bids (pre-EOR) and the post-EOR results for each round. In the example, the auction closes after round 4.

Round 1

For round 1, the announced prices are \$75.00 and \$82.00 for Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. At those announced prices, BidderA bids 55 tranches and 85 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. BidderB bids 80 tranches and 27 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Each product is over-subscribed: 135 tranches were bid on Product-1 which has a tranche target of 100, and 112 tranches were bid on Product-2 which has a tranche target of 100.

The announced price for Product-1 will be reduced from \$75.00 to \$72.50 for round 2. The announced price for Product-2 will be reduced from \$82.00 to \$78.60 for round 2.

BidderA will have eligibility of $55+85 = 140$ tranches for round 2, and BidderB will have eligibility of $80+27 = 107$ tranches for round 2.

Round 2

At the announced prices for round 2, BidderA bids 40 tranches and 85 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderA reduced its tranches bid on Product-1 from 55 to 40 tranches. BidderB bids 50 tranches and 57 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderB switched 30 tranches from Product-1 to Product-2.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Product-1 is under-subscribed by 10 tranches: only 90 tranches bid against the tranche target of 100 tranches: BidderA's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 15 tranches, while BidderB's bid maintained its eligibility. Thus, 10 of the 15 eligibility reduction tranches of BidderA are rolled back on Product-1. Those 10 tranches are priced at the announced price for Product-1 at which they were bid in round 1: \$75.00. The announced price for Product-1 will remain at \$72.50 for round 3.

Product-2 is over-subscribed by 42 tranches. The announced price for Product-2 will be reduced from \$78.60 to \$76.10 for round 3.

BidderA will have eligibility of $50+85 = 135$ tranches for round 3 (including the 10 tranches rolled back on Product-1), and BidderB will have eligibility of $50+57 = 107$ tranches for round 3.

Round 3

At the announced prices for round 3, BidderA bids 99 tranches and 36 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderA is switching 49 of the tranches bid from Product-2 to Product-1. BidderB bids 50 tranches and 35 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderB is reducing its tranches bid on Product-2 from 57 to 35 tranches.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Product-1 is over-subscribed by 49 tranches. Product-2 is under-subscribed by 29 tranches: only 71 tranches bid against the tranche target of 100 tranches: BidderA's bid maintained its eligibility while BidderB's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 22 tranches. Thus, all 22 of the eligibility reduction tranches of BidderB are rolled back on Product-2. Those 22 tranches are priced at the announced price for Product-2 at which they were bid in round 2: \$78.60. Even after rolling back those 22 eligibility reduction tranches of BidderA, Product-2 still is under-subscribed — by 7 tranches. So 7 tranches that BidderA had switched from Product-2 to Product-1 are rolled back to Product-2. Those 7 tranches are priced at the announced price for Product-2 at which they were bid in round 2: \$78.60.

After rolling back 7 tranches from Product-1 to Product-2 for BidderA, BidderA still has increased the number of tranches it is bidding on Product-1: from 50 tranches bid in round 2 (10 tranches at \$75.00 and 40 tranches at \$72.50) to 92 tranches bid in round 3 (10 tranches at \$75.00 and 82 tranches at \$72.50). Product-1 is over-subscribed as a result, so higher-priced tranches in Product-1's bid stack can be removed. All 10 of BidderA's higher-priced tranches are removed from Product-1's bid stack, and these 10 tranches become BidderA's free eligibility for round 4. In round 4, BidderA can bid any of the 10 tranches on any product, but to the extent those 10 tranches are not bid on a product in round 4, those free eligibility tranches and their associated eligibility for BidderA will be permanently removed from the auction after round 4.

Because Product-1 is over-subscribed, the announced price for Product-1 will be reduced from \$72.50 to \$70.15 for round 4. Because Product-2 is not over-subscribed, the announced price for Product-2 will remain at \$76.10 for round 4.

BidderA will have eligibility of $82+43+10 = 135$ tranches for round 4, and BidderB will have eligibility of $50+57 = 107$ tranches for round 4 (including the 22 tranches rolled back on Product-2).

Round 4

At the announced prices for round 4, BidderA bids 46 tranches and 43 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderA reduced its tranches bid on Product-1 from 82 to 46 tranches. BidderB bids 32 tranches and 57 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderB reduced its tranches bid on Product-1 from 50 to 32 tranches.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Product-1 is under-subscribed by 22 tranches: only 78 tranches bid against the tranche target of 100 tranches: BidderA's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 36 tranches, while BidderB's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 18 tranches. Of the 54 fewer tranches bid on Product-1, 36 were eligibility reductions from BidderA and 18 were eligibility reductions from BidderB. Of those 54 fewer tranches bid, $100-78 = 22$ tranches need to be rolled back on Product-1. The selection of which tranches are rolled back is done by assigning random numbers tranche by tranche (not bidder by bidder) to each of the 54 fewer tranches bid on Product-1. On average, the selection of the rolled back tranches will be proportional based on the number of tranches by which each bidder reduced its bid on the product. Thus, if the assignment of random numbers and selection of rolled back tranches were repeated many times, the number of rolled back tranches for BidderA on Product-1 would be expected to be 15 on average or $(82-46)/(132-78)*(100-78) = 36/54*22$, rounded, and the number of rolled back tranches for BidderB on Product-1 would be expected to be 7 on average: $(50-32)/(132-78)*(100-78) = 18/54*22$, rounded.

Auction Close

After the rollback is done for Product-1, it is determined that no product is over-subscribed and no bidder has free eligibility tranches. Thus, the criteria are met for closing the auction.

Product-1's bid stack has tranches bid at \$72.50 and tranches bid at \$70.15. So Product-1's clearing price is the higher of the two, or \$72.50. BidderA wins 61 tranches and BidderB wins 39 tranches for Product-1. All 100 tranches procured for Product-1 are paid the price of \$72.50.

Product-2's bid stack has tranches bid at \$78.60 and tranches bid at \$76.10. So Product-2's clearing price is the higher of the two, or \$78.60. BidderA wins 43 tranches and BidderB wins 57 tranches for Product-2. All 100 tranches procured for Product-2 are paid the price of \$78.60.

Example 2. Round-by-Round Bidding with Pre-EOR and Post-EOR Results

| Round | Product-1 | | | | | Product-2 | | | | | Next-Round Eligibility | |
|----------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|-----------|---------------|------------------------|-------|
| | Announced Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Bid | @ Price | Excess Supply | Announced Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Bid | @ Price | Excess Supply | Free | Total |
| 1 | \$75.00 | | | | | \$82.00 | | | | | | |
| Pre-EOR | | 100 | 135 | | 35 | | 100 | 112 | | 12 | | |
| BidderA | | | 55 | @ \$75.00 | | | | 85 | @ \$82.00 | | — | 140 |
| BidderB | | | 80 | @ \$75.00 | | | | 27 | @ \$82.00 | | — | 107 |
| Post-EOR | | 100 | 135 | | 35 | | 100 | 112 | | 12 | | |
| BidderA | | | 55 | @ \$75.00 | | | | 85 | @ \$82.00 | | — | 140 |
| BidderB | | | 80 | @ \$75.00 | | | | 27 | @ \$82.00 | | — | 107 |
| 2 | \$72.50 | | | | | \$78.60 | | | | | | |
| Pre-EOR | | 100 | 90 | | (10) | | 100 | 142 | | 42 | | |
| BidderA | | | 40 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 85 | @ \$78.60 | | — | 125 |
| BidderB | | | 50 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 57 | @ \$78.60 | | — | 107 |
| Post-EOR | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | 100 | 142 | | 42 | | |
| BidderA | | | 50 | 10 @ \$75.00 40 @ \$72.50 | | | | 85 | @ \$78.60 | | — | 135 |
| BidderB | | | 50 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 57 | @ \$78.60 | | — | 107 |

| Round | Product-1 | | | | | Product-2 | | | | | Next-Round Eligibility | |
|----------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|------------------------------|---------------|------------------------|-------|
| | Announced Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Bid | @ Price | Excess Supply | Announced Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Bid | @ Price | Excess Supply | Free | Total |
| 3 | \$72.50 | | | | | \$76.10 | | | | | | |
| Pre-EOR | | 100 | 149 | | 49 | | 100 | 71 | | (29) | | |
| BidderA | | | 99 | 10 @ \$75.00 89 @ \$72.50 | | | | 36 | @ \$76.10 | | — | 135 |
| BidderB | | | 50 | 50 @ \$72.50 | | | | 35 | @ \$76.10 | | — | 85 |
| Post-EOR | | 100 | 132 | | 32 | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | |
| BidderA | | | 82 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 43 | 7 @ \$78.60 36 @ \$76.10 | | 10 | 135 |
| BidderB | | | 50 | @ \$72.50 | | | | 57 | 22 @ \$78.60 35 @ \$76.10 | | — | 107 |
| 4 | \$70.15 | | | | | \$76.10 | | | | | | |
| Pre-EOR | | 100 | 78 | | (22) | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | |
| BidderA | | | 46 | @ \$70.15 | | | | 43 | 7 @ \$78.60 36 @ \$76.10 | | — | 89 |
| BidderB | | | 32 | @ \$70.15 | | | | 57 | 22 @ \$78.60 35 @ \$76.10 | | — | 89 |
| Post-EOR | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | 100 | 100 | | 0 | | |
| BidderA | | | 61 | 15 @ \$72.50 46 @ \$70.15 | | | | 43 | 7 @ \$78.60 36 @ \$76.10 | | — | 104 |
| BidderB | | | 39 | 7 @ \$72.50 32 @ \$70.15 | | | | 57 | 22 @ \$78.60 35 @ \$76.10 | | — | 96 |

| | Product-1 | | | | Product-2 | | | Tranches Won |
|---------|----------------|----------------|--------------|--|----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Clearing Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Won | | Clearing Price | Tranche Target | Tranches Won | |
| Results | \$72.50 | 100 | 100 | | \$78.60 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| BidderA | | | 61 | | | | 43 | 104 |
| BidderB | | | 39 | | | | 57 | 96 |

EXHIBIT C

Penelec Default Service Supply Plan

June 1, 2013 to May 31, 2015

21- 50 MW Residential Tranche Procurement Schedule (18 Full Requirements Tranches and 3 Fixed Block and Spot Tranches)

| Auction | Tranches Bid | Total Tranches | Months to Delivery | Delivery Period | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|----------|---------|---------|--------|----------|
| | | | | 6/1/11 | 5/31/12 | 6/1/12 | 5/31/13 | 6/1/13 | 11/30/13 | 12/1/13 | 5/31/14 | 6/1/14 | 11/30/14 |
| Jan-10 | 3 | 14% | 17 | 35 months (Energy Only) - 50MW | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan-13 | 9 | 43% | 5 | 24 months | | | | | | | | | |
| Feb-13 | 9 | 43% | 4 | 12 months | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan-14 | 9 | 43% | 5 | 12 months | | | | | | | | | |

20 - Commercial Tranche Procurement Schedule

| Auction | Load Bid | Total Load | Months to Delivery | Delivery Period | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|----------|------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|----------|---------|---------|--------|----------|
| | | | | 6/1/11 | 5/31/12 | 6/1/12 | 5/31/13 | 6/1/13 | 11/30/13 | 12/1/13 | 5/31/14 | 6/1/14 | 11/30/14 |
| Jan-13 | 10 | 50% | 5 | 6 months | | | | | | | | | |
| Feb-13 | 10 | 50% | 4 | 12 months | | | | | | | | | |
| Sep-13 | 10 | 50% | 3 | 12 months | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan-14 | 10 | 50% | 5 | 12 months | | | | | | | | | |
| Sep-14 | 10 | 50% | 3 | 6 months | | | | | | | | | |

11 - Hourly Pricing Service Tranche Procurement Schedule

| Auction | Tranches Bid | Total Tranches | Months to Delivery | Delivery Period | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|----------|---------|---------|--------|----------|
| | | | | 6/1/11 | 5/31/12 | 6/1/12 | 5/31/13 | 6/1/13 | 11/30/13 | 12/1/13 | 5/31/14 | 6/1/14 | 11/30/14 |
| Sep-13 | 11 | 100% | 3 | [Redacted] | | | | | | | | | |

