

**BEFORE THE
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**

Thomas and Linda Licht	:	
	:	
v.	:	C-2018-3004078
	:	
Metropolitan Edison Company	:	

INITIAL DECISION

Before
Joel H. Cheskis
Deputy Chief Administrative Law Judge

INTRODUCTION

This decision denies a formal complaint filed by customers of an electric distribution company who averred that the company threatened to terminate their electric service for failure to permit the installation of a smart meter in place of their analog meter on their property. The complaint will be dismissed because the complainants failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that the company violated the Public Utility Code, a Commission order or regulation or a Commission-approved tariff of the company regarding the installation of a smart meter.

HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDING

On August 14, 2018, Thomas Licht and Linda Licht filed a formal complaint with the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Commission) against Metropolitan Edison Company (Met-Ed), docket number C-2018-3004078. The Lichts averred that Met-Ed threatened to terminate their electric service for failure to permit the installation of a smart meter in place of their current meter on their property. The Lichts further averred that they are

declining the installation of a smart meter. The Lichts added that they met someone whose house caught on fire after the installation of a smart meter and raised concerns regarding health, safety, privacy and cyber security issues. Finally, the Lichts also stated that the forced installation of a smart meter was an invasion of their privacy and violated their Fourth Amendment constitutional rights.

As relief, the Lichts requested that Met-Ed stop harassing them and threatening to terminate their electric service. The Lichts further requested that they be permitted to keep their analog meter, that the mandate to force them to have a smart meter be rescinded and that they be permitted to opt-out of the smart meter installation program without any financial penalties.

On September 6, 2018, Met-Ed filed an answer and new matter to the complaint, essentially denying the material allegations set forth in the complaint. Met-Ed admitted that it provides residential retail electric service to the Lichts. Met-Ed averred, *inter alia*, that the Lichts have refused access to permit the installation of a smart meter at the service location. Met-Ed denied the remaining material allegations set forth in the complaint. Met-Ed further averred it is required by Act 129 of 2008, 66 Pa.C.S. § 2806.1, *et seq.* (Act 129), to install a smart meter at the Lichts' residence.

Subsequently, various procedural matters occurred in this case. In particular, a hearing notice was issued on December 19, 2019 establishing an initial in-person hearing for this matter for February 27, 2020 and assigning me as the presiding officer. A prehearing order dated December 23, 2019 was issued setting forth various procedural issues that would govern that hearing.

The evidentiary hearing was held on February 27, 2020, as scheduled. The Lichts appeared *pro se* and both presented oral testimony. Tori Giesler, Esquire and Lauren Lepkoski, Esquire, appeared on behalf of Met-Ed and presented one witness. Neither party presented exhibits for the record. A transcript of 51 pages was created and submitted to the Commission on March 9, 2020.

On March 4, 2020, the Lichts submitted a written request to file briefs in this matter. Met-Ed did not object to that request. As a result, the Lichts' request was granted and a briefing order was issued on March 19, 2020 establishing a briefing schedule and addressing additional procedural issues regarding briefs. Pursuant to the briefing schedule, Met-Ed filed a main brief on April 16, 2020. The Lichts did not file a main brief. Neither the Lichts nor Met-Ed filed a reply brief.

The record in this case closed on May 7, 2020, the day reply briefs were due. For the reasons discussed below, the Lichts' complaint will be denied.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Complainants in this case are Thomas and Linda Licht.
2. The Respondent in this case is Metropolitan Edison Company.
3. The service address is 74 Cedar Lane, Birdsboro, Pennsylvania.
4. The Lichts never had any problems with their analog meter. Tr. 11.
5. Mr. Licht has a pacemaker. Tr. 23.
6. Met Ed witness John C. Ahr is employed by FirstEnergy Service Company, a direct subsidiary of FirstEnergy Corporation, as an advisor for regulatory compliance for smart meters. Tr. 25.
7. Mr. Ahr has worked for FirstEnergy Service Company for over 35 years. Tr. 25.

8. Mr. Ahr has a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering from Pennsylvania State University and a master's in business administration from University of Pittsburgh. Tr. 25-26.

9. Mr. Ahr is responsible for all regulatory proceedings associated with the development and approval of Met-Ed's smart meter deployment plan and is the subject matter expert on Act 129 for Met-Ed. Tr. 26.

10. There is an internal surge protector built into the metrology circuitry of the smart meters. Tr. 28, 31.

11. The smart meters deployed by Met-Ed adhere to all of the safety standards established by such entities as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the manufacturer of the meters, Itron, enlists certified personnel to perform the testing required by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Tr. 28-29.

12. The smart meters used by Met-Ed are approved by Underwriters Laboratories (UL) and adhere to UL 2735 standard for electric meters. Tr. 29.

13. Met-Ed did not deploy a second wave of smart meters as a result of any issues with the meters that Met-Ed was installing. Tr. 30.

14. Zigbee is a radio protocol within the smart meters that allows customers who wish to have a qualified home energy monitoring device to communicate between the smart meter and the customer's qualified home energy device. Tr. 31-32.

15. The Zigbee radio can only be turned on and off at the request of a customer if the customer wished to see their meter real time usage of their electricity. Tr. 32.

16. The smart meter will not allow Met-Ed to turn off any electrical appliance in the customer's home. Tr. 32.

17. The meters are equipped with a remove service switch that would allow Met-Ed to disconnect and reconnect electricity remotely without requiring Met-Ed personnel to physically visit the site to do that manually in a manner consistent with the Commission's Chapter 56 regulations regarding disconnection of electricity service for non-payment. Tr.33.

18. Analog meters have a book life of 30 years. Tr. 34.

19. Smart meters have a book life of 15 years. Tr. 34.

20. The smart meters are tested by certified personnel that follow the ANSI standards for meters. Tr. 35.

21. Smart meter technology records the customers' electrical usage on an hourly interval basis which allows customers to make more informed decisions about their electric usage and how they manage their electricity usage. Tr. 38.

22. Smart meters do not have the ability to determine what appliance inside a customer's home is causing usage, only the total usage. Tr. 38.

23. The meters Met-Ed has deployed throughout its service territory is the Itron Openway Centron meter. Tr. 40.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard

Section 332(a) of the Public Utility Code provides that the party seeking relief from the Commission has the burden of proof. 66 Pa.C.S. § 332(a). As a matter of law, a complainant must show that the named utility is responsible or accountable for the problem described in the complaint in order to prevail. Patterson v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 72 Pa. PUC 196 (1990). "Burden of proof" means a duty to establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence,

or evidence more convincing, by even the smallest degree, than the evidence presented by the other party. Se-Ling Hosiery v. Margulies, 364 Pa. 54, 70 A.2d 854 (1950) (Se-Ling Hosiery). The offense must be a violation of the Public Utility Code, the Commission's regulations or an outstanding order of the Commission. 66 Pa.C.S. § 701. In this proceeding, the Lichts averred in their complaint that they would like to keep their analog meter and not have a smart meter installed. The Lichts, therefore, have the burden of proof in this proceeding.

If a complainant establishes a *prima facie* case, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the utility. If a utility does not rebut that evidence, the complainant will prevail. If the utility rebuts the complainant's evidence, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts back to the complainant, who must rebut the utility's evidence by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of going forward with the evidence may shift from one party to another, but the burden of proof never shifts; it always remains on a complainant. Milkie v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 768 A.2d 1217 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001) (Milkie); *see also*, Burleson v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 443 A.2d 1373 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1982).

On appeal, the decision of the Commission must be supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. "Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. More is required than a mere trace of evidence or a suspicion of the existence of a fact sought to be established. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 109, 413 A.2d 1037 (1980); Erie Resistor Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 166 A.2d 96 (Pa.Super. 1961); and Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare, White Haven Center, 480 A.2d 382 (Pa.Cmwlth.1984).

In addition, the Commission has established that a person does not sustain his or her burden of proof in an electric and magnetic field exposure case when the record evidence, "taken as a whole, leads to the ultimate finding and conclusion that the scientific studies at present are inconclusive." Letter of Notification of Phila. Elec. Co. Relative to the Reconstructing and Rebuilding of the Existing 138 kV Line to Operate as the Woodbourne-Heaton 230 kV Line in Montgomery and Bucks Counties, 1992 Pa. PUC Lexis 160, at *210-11 (June 29, 1992) (Initial Decision). Rather, the person must demonstrate by a preponderance of

the evidence that such exposure actually causes adverse health effects. Id. at *211. More recently, the Commission has held that “[t]he Complainant will have the burden of proof during the proceeding to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the utility] is responsible or accountable for the problem described in the Complaint.” Kreider v. PECO Energy Co., Docket No. P-2015-2495064, p. 18 (Order entered Sept. 3, 2015) (Kreider); *see also* Romeo v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 154 A.3d 422, 429 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (reversing the Commission’s decision to dismiss the complaint on preliminary objections and giving the smart meter complainant a hearing to try to prove his claim through “the testimony of others as well as other evidence that goes to that issue.”)

When presented with a challenge to a smart meter installation, the Commission has pronounced that “[t]he ALJ’s role . . . will be to determine based on the record in this particular case, whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the Complainant was adversely affected by the smart meter or whether [the utility’s] use of a smart meter will constitute unsafe or unreasonable service in violation of Section 1501 under the circumstances in this case.” Kreider, at 429, *citing*, 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501. Section 1501 of the Public Utility Code provides, in pertinent part:

Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe and reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations, substitutions, extensions and improvements in or to such service and facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees and the public. . . .

66 Pa.C.S. § 1501.

Position of the parties

In this case, the Lichts did not present any exhibits or witnesses. Nor did they present any legal argument, despite the fact that they requested, and were granted, an opportunity to file briefs in this case. As a result, the entirety of evidence the Lichts presented in support of their complaint comprises the oral testimony they provided during the hearing.

This testimony comprises primarily Ms. Licht's testimony that she believes that Act 129 does not require the deployment of smart meters to every customer of Met-Ed. Tr. 35; *see also*, Tr. 8. Ms. Licht testified that the Commission has incorrectly interpreted the language of Act 129 that requires the deployment of smart meters over a 15-year period because the use of the 15-year period in Act 129 pertains to depreciation. Tr. 35. Ms. Licht also testified regarding the various efforts that she and Mr. Licht have expended regarding their complaint and the fact that no other complainant has received an order sustaining a complaint that a smart meter should not be installed on a home. Tr. 9. Ms. Licht testified that they did not file their complaint due to health-related matters but that they believe they should not be forced to have something attached to their home that they do not want. Tr. 10-11. This is especially true since Ms. Licht has had her analog meter for 30 years and has never had a problem with it. Tr. 11. Ms. Licht also testified that she is concerned about her appliances, noting that she just replaced her air conditioning and heating unit. Tr. 12, 33. She was concerned about the lack of a surge protector to protect her appliances and that Met-Ed would be able to know what appliances she was using and when. Tr. 12, 31. Ms. Licht also testified that she was concerned about the smart meter causing a fire at her home. Tr. 14, 16. She also testified that she does not feel comfortable being forced to have the smart meter because "this is America and you took away my choice." Tr. 16-17, 19. Ms. Licht was also concerned about "dirty electricity" coming into her home. Tr. 16, 30. Ms. Licht made several grievances about how she was treated after she filed her complaint with the Commission and whether it was reasonable that the Commission regulated Met-Ed. Mr. Licht expressed concerns regarding his pacemaker and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Tr. 22-23.

In response to the Lichts' testimony, Met-Ed presented John C. Ahr, who has worked with FirstEnergy, Met-Ed's parent company, for 35 years and is responsible for Met-Ed's deployment of smart meters throughout its territory. Tr. 25-26. Mr. Ahr is the subject matter expert for Met-Ed regarding Act 129 and the smart meter project. Tr. 26. Mr. Ahr testified that there is a surge protector in the smart meter that is designed to protect the smart meter. Tr. 28. Mr. Ahr added that he has no safety concerns about the smart meters because they adhere to all FCC and ANSI safety standards. Tr. 28-29. Mr. Ahr also responded to Ms.

Licht's testimony that Met-Ed had a second wave of smart meter deployment by noting that there was no second wave. Tr. 29-30, 40.

Met-Ed also submitted a brief in this case wherein the company argued that the Lichts failed to meet their burden of proof that the installation of a smart meter at their residence would constitute unreasonable service in violation of the Public Utility Code or any Commission order or regulation. Met-Ed also argued that, instead, the company had an obligation to install smart meters at all of its customers' service locations under Act 129 and that neither Act 129 nor subsequent Commission orders regarding smart meter installation allow customers' to "opt out" from receiving a smart meter. Met-Ed argued that the Lichts' limited testimony expressed concerns about the safety of smart meters but never provided any credible or convincing evidence to support their allegations. Met-Ed contrasted the testimony presented by the Lichts with the testimony presented by its witness, Mr. Ahr, that the smart meters comply with all safety requirements and standards established by the FCC, ANSI and UL. Met-Ed provided significant legal discussion in support of its position about Section 2807 of the Public Utility Code and Met-Ed's own smart meter installation plan and refuted several of the arguments the Lichts raised in their testimony. Met-Ed also provided proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and ordering paragraphs with its main brief, as was requested in the briefing order, and concluded that the Lichts' complaint should be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

Disposition

The Lichts' complaint must be dismissed because they have failed to present substantial record evidence demonstrating that Met-Ed violated the Public Utility Code, a Commission order or regulation or a Commission-approved tariff of the company with regard to the service provided to them. When weighing the evidence presented by the Lichts against the evidence presented in response by Met-Ed, it is clear that the Lichts have failed to satisfy their burden of proof in this case. *See, Se-Ling Hosiery, Milkie, supra.*

The Lichts raised several arguments during the hearing held in this case on February 27, 2020, including their belief 1) that Act 129 does not require deployment of smart

meters to every customer in Met-Ed’s service territory and that Met-Ed is incorrectly interpreting the depreciation language in Act 129 to mandate that requirement; 2) that they should not be required to have something attached to their home if they do not want it attached to their home, especially when they believe that what is being replaced is working fine; 3) that the smart meter could cause harm to their home because there is no surge protector and because of the potential of the smart meter to cause fires; and, 4) that the smart meter causes “dirty electricity” to enter their home. Yet, the Lichts did not present any evidence beyond their own beliefs that these problems will in fact arise as a result of a smart meter being installed at their home. It is well settled that bald assertions, personal opinions or perceptions do not constitute evidence. Rivera v. Philadelphia Gas Works, Docket No. C-2010-2164222 (Order entered January 12, 2012) (Rivera); *citing*, Pa. Bureau of Corrections v. City of Pittsburgh, 516 Pa. 75, 532 A.2d 12 (1987). Therefore, the Lichts have failed to satisfy their burden of proof in this case.

Had the Lichts presented testimony from an engineer that demonstrated that somehow the smart meter, for example, caused “dirty electricity” to enter their home, or an analysis of their home energy usage that supported continued use of their analog meter, such evidence would have weighed heavily in favor of granting the Lichts’ complaint. The Lichts did not present any evidence beyond their own personal opinions and beliefs in support of their position that they should not be required to have a smart meter installed at their home.

Ms. Licht’s request that they should not be forced to have the smart meter because “this is America and you took away my choice” does not outweigh the legal argument presented by Met-Ed that they are obligated to install smart meters to every customer throughout their service territory. Met-Ed is correct that Section 2807 of the Public Utility Code provides:

(f) Smart meter technology and time of use rates.—

* * * *

(2) Electric distribution companies *shall* furnish smart meter technology as follows:

(i) Upon request from a customer that agrees to pay the cost of the smart meter at the time of the request.

(ii) In new building construction.

(iii) In accordance with a depreciation schedule not to exceed 15 years.

66 Pa. C.S. § 2807(f)(2)(emphasis added). The use of the word “shall” in the statute indicates the General Assembly’s direction that all customers will receive a smart meter. Furthermore, there is no provision in the statute that allows customers to “opt out” of smart meter installation, as the Lichts desire.

Nor do the Commission’s Orders implementing this provision of Act 129 or Met-Ed’s specific implementation plan allow customers to “opt out” of smart meter installation. The Commission believes that it was the intent of the General Assembly to require all covered electric distribution companies to deploy smart meters system-wide when it included a requirement for smart meter deployment in accordance with a depreciation schedule not to exceed 15 years. *See, e.g., Smart Meter Procurement and Installation Implementation Order*, Docket No. M-2009-2092655 (entered June 24, 2009). The Commission’s Order does not have a provision for customers to “opt out” of the smart meter installation.

Nor have the Lichts presented any evidence supporting any other argument that warrants granting their complaint. In their complaint, the Lichts raised issues regarding health, safety, privacy, cyber security and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Yet, the Lichts provided no evidence on these issues at the hearing. The Lichts did not raise any concerns regarding health issues, aside from Mr. Licht’s passing reference after he completed his testimony that he has a pacemaker and was told not to stand in front of microwaves. Tr. 23. As Mr. Ahr testified, the smart meters are safe. Tr. 28-29. Likewise, Ms. Licht’s concerns regarding a lack of surge protector and the ability to control her appliances were effectively rebutted by Mr. Ahr’s testimony that the smart meters have their own internal surge protectors. Tr. 28. Mr. Ahr has worked for FirstEnergy for 35 years and is the subject matter expert for Met-Ed regarding smart meters. He testified that he is responsible for all the regulatory

proceedings associated with the development and approval of the smart meter deployment plan and he has been involved in all aspects of approval of the plan before the Commission. Tr. 26. As a result, Mr. Ahr's testimony will be given substantial weight when compared to the testimony of the Lichts. When weighed against Mr. Ahr's testimony, the testimony of the Lichts is insufficient to sustain their complaint.

When balancing the evidence of record in this case, it is clear that the Lichts have failed to meet their burden of proof that they should not be required to have a smart meter installed at their home. *See, Se-Ling Hosiery, supra*, ("Burden of proof" means a duty to establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence, or evidence more convincing, by even the smallest degree, than the evidence presented by the other party). This is particularly true given the burden associated with smart meter cases, as discussed above, that, in smart meter-related matters, the Commission has held that "[t]he Complainant will have the burden of proof during the proceeding to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the utility] is responsible or accountable for the problem described in the Complaint." *Kreider, supra*. The Lichts have raised several general concerns that they believe to be true with regard to smart meters but have not provided substantial evidence to support their arguments. The evidence presented by the Lichts is essentially comprised of their own perceptions and opinions. Such arguments are outweighed by the testimony of Met-Ed's witness based on his 35 years working in the industry and significant involvement in the deployment of smart meters. As a result, the Lichts' arguments must be rejected.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Lichts' argument that Met-Ed has violated the Public Utility Code, a Commission order or regulation or a Commission-approved tariff of the company by seeking to install a smart meter at their residence will be rejected. The Lichts have failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that Met-Ed's installation of a smart meter will violate the Public Utility Code, a Commission order or regulation or a Commission-approved tariff of the company.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Commission has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this proceeding. 66 Pa.C.S. § 701.

2. Section 332(a) of the Public Utility Code provides that the party seeking relief from the Commission has the burden of proof. 66 Pa.C.S. § 332(a).

3. A complainant must show that the named utility is responsible or accountable for the problem described in the complaint in order to prevail. Patterson v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 72 Pa. PUC 196 (1990).

4. "Burden of proof" means a duty to establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence, or evidence more convincing, by even the smallest degree, than the evidence presented by the other party. Se-Ling Hosiery v. Margulies, 364 Pa. 54, 70 A.2d 854 (1950).

5. The offense must be a violation of the Public Utility Code, the Commission's regulations or an outstanding order of the Commission. 66 Pa.C.S. § 701.

6. If a complainant establishes a *prima facie* case, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the utility. If a utility does not rebut that evidence, the complainant will prevail. If the utility rebuts the complainant's evidence, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts back to the complainant, who must rebut the utility's evidence by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of going forward with the evidence may shift from one party to another, but the burden of proof never shifts; it always remains on a complainant. Milkie v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 768 A.2d 1217 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001); *see also*, Burleson v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 443 A.2d 1373 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1982).

7. The decision of the Commission must be supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.

8. "Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. More is required than a mere trace of evidence or a suspicion of the existence of a fact sought to be established. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 109, 413 A.2d 1037 (1980); Erie Resistor Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 194 Pa.Super. 278, 166 A.2d 96 (1961); and Murphy v. Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare, White Haven Center, 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 23, 480 A.2d 382 (1984).

9. A person must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that an electric and magnetic field exposure actually causes adverse health effects. Letter of Notification of Phila. Elec. Co. Relative to the Reconstructing and Rebuilding of the Existing 138 kV Line to Operate as the Woodbourne-Heaton 230 kV Line in Montgomery and Bucks Counties, 1992 Pa. PUC Lexis 160, at *211 (June 29, 1992) (Initial Decision).

10. In smart meter-related matters, the complainant will have the burden of proof during the proceeding to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the utility is responsible or accountable for the problem described in the Complaint. Kreider v. PECO Energy Co., Docket No. P-2015-2495064, p. 18 (Order entered Sept. 3, 2015).

11. Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe and reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations, substitutions, extensions and improvements in or to such service and facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees and the public. 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501.

12. Personal opinions or perceptions do not constitute substantial evidence sufficient to permit a complainant to sustain their burden of proof. Kirby v. PPL Electric Utilities Corporation, Docket No. C-20066297 (Final Order entered November 16, 2006) (citing, Pa. Bureau of Corrections v. City of Pittsburgh, 532 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1987)).

13. Electric distribution companies shall furnish smart meter technology as follows: (i) upon request from a customer that agrees to pay the cost of the smart meter at the

time of the request; (ii) in new building construction; and (iii) in accordance with a depreciation schedule not to exceed 15 years. 66 Pa. C.S. §2807(f)(2).

14. The Commission has concluded that it was the intent of the General Assembly to require all covered electric distribution companies to deploy smart meters system-wide when it included a requirement for smart meter deployment in accordance with a depreciation schedule not to exceed 15 years. Smart Meter Procurement and Installation Implementation Order, Docket No. M-2009-2092655 (entered June 24, 2009).

15. The Lichts have failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that Met-Ed has violated the Public Utility Code, a Commission order or regulation or a Commission-approved tariff of the company with regard to installing a smart meter at their home.

ORDER

THEREFORE,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That the formal complaint filed by Thomas and Linda Licht against Metropolitan Edison Company on August 14, 2018 at docket number C-2018-3004078 is hereby denied.
2. That this matter be marked closed.

Date: July 30, 2020

_____/s/
Joel H. Cheskis
Deputy Chief Administrative Law Judge