

**BEFORE THE  
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**

ALDERWOODS (PENNSYLVANIA), INC.,  
a wholly owned subsidiary of SERVICE  
CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL, t/a  
BURTON L. HIRSCH FUNERAL HOME,

No. C-2016-2522634

Complainant,

vs.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY,  
  
Respondent.

**RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION  
TO COMPLAINANT'S PETITION FOR  
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW AND  
ANSWERS TO MATERIAL QUESTIONS**

Filed on Behalf of the Respondent,  
Duquesne Light Company

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Pursuant to 52 Pa Code § 5.302(b), Respondent Duquesne Light Company ("Duquesne Light" or the "Company") submits this Brief in Opposition to Complainant's Petition for Interlocutory Review and Answers to Material Questions:

**I. BACKGROUND**

Complainant Alderwoods (Pennsylvania), Inc.'s ("Complainant" or the "Funeral Home") Petition marks the fifth time -- in the fourth different forum -- it has argued that the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission ("Commission") lacks the jurisdiction to make a liability determination in this action. The Funeral Home's argument has been rejected each time: twice by the Honorable Paul F. Luty in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County; once by the Superior Court; and once by Administrative Law Judge Conrad Johnson. Complainant's latest challenge to the Commission's jurisdiction should be rejected again, for the same reasons.

This action's lengthy procedural history rebuts the Funeral Home's argument that yet another round of jurisdictional debate will expedite the ultimate resolution of this action.

On January 9, 2009, an unidentified vehicle crashed into a utility pole on Forward Avenue in Pittsburgh. The pole carried Duquesne Light electrical lines. The crash broke the pole and caused several local buildings, including the Funeral Home, to lose power. Soon after power was restored, a fire broke out in the Funeral Home. The Funeral Home's insurer filed this subrogation action against Duquesne Light in August 2009, claiming that Duquesne Light incorrectly attached wires in restoring power. When discovery developed no evidence to support this theory, the Funeral Home then claimed that Duquesne Light should have inspected the Funeral Home's internal electrical system before restoring service.

Duquesne Light moved for summary judgment because it owed the Funeral Home no legal duty to enter or inspect the Funeral Home before restoring service and, therefore, as a matter of law it could not be found negligent. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas granted Duquesne Light's motion. The Funeral Home appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court's decision, holding that an electric utility company may have to inspect and to warn prior to restoring service. Alderwoods (Pa), Inc. v. Duquesne Light Co., 52 A.3d 347 (Pa. Super. 2012). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Duquesne Light's petition for allowance of appeal and affirmed in part, holding that electrical service providers have a duty "to take reasonable measures to avert harm in a scenario in which the utility has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition impacting a customer's electrical system, occasioned by fallen and intermixed electrical lines proximate to the customer's premises." Alderwoods (Pa), Inc. v. Duquesne Light Co., 106 A.3d 27, 42 (Pa. 2014). This duty encompasses an obligation to provide "some form of warning" to its customers prior to restoring power if such actual or constructive knowledge is present. Id. at 39 (emphasis added). The case was remanded for further proceedings. The Parties' trip through the appellate circuit took about four years.

After remand, the Funeral Home filed a Second Amended Complaint. The Funeral Home amended its pleading to "leave no doubt that it alleges a failure to warn as well as a

failure to inspect. Hirsch therefore seeks to amend the subparagraphs of the paragraphs recounting the specifics of Duquesne Light's negligence -- paragraph 22 of the Second Amended Complaint -- to state the specifics of Duquesne Light's failure to warn, **and to make clear that Duquesne Light's negligence was more in its overall restoration of service** rather than mere physical reconnection." Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 19 (emphasis added).

Because the Funeral Home's new theory of liability placed at issue subjects that are comprehensively and exclusively regulated by the PUC -- restoration of electrical service and communications with customers before restoring service -- Duquesne Light moved for bifurcation and transfer of the liability phase of this action to the Commission under the primary jurisdiction rule. The Funeral Home opposed Duquesne Light's motion to bifurcate, arguing that the primary jurisdiction rule did not apply. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas (Lutty, J.) disagreed with the Funeral Home, bifurcated the action, and transferred the liability portion to the Commission for resolution. Judge Lutty's Order was entered on September 14, 2015.

Since that time, the Funeral Home has filed pleadings asking four different forums to reverse the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas' decision to transfer the liability determination to the Commission. The Funeral Home's central argument has been the same each time: that the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply and the Commission lacks jurisdiction to determine Duquesne Light's liability.<sup>1</sup>

The Funeral Home's first attempt to disturb the Common Pleas Court's ruling was a Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative for Amendment of Order to Allow Interlocutory Appeal, filed with the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on September 22, 2015. The Funeral Home argued in its Motion for Reconsideration that the cases cited in the first

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<sup>1</sup> Most of these motions, briefs, and orders were attached as exhibits to the Funeral Home's Formal Complaint, and are thus part of the record in this matter.

paragraph of the "Discussion" section of its Petition warranted reversal. The court disagreed and denied the motion.

The Funeral Home's next attempt was a Petition for Review with the Superior Court. The Funeral Home again argued, *inter alia*, that the Commission could not award damages and therefore lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Duquesne Light's liability under the primary jurisdiction rule. The Superior Court, in a single sentence *per curiam* order, dismissed the appeal.

After the Superior Court rejected its request for interlocutory appeal, the Funeral Home filed the pending Formal Complaint before the Commission. Shortly thereafter, the Funeral Home filed preliminary objections *to its own Complaint*, arguing yet again that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Duquesne Light's liability. ALJ Johnson correctly overruled the preliminary objections, reasoning that the Commission had jurisdiction "to determine Duquesne's duty in providing service to Hirsch." First Interim Order, p. 7, 8. The Funeral Home then filed the pending Petition arguing, for the fourth time in the past seven months, that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to resolve Duquesne Light's liability.

## II. STANDARD

The "standard for granting a petition for Commission review and answer to a material question is a high one." Mobilfone of Northeastern Pa., Inc. v. Paul Kelly d/b/a American Teletronix, 67 Pa. P.U.C. 256 (1988). Section 5.302(a) of 52 Pa. Code requires that there be "*compelling reasons why interlocutory review will prevent substantial prejudice or expedite the conduct of the proceedings*" for a request like Complainant's to be granted (emphasis added).

## III. ARGUMENT

### A. **The Funeral Home has not made the showing to obtain interlocutory review required by 52 Pa Code § 5.203.**

The Commission will not review an ALJ's rulings "except upon a petition alleging *compelling reasons for same*." Mobilfone, *supra* (emphasis in original). The Funeral Home

incorrectly claims to have met the stringent requirements of 52 Pa. Code § 5.302 merely because this case is several years old and it believes the Commonwealth Court will eventually rule in its favor. Petition, p. 3. In other words, the Funeral Home asserts that interlocutory review is justified by the mere passage of time, its disagreement with ALJ Johnson's interpretation of the law, and its threats to file more appeals from future rulings. That position, which could be taken by any litigant on the losing side of any motion, falls far short of the exceptional circumstances warranting interlocutory review under the Commission's regulations.

The Commission's task in resolving the Petition is "to examine whether substantial prejudice would be visited upon the Complainant if the Commission does not consider [its] Petition. . . ." Linda Berkery v. PECO Energy Co., C-2010-2170223, 2011 WL 765620, at \*4 (Jan. 13, 2011). The Funeral Home must establish that the alleged error "and any prejudice flowing therefrom . . . could not be satisfactorily cured during the normal Commission review process." Id. The Commission must also consider whether answering the Funeral Home's questions "will expedite the conduct of the proceeding." Id. The only alleged prejudice the Funeral Home claims it will suffer without interlocutory review is the normal time it will take to litigate this matter. Petition, p. 3. The Funeral Home admits that this so-called delay "is not typically in itself grounds for prejudice." Petition, p. 3.

The Funeral Home's concession is an important but unsurprising one, given Commission precedent. For example, in Mobilfone, supra, the respondent sought interlocutory review of an ALJ's denial of its motion to dismiss. Id. The respondent argued, like the Funeral Home,<sup>2</sup> that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the dispute in light of a prior ruling by another adjudicative body (the Federal Communications Commission) and that interlocutory "review will prevent substantial prejudice because the Respondent would not have to bear substantial

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<sup>2</sup> The Funeral Home contends that the Commonwealth Court's ruling in Poorbaugh v. Pa. Public Utility Comm'n, 666 A.2d 744 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), prevents the Commission from assuming jurisdiction over the service-related issues involved in the instant matter. Petition, pp. 2-3. Complainant's

additional duplication of time, effort and expense to litigate an issue where the FCC Ruling is controlling in this matter.” Id. Noting the high standard required to obtain interlocutory review, the Commission dismissed that argument:

The Commission will not grant review of ALJ rulings except upon petition alleging *compelling reasons* for same. Review should not be used as a vehicle to second-guess the rulings of an Administrative Law Judge where there has not been a final order resolving any of the issues involved in the proceeding. This is a more compelling rule here, where the substantial prejudice or delay alleged by Respondent is the normal time and expense associated with litigating the complaint before the Commission. We find that the Respondent has failed to demonstrate the compelling reasons required for Commission review and answer to a material question of an ALJ ruling on an interim matter, which does not finally determine any issue in the proceeding.

Id. (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted). Relying on Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, the Commission explained that the trouble and expense caused by participating in a Commission proceeding did not make “the remedy of appeal less than adequate.” Id.

The Funeral Home has not alleged any discernible prejudice it will suffer if interlocutory review is denied. The Funeral Home simply threatens to continue to appeal if it loses again. The Funeral Home’s position, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow immediate interlocutory review of every ruling unfavorable to one of the parties. Such a position defies reason and is contrary to the law of the case doctrine. Because the question of the PUC’s jurisdiction has already been decided, it is now the law of the case and cannot be disturbed. Tyro Industries, Inc. v. James A. Wood, Inc., 614 A.2d 279, 284 (Pa. Super. 1992) (“Law of the case means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case”). The PUC lacks authority to reconsider what two courts have already decided. Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons, 572 Pa. 134, 140-42 (Pa. 2002) (“Judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each others’ decisions”).

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interpretation of Poorbaugh (and the other cases cited in its Petition) is flawed for the reasons discussed

The Funeral Home has not shown that interlocutory review will expedite the conduct of these proceedings. Quite to the contrary, the PUC's authority to adjudicate this matter has been argued and decided several times over. After the parties' four-year trip through the Superior and Supreme Courts, and the ensuing battle over the Commission's jurisdiction that has consumed almost another year, it is inconceivable that yet another appeal would advance rather than delay the ultimate resolution of this action. The only way to expedite this proceeding is to move on to the merits.

**B. The primary jurisdiction rule gives the Commission jurisdiction over the liability phase of this action. (Complainant's Material Question A.)**

While the merits of ALJ Johnson's ruling are not the dispositive factor in the Commission's analysis of the propriety of a request for interlocutory review,<sup>3</sup> it is important to note that ALJ Johnson's ruling (and the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas' and Superior Court's before it) are supported by well-established Pennsylvania law.

**1. The Commission has jurisdiction to determine Duquesne Light's liability to the Funeral Home.**

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is well-settled Pennsylvania law and was first approved by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over 35 years ago. It allows a court to transfer a case to the proper administrative agency where both the court and the agency have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. "[W]here the subject matter is within an agency's jurisdiction and where it is a complex matter requiring special competence, with which the judge or jury would not or could not be familiar, the proper procedure is for the court to refer the matter to the

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in Section III(B), below.

<sup>3</sup> See Berkery, 2011 WL 765620 at \*4 ("We emphasize that the correctness of the Presiding Officer's ruling is not at issue when the Commission sets out to determine whether a petitioner has fulfilled the regulatory requirements for the Commission to take interlocutory review and answer a material question. Instead, the pertinent consideration is whether interlocutory review is necessary to avoid substantial prejudice, that is, that the error and any prejudice flowing therefrom, could not be satisfactorily cured during the normal Commission review process") (internal citations omitted).

appropriate agency. Also weighing into the consideration should be the need for uniformity and consistency in agency policy and the legislative intent.” Elkin v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 420 A.2d 371, 377 (Pa. 1980). The doctrine “creates a workable relationship between the courts and administrative agencies wherein, in appropriate circumstances, the courts have the benefit of the agency's views on issues within the agency's competence.” Elkin, 420 A.2d 376.

This case falls squarely within the PUC’s competence because it revolves around the responsibilities a utility company owes to its customer before restoring service after an outage. The thrust of Complainant’s claim is that it was unsafe and unreasonable for Duquesne Light to restore service to the Funeral Home without first engaging in certain communications with its customer. Such service-related issues are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUC. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long recognized the PUC “as the appropriate forum for the adjudication of issues involving the reasonableness, adequacy and sufficiency of public utility services.” Elkin, 420 A.2d at 374; Duquesne Light Co. v. Monroeville Borough, 298 A.2d 252 (Pa. 1972).

As the Commission is well aware, the Public Utility Code, 66 Pa.C.S.A. § 101 et seq., grants the PUC the authority to carry out the provisions of the Public Utility Code and address issues within the ambit of “services” that a utility company provides to its customers.

66 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501.<sup>4</sup> Under this broad grant of authority, the actions at the heart of Complainant’s case fall within the realm of “service.”<sup>5</sup> The Commission enacts and enforces

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<sup>4</sup> “Service” is broadly defined by the Public Utility Code and is “used in its broadest and most inclusive sense, including any and all acts done, rendered, or performed, and any and all things furnished or supplied, and any and all facilities used, furnished, or supplied by public utilities, or contract carriers by motor vehicle, in the performance of their duties under this part to the patrons, employees, other public utilities, and the public, as well as the interchange of facilities between two or more of them. . . . 66 Pa.C.S.A. § 102

<sup>5</sup> The Commission has already resolved cases involving two crucial subjects involved in this case -- power interruptions and restorations as well as the scope of a utility’s responsibilities regarding issues with its customer’s equipment. See, e.g., Gary Eckenrode v. PECO Energy Co., No. C-2012-2337839, 2014 WL 527260 (Pa. P.U.C. Feb. 6, 2014) (adjudicating customer’s complaint that PECO failed to restore service promptly after Hurricane Sandy); Maluchnik v. Penna. Elec. Co., No. C-2011-2245451, 2013 WL 1180372 (Pa. P.U.C. March 14, 2013) (“It is clear from [the utility’s] tariff, and supported in our

regulations regarding the restoration of service to customers as part of its efforts to ensure safe and reliable service. For example, 52 Pa. Code § 57.194(d) states that, when service interruptions occur, utility companies must “restore service within the shortest reasonable time.” The PUC is empowered to take, and has taken, extensive steps to regulate electric safety. See, e.g., 52 Pa. Code § 57.191; 52 Pa. Code § 57.194, 52 Pa. Code § 69.1902.

In short, Complainant’s theory of liability hinges on matters within the Commission’s jurisdiction; namely, restoration of electrical service and communications the Company should have with customers about the customers’ electrical equipment before restoring service. The overarching flaw in the Funeral Home’s position is its refusal to recognize that its allegations depend on matters within the Commission’s jurisdiction. Adjudicating Duquesne Light’s duty for restoring service to the Funeral Home should be done by the agency that administers the Commonwealth’s regulations governing restoration of service and has the special expertise necessary to make that determination in light of the practical implications of the duty Complainant seeks to impose.

**2. The Funeral Home’s demand for monetary damages does not defeat the Commission’s jurisdiction.**

A fundamental premise of the Funeral Home’s argument is that transfer was improper because the PUC cannot adjudicate a claim for monetary damages. Petition, p. 3. This is a red herring. Duquesne Light freely acknowledges that the PUC cannot award damages. So did the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when it adopted the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Elkin, 420 A.2d at 375. That is why the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a bifurcation procedure in

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Regulations, that there is a point where the responsibility of the utility ends and the responsibility of the customer begins”); Hineline v. Metro. Edison Co. and Penna. Power & Light Co., No. C-902777, 1990 WL 10714871 (Pa. P.U.C. Oct. 4, 1990) (“the ownership and maintenance responsibility of an electric utility ends at the point of delivery to the customer” and that imposing duties beyond that line of demarcation would increase costs for the utility and the ratepayers); Craft v. Penna. Elec. Co., 50 Pa. P.U.C. 1, 7 (Pa. P.U.C. 1976) (“Inasmuch as [the utility’s] ownership and maintenance responsibilities end at the point of delivery, it is [the customer’s] sole responsibility for maintaining the internal circuitry and controlling his consumption of electrical energy”).

those cases in which damages are sought in a matter involving the special expertise of the PUC. Elkin, 420 A.2d 371. Under that procedure, the issue of liability is transferred to and decided by the PUC. If necessary, the matter returns to the trial court to determine damages:

Once the administrative tribunal has determined the issues within its jurisdiction, then the temporarily suspended litigation may continue, guided in scope and direction by the nature and outcome of the agency determination.

Elkin, 420 A.2d at 377.

The Supreme Court flatly rejected the Funeral Home's argument that a litigant can avoid the PUC simply by seeking monetary damages in Elkin v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa. 420 A.2d 371 (Pa. 1980) -- a case relied upon by Complainant which *affirmed* a request to transfer the case to the PUC: "Initially, we address appellant's argument, the entire thrust of which is that Feingold has ousted the PUC for all purposes in any case involving an action for damages. Appellant's interpretation of Feingold is too broad and would 'virtually strip' the PUC of all jurisdiction merely by framing the allegations in contractual and/or trespassory terminology, and demanding damages." Id. at 375. The Court added:

Appellant's simplistic notion ignores the reality that frequently both the courts and administrative agencies must each play roles in the adjudication of certain matters, and would have this Court ignore an adjudication of a competent Commonwealth administrative agency rendered after a full and fair evidentiary hearing and consideration of briefs and arguments of the parties, in an area peculiarly within the area of expertise entrusted to the agency by the legislature. This we will not do.

Id. at 375. Not only did the Court expressly reject the very argument advanced by the Funeral Home, it also approved of the decision initially to refer the case (which also sought monetary damages) to the PUC, all the while touting the benefits of the procedure requested by Duquesne Light, ordered by the Court of Common Pleas, and approved by ALJ Johnson.

Commission precedent is in accord. Lolly v. Duquesne Light Co., Docket No.C-2010-2167824, 2011 WL 2113407 (Pa. P.U.C. May 9, 2011) ("Nevertheless, we note that, when a complaint seeking monetary damages also alleges a violation of the Code, such as the failure to

provide safe, adequate, reasonable or efficient service, we have jurisdiction to consider these service issues”).

**3. Neither Poorbaugh nor any other case cited by the Funeral Home undermines ALJ Johnson’s First Interim Order.**

The Funeral Home cites a number of cases in its Petition, but places primarily reliance on Poorbaugh v. Public Utility Comm’n, 666 A.2d 744 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), which it claims renders reversal of the “Court of Common Pleas’ bifurcation order . . . all but inevitable.” Petition, p. 3. Poorbaugh would not compel the Commonwealth Court to reverse ALJ Johnson’s ruling. While both cases involve a building damaged by fire, the theory of liability in Poorbaugh was entirely different from that advanced by the Funeral Home. In Poorbaugh, plaintiff alleged that West Penn was negligent because the company failed to take good care of its own equipment, using improper wire and splicing the wire too often. *Id.* at 745-46. Poorbaugh did not involve a duty to warn, which is the focus of the Funeral Home’s allegations. When the Funeral Home’s allegations *were* similar to those at issue in Poorbaugh -- that Duquesne Light physically misconnected its wires -- Duquesne Light did not seek bifurcation and transfer to the PUC. It was not until the Funeral Home asserted (and the appellate courts sustained) an alleged duty to warn that Duquesne Light sought to transfer to the PUC. This alleged duty to warn, which by Plaintiff’s own admission places Duquesne Light’s “overall restoration of service” directly at issue (Motion for Leave, ¶ 19), justified transferring this action to the Commission.

Plaintiff also cites cases such as DeFrancesco v. Western Pa. Water Co., 453 A.2d 595 (Pa. 1982), and Schriner v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 501 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. 1985), in support of its argument that this action should not have been bifurcated and transferred to the PUC. Those cases are distinguishable. They neither dealt with a comprehensive regulatory scheme like the one involved in this litigation, nor duty to warn allegations such as those advanced by the Funeral Home. The distinctions are critical.

DeFrancesco stemmed from allegations that a water company failed to provide adequate water service to a hydrant near plaintiff's residence. Id. at 596. The only similarity between DeFrancesco and the instant case is that both involved allegations of negligence. Unlike the instant case, resolution of the claims in DeFrancesco "depended upon no rule or regulation predicated on the peculiar expertise of the PUC, no agency policy, no question of service or facilities owed to the general public, and no particular standard of safety or convenience articulated by the PUC." Id. at 597. That is not the case here. Similarly, as Complainant notes, DeFrancesco did not involve "the question of whether appellants were entitled to [service,]" but this action does. 453 A.2d at 597. Complainant's fundamental position is that Duquesne Light *cannot restore service to its customers after an interruption* until certain communications and/or inspections take place. Complainant's allegations take dead aim at the circumstances under which its customers are entitled to prompt service restoration.

In Schriner, plaintiffs sought damages from multiple defendants for loss of their dairy cattle arising from an infection supposedly caused by "stray voltage" coming from their milking equipment, which was powered by PP&L. Id. at 1129-30. The court determined that the PUC did not have primary jurisdiction over the dispute because the case only remotely dealt with the service PP&L provided to its customers. Id. at 1130. Complainant seemingly believes that since referral to the PUC was not proper in Schriner, which involved damage stemming from stray voltage, it is also not proper in this case because this case allegedly involves damage from an alleged overvoltage. Such an argument, however, misses the point. The issue that warrants the PUC's attention in this case is not the overvoltage. It is Complainant's allegation that Duquesne Light *cannot restore service to its customer* under certain circumstances without first warning the customer about potential problems in the customer's own equipment.

In short, resolutions of the Funeral Home's allegations that Duquesne Light should have denied service to its customer until certain communications had occurred fall squarely within the

expertise and jurisdiction of the Commission. The Funeral Home's newest attempt to avoid PUC jurisdiction must meet the same fate as its prior ones.

**C. The Commission will determine whether Duquesne Light is liable to the Funeral Home, not resolve a hypothetical question. (Complainant's Material Question B.)**

The second of the Funeral Home's material questions distorts ALJ Johnson's ruling as well as Duquesne Light's request to transfer the liability phase of this case to the PUC. Duquesne Light does not seek an advisory opinion on a hypothetical question. It seeks a ruling as to whether it is liable to the Funeral Home. The Funeral Home's overtures about actual cases and controversies and the Commission's ability to answer hypothetical questions have nothing to do with the ultimate resolution of this matter. ALJ Johnson's First Interim Order makes clear this perfectly clear. He specifically indicated that the Commission has "authority to determine *Duquesne's duty in providing service to Hirsch.*" First Interim Order, p. 7 (emphasis added). There is nothing hypothetical about the First Interim Order.

**IV. CONCLUSION**

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent Duquesne Light Company respectfully requests that the Commission reject Complainant's Petition for Interlocutory Review and Answers to Material Questions and remand this action to Administrative Law Judge Johnson for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

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
**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on this 2nd day of May, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Complainant's Petition for Interlocutory Review and Answers to Material Questions, in accordance with the requirements of §1.54 (relating to service by a party), as follows:

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The document was filed electronically on the Commission's electronic filing system.



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