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September 3, 2025

**VIA ELECTRONIC FILING**

Matthew L. Homsher, Secretary  
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission  
Commonwealth Keystone Building  
400 North Street, Filing Room  
Harrisburg, PA 17120

RE: Monroe Energy, LLC, Lucknow-Highspire Terminals, LLC, Sheetz, Inc. and PBF Holding Company LLC v. Laurel Pipe Line Company, L.P.; Docket No. C-2025-3053018; **MONROE ENERGY, LLC, LUCKNOW-HIGHSPIRE TERMINALS, LLC, SHEETZ, INC., AND PBF HOLDING COMPANY LLC BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW AND ANSWER TO A MATERIAL QUESTION**

Dear Secretary Homsher:

Enclosed for filing with the Commission is the Complainants' Brief in Support of Petition for Interlocutory Review and Answer to a Material Question in the above-captioned matter. Copies of the Brief have been served in accordance with the attached Certificate of Service.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact my office.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Todd S. Stewart", is written over a large, stylized blue scribble that extends across the signature line and into the text below.

Todd S. Stewart  
*Counsel for Monroe Energy, LLC*

TSS/jld

Enclosure

cc: Administrative Law Judge Eranda Vero (via electronic mail – [evero@pa.gov](mailto:evero@pa.gov))  
Per Certificate of Service


**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I have this day served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the parties, listed below, in accordance with the requirements of 52 Pa. Code § 1.54 (relating to service by a party).

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Todd S. Stewart

DATED: September 3, 2025

**BEFORE THE  
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**

Monroe Energy, LLC, Lucknow-Highspire	:	
Terminals, LLC, Sheetz, Inc. and PBF	:	
Holding Company, LLC,	:	
	:	Docket No. C-2025-3053018
Complainants,	:	
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
Laurel Pipe Line Company, L.P.	:	
	:	
Respondent.	:	

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**BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION  
FOR INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW AND ANSWER TO A MATERIAL QUESTION**

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**TO THE HONORABLE, THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION:**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Monroe Energy, LLC, Lucknow-Highspire Terminals, LLC, Sheetz, Inc., and PBF Holding Company LLC (“Complainants”) and hereby submit this Brief in Support of their Petition for Interlocutory Review and Answer to a Material Question, submitted August 26, 2025, in the above-captioned matter, pursuant to 52 Pa. Code § 5.302. Granting the Petition is necessary to prevent an irreparable denial of due process occasioned by the imposition of a procedural schedule in this matter that does not provide sufficient time between the submission of Respondent, Laurel Pipe Line Company, L.P.’s (“Laurel”) Rebuttal Testimony and the hearing dates for Complainants to conduct any meaningful discovery of the Laurel testimony prior to being required to cross examine the Laurel witnesses at the hearing. Prior to submitting its Rebuttal Testimony Laurel served 15 separate sets of discovery, several hundred interrogatories in total, and so it can be surmised that its Rebuttal Testimony will be similarly robust.

At the time the procedural schedule was issued, Laurel was proposing that an entire hearing on this matter, with only “live” testimony, should only take a few days. Now it is not clear whether the four scheduled days will be sufficient – depending on how many witnesses Laurel decides to present. What is clear is that the procedural schedule imposed by the ALJ, even as revised, does not provide sufficient time for needed discovery. Without adequate time to prepare for hearings, including testing the basis of Laurel’s case, the Complainants will be disadvantaged compared to the nearly 7 weeks that were allotted to Laurel to conduct discovery after the submission of Complainants’ Direct Testimony on July 15.

## **II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

1. On January 21, 2025, Complainants filed a Formal Complaint (“Complaint”) against Laurel before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“Commission”) alleging that Laurel is: 1) providing the Complainants with unreasonable service in violation of 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 and its Commission-approved tariff; and 2) circumventing Commission jurisdiction in violation of 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102 and 1302. The Complaint was in response to Buckeye, Laurel’s affiliate, filing a Petition for Declaratory Order with FERC seeking to bypass the Commission by seeking FERC approval for service changes that would require Laurel to extend bi-directional service on its pipeline eastwards from Eldorado to Sinking Spring.

2. As relief, the Complaint requests that the Commission find that Laurel's proposed expansion of bi-directional service to include the 720 and 724 pipeline segments violates (i) Laurel’s existing Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) and 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501, which requires jurisdictional public utilities like Laurel to provide service that is reasonably continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or delay, (ii) 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 1302 and 1303, which require public utilities like Laurel to maintain, file and adhere to tariffs that reflect service offerings and rules

associated with service and are modified pursuant to the tariff review process when service is changed; and (iii) Chapter 11 of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Code, 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 101 *et seq.* (the Code) because Laurel must make the appropriate filings with and obtain the approval of this Commission to implement bi-directional transportation on the 720 and 724 pipeline segments because such proposal constitutes a partial abandonment of Laurel's existing east-to-west tariffed intrastate petroleum products transportation service between Sinking Spring and Eldorado, Pennsylvania.

3. On February 11, 2025, Laurel filed an Answer and New Matter to the Complaint as well as Preliminary Objections thereto. In its Preliminary Objections, Laurel sought to dismiss the Complaint because the Commission lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested, and because the Complainants failed to state a claim against Laurel.

4. The Complainants filed their answer to the preliminary objections on February 21, 2025, and their Answer to New Matter on March 3, 2025.

5. By Order dated April 21, 2025, Presiding Administrative Law Judge, Eranda Vero, issued an Order Overruling Laurel's Preliminary Objections.

6. A Notice was issued by the Commission on April 23, 2025, setting this matter for hearing before ALJ Vero on June 12, 2025. After communication between the parties and ALJ Vero concerning the hearing, a Prehearing Conference was held on May 9, 2025. During the Conference, the parties could not agree on a litigation schedule. In response, ALJ Vero instructed to parties to either come to an agreement or to notify her of each party's position and she would decide. The Parties were unable to agree on a schedule and, as directed by the ALJ, submitted separate proposed schedules and written rationales to the ALJ. Following receipt of the parties' proposals, ALJ Vero, by Order Establishing Litigation Schedule issued May 21, 2025, directed the

parties to comply with a litigation schedule with Complainants Direct testimony due on July 15, 2025, Laurel's Rebuttal testimony due on August 29, 2025, and hearings scheduled to begin eleven (11) days later on September 9-12, 2025. No provision was made for Surrebuttal testimony.

7. On May 5, 2025, Complainants issued their Set I discovery to Laurel, consisting of 108 interrogatories and requests for admission. On the same day, Laurel issued its Set I discovery to Complainants, consisting of 182 Interrogatories and 68 requests for admission.

8. On July 10, 2025, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued an order holding Buckeye's Petition for Declaratory Relief proceeding, at FERC Docket No. OR25-6-000, in abeyance until the conclusion of the instant case before the Commission.

9. On July 15, 2025, the Complainants served the Direct Testimony of five witnesses. Since that time, Laurel has served each Complainant with discovery sets II-IV in addition to separate sets I-IV directed at Complainant's expert witnesses. In total Laurel issued to Complainants, separately and collectively, 15 sets of interrogatories on Complainants' testimony exceeding 500 questions. This is in addition to the 250 questions and requests for admission issued by Laurel in advance of Complainants' Direct Testimony.

10. On August 5, 2025, Complainants inadvertently filed a motion seeking to modify the procedural schedule. This motion was immediately withdrawn on August 6, 2025 via a Petition to Seek Leave to Withdraw Motion, which stated that Complainants seek to withdraw the filed motion, without prejudice, in order to confer with Laurel on the procedural issues raised in the motion and seek further relief as may be necessary.

11. On August 15, 2025, after further discussing concerns with the procedural schedule with counsel for Laurel, the Complainants filed and served the instant Motion to Modify the Procedural Schedule ("Motion"), seeking to adjust the hearing dates in particular, to permit the

Complainants to conduct discovery after the submission of Laurel's case-in-chief, on August 29, 2025. There have been no modifications to the discovery rules in this matter and under the 20 day response period provided for in Section 5.342(d), Laurel's responses to discovery issued at the earliest possible date, September 2, 2025, would allow the responses to be served on September 22, 2025, which would be a full ten days after the end of the last day of hearings scheduled.

12. On August 20, 2025, Laurel answered the Complainant's Petition and demanded that any order extending the hearing schedule be accompanied by an order allowing Laurel to proceed with the expansion of bi-directional service that is at the heart of this matter no later than November 1, 2025, without Commission approval. Laurel opposed any modification to the procedural schedule and claimed that Complainants were merely seeking to delay the process, which is not true.

13. On August 21, 2025, Complainants submitted a Motion for Leave to File an Answer and Answer to Laurel's Answer. In the response, Complainant's addressed the need for the expanded hearing schedule as being that under the status quo, Complainants, who bear the burden of proof will have the burden of preparing for 4 days of hearings with no ability to conduct discovery on Laurel's case in chief, when Laurel had nearly two months to conduct discovery, and did, to the tune of 15 sets of interrogatories totaling more than 500 requests.

14. On Friday, August 22, 2025, ALJ Vero circulated an email request for times for a telephonic prehearing conference to discuss the hearing schedule, which took place on August 25, 2025. At that prehearing conference, ALJ Vero declined to acknowledge that Complainants required discovery of Laurel's case in chief in order to provide fairness in the process and refused to extend the schedule beyond cancelling the first day of hearings (September 9, 2025) and adding an additional day on the end of the schedule. (September 15, 2025). ALJ Vero did agree to adjust

the discovery timelines, but it does not appear that she is prepared to provide Complainants with more than a single day to review and incorporate Laurel’s responses into its cross and any rejoinder testimony of its witnesses, to the extent that Laurel does not object to significant numbers of requests – for whatever reason. The ALJ allowed the parties just a single business day following receipt of Laurel’s Rebuttal Testimony to issue any discovery and directed Laurel to respond to such discovery by September 9, 2025, a mere day before commencement of evidentiary hearings on September 10, 2025. In total, the schedule from Complainants’ receipt of Laurel’s Rebuttal Testimony until commencement of hearings was set as follows:

<b>Current Schedule from Rebuttal Through Hearings</b>	
Laurel’s Rebuttal Testimony	August 29, 2025
Complainants’ Discovery Requests	September 2, 2025, at noon.
Laurel’s Objections to Discovery Requests	September 3, 2025, but may come in even after 4:30 p.m
Complainants’ Motions to Compel	September 5, 2025
Laurel’s Answer to Motion to Compel	September 8, 2025.
Laurel’s Responses to Complainant’s Discovery	September 9, 2025
Evidentiary Hearings	September 10, 2025

15. As set forth below, the current schedule, which affords Complainants one business day to issue discovery on Laurel's Rebuttal and less than 24 hours to review responses to such discovery prior to hearings, substantially prejudices Complainants, particularly where Laurel was afforded more than 50 days to issue discovery on Complainants Direct Testimony.

### III. LEGAL STANDARD

The standards for interlocutory review are well established. Section 5.302(a) of the Commission's Regulations, 52 Pa. Code § 5.302(a), requires that a petition "state . . . the compelling reasons why interlocutory review will prevent substantial prejudice or expedite the conduct of the proceeding." The pertinent consideration is whether interlocutory review is necessary in order to prevent substantial prejudice -- that is, the error and any prejudice flowing therefrom could not be satisfactorily cured during [\*11] the normal Commission review process. *Joint Application of Bell Atlantic Corp. and GTE Corp.*, Docket No. A-310200F0002, et al.<sup>1</sup> While the Commission generally does not grant interlocutory review of scheduling decisions, if such decision has the impact on a party that cannot be subsequently cured, the Commission will engage. If such a scheduling decision impacts a party's due process rights, the Commission must act. In *Mindy Jaye Zied and Binnie A. Zied v. PECO Energy Company*, Docket No. P-2015-252047, the Commission recognized its obligation to grant interlocutory review on a request affecting the presentation of the Complainants' "entire case and any testimony and exhibits" as necessary to protect the due process rights of all parties. In *Hess v. Pa. PUC*, 107 A.3d 246, 266 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), the Commonwealth Court affirmed that the Commission is "bound by the due process provisions of constitutional law and by the principles of common fairness." Among such due process requirements are "notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issues, to be apprised

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<sup>1</sup> *West Goshen Twp. v. Sunoco Pipeline, L.P.*, C-2017-2589346 (Order entered March 15, 2018) slip. op at 10-11.

of the evidence submitted, to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal.”

In *In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury*, 649 Pa. 574, 197 A.3d 712 (Pa. 2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed that the amount of process that is due in any particular circumstance must be determined by application of the three-part balancing test first established in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). *Id.* at 717. This balancing test considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state. *Id.*<sup>2</sup>

#### **IV. ARGUMENT**

The crux of eligibility for interlocutory review of a material question is that petitioner must demonstrate that the error, in this case the failure to provide adequate time to conduct discovery. The discovery in question is to be directed to the testimony of four witnesses that will testify on behalf of Laurel. Complainants will have to promulgate the questions within mere hours of having received the testimony and will have the responses to these interrogatories for a single day prior to the commencement of hearings under the ALJ’s order.

The three-part test endorsed by the Supreme Court in *Friends of Devito* clearly indicates that additional time is required to ensure the provision of adequate due process. In this case, the private interests involve the interest of Laurel to implement bi-directional service on a substantially larger section of the Laurel Pipeline, and for the Complainants it is the desire to ensure that any such change complies with the law because they believe that such bi-directional service has been

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<sup>2</sup> *Friends of Devito v. Wolf*, 658 Pa. 165, 207, 227 A.3d 872, 897, 2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987, \*54. (“*Friends of Devito*”).

and will be detrimental to their legitimate business interests. The act of not providing adequate time to prepare their case has a high degree of probability of causing harm to the Complainants that cannot be subsequently remedied. The only way to ensure that due process is provided and Complainants do not suffer substantial prejudice is to allow sufficient time as Complainants requested in their Motion to the ALJ. For Laurel the cost is the passage of a few additional weeks before an initial decision in this matter is rendered that could fundamentally and perhaps permanently alter the operation of Laurel's PUC-regulated pipeline. Finally, the state's interest is nominal. At the time the ALJ rejected the request to extend the schedule, there were available dates in her schedule that would have allowed Complainants sufficient time, with a minor disruption, but she was unwilling to provide any relief beyond allowing a single additional day for Complainants to conduct and process discovery after receiving Laurel's case-in-chief. This disparity in allowable discovery is itself a violation of due process and fundamental fairness. Allowing respondent Laurel 7 weeks and the party with the burden of proof a single week – that includes a holiday weekend – is neither balanced nor fair.

The only safeguard that protects the due process rights of all parties and does not cause immediate harm to any party is to extend the procedural schedule. But the ALJ appears to have ruled out that possibility as early as her initial decision on the litigation schedule in May; "I said the October date is too far down the road, it's unacceptable." (Tr. 81:12-13). Indeed, much of the ALJ's basis for denying Complainants' Motion derives from an impression that the Motion was untimely, as the ALJ claimed Complainants never challenged her initial schedule determination. However, Complainants vigorously argued for an extended litigation schedule at the initial Prehearing Conference in May, requesting that the ALJ hold hearings in November to allow

adequate time for discovery, testimony, and hearings.<sup>3</sup> The ALJ rejected Complainants proposed schedule and imposed an unreasonably compressed schedule. Now, the ALJ argues that Complainants cannot reasonably propose modifications to the schedule because they knew or should have known that they would not have an opportunity for discovery on Laurel's Rebuttal when she initially approved the schedule in May.

This circular reasoning immensely prejudices Complainants. While Complainants were clearly aware of the unreasonableness of the initial schedule, having vigorously supported a longer procedural schedule at the initial Prehearing Conference, Complainants reasonably proceeded under the approved litigation schedule with the expectation that, pursuant to Section 5.103 of the Commission's Regulations, they reserved the right to file a Motion to amend the procedural schedule as may become necessary. 52 Pa. Code § 5.103 ("a motion may be made in writing at any any time...")<sup>4</sup>. Accordingly, even if the Commission concurs with the ALJ that Complainants should have filed the Motion at an earlier date, the balance of harm of extending the schedule by a matter of weeks versus the tremendous and prejudicial results of the current schedule favor granting Complainants requested relief.

Notably, there is no statutory deadline requiring the Commission to adjudicate this Complaint by a date certain. Accordingly, while Complainants understand the Commission's interest in efficient regulatory processes, the state interest here remains minimal in comparison to the due process rights at issue. Unfortunately, when presented with these arguments on the Motion, the ALJ continued to support the schedule affording Complainants no time for discovery on

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<sup>3</sup> The reference to proposed October hearings at Tr. 76:11 (referencing the schedule initially proposed by Complainants in May, was in error and should have referred to proposed November hearings.

<sup>4</sup> Complainants additionally note that counsel for Laurel indicated at the second Prehearing Conference that the Complainants Motion was an attempt to seek untimely reconsideration of an Order. (Tr. 79:2-9). This argument should be disregarded as Petitions for Reconsideration are applicable only to Commission Orders or non-ALJ staff Orders. 52 Pa. Code §§ 5.44, 5.572.

Laurel's Rebuttal testimony. On one hand, the ALJ advised Complainants that the schedule was intentionally developed, stating "I thought very hard when I made that litigation schedule and want to stick to it." (Tr. 85:23-25). At the same time, the ALJ appeared to conflate the time for discovery in advance of testimony with the Complainants' concerns over a lack of time for discovery on Laurel's pre-served testimony. When Complainants attempted to outline the disparity in the schedule, the ALJ rejected the notion of any disparity, saying: "I don't see where your discovery period was shorter than Laurel's". (Tr. 71:14-15). In doing so, the presiding ALJ focused on the total time allowable for discovery from the date of the Complaint filing, while ignoring that the ability to issue discovery necessary to fully develop a record is limited prior to review of a party's case in chief, which in this case was made by Laurel in its Rebuttal Testimony (as only the Complainants submitted Direct Testimony). As a result, the ALJ concurred with the general principle adduced by the Complainants, stating "I believe that you should rightfully be entitled to the same discovery period," but misunderstood the critical difference between discovery on the pleadings and discovery on the evidence presented by parties through pre-served written testimony, opining that Complainants "should have conducted discovery since January." (Tr. 74:22-23, 81:5-6). Complainants aver that this misunderstanding created the substantially prejudicial outcome where Complainants receive ten (10) days between service of Laurel's testimony and the first day of hearings to conduct discovery and prepare for hearing, while Laurel had nearly sixty (60) days to conduct discovery after receiving Complainants' testimony.

Rather than address the root prejudice of the circumstances, the ALJ focused on a perception that Complainants failed to seek appropriately prompt relief following her initial development of the litigation schedule. However, at the same time, the ALJ also gave credence to the very thought process that gave Complainants pause about presenting the Motion earlier in the

proceedings, i.e., recognizing that the record from which to claim that the additional time was needed was not available. During the August 25 Prehearing Conference, the ALJ indicated that the Complainants could not yet know whether discovery would be needed on Laurel's Rebuttal, stating "Well how do you know you questions to ask? They haven't filed anything, for one thing. And the other thing is, why didn't this dawn on you earlier?" (Tr. 72:19-22). This question places Complainants between a proverbial rock and a hard place, as the request for relief from a prejudicial schedule was deemed both too early and too late.

As stated above, the unreasonableness of the original schedule was clear to Complainants, from May, but neither the prejudicial consequences of the schedule nor the factual basis to support a Motion to Amend the procedural schedule became manifest until Complainants could refer to the record of multiple rounds of discovery that Laurel had propounded upon Complainants as support for the expectation of dense Rebuttal Testimony. Further, Laurel had previously informed Complainants that it would sponsor two fact witnesses for these proceedings. At the August 25, 2025 second prehearing conference, Laurel advised Complainants, for the first time, that the number of witnesses sponsoring testimony had been increased to four. The Complainants appreciate that the ALJ, upon review of this new information, made some effort to modify the procedural schedule to move hearings back one day, from September 9, 10, 11, 12 to September 10, 11, 12 and 15. It is clear that the ALJ desired to respect the views of the parties to a certain extent. However, this consideration was not sufficient to correct the substantial prejudice imposed on Complainants.

As it turns out, Laurel has submitted four pieces of testimony totaling more than two hundred pages with exhibits far more expansive, and while Complainants were able to serve two sets of discovery over a holiday weekend, they will have but a single day to review and figure out


how to use what answers are provided by Laurel. There is no fairness, no level playing field in that result, and if the case proceeds to hearing without more time, the harm will be irreparable later. No appeal will be able to repair the record.

**V. CONCLUSION**

The notion of due process may be flexible, but in some cases, it clearly dictates a result of fairness to all parties. The result here, without intervention from the Commission will be a decided lack of fairness, which can be corrected now, before the harm becomes irreparable.

**WHEREFORE**, for all the foregoing reasons, the Commission should answer the Material Question, reverse the presiding ALJ's denial of Complainants' Motion to Amend Procedural Schedule, and take any other action deemed necessary to resolve the above-captioned proceeding.

Respectfully submitted,



DATED: September 3, 2025

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